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INTRODUCTION
Two thousand and three was the year of recording industry litiga-
tion. For the first time, the industry filed lawsuits against individual end-
users whom it suspected of illegally trading music. In April, the major
record labels filed high-profile lawsuits against four college students who
ran file-sharing engines that allowed fellow students to download copy-
righted songs. 1 Five months later, the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA"), the trade group that represents the five major labels
and other smaller member companies, launched frill-fledged battles
against individuals suspected of swapping music without authorization
via peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks, 2 such as Grokster, iMesh, KaZaA,
and Morpheus. Hundreds of lawsuits were filed,3 thousands of subpoe-
nas were issued, 4  and countless people-innocent or otherwise-
received the trade group's notorious cease-and-desist letters. 5 These
1. Frank Ahrens, 4 Students Sued over Music Sites, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2003, at El;
Jon Healey, Students Hit with Song Piracy Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at C 1.
2. P2P networks are computer networks that allow individual end-users to communicate
with each other without using a centralized server. For a brief discussion of the operation of
P2P networks, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1158-60 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). See generally PEER-TO-PEER:
HARNESSING THE BENEFITS OF A DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY (Andy Oram ed., 2001) [herein-
after PEER-TO-PEER].
3. Amy Harmon, 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at
Al [hereinafter Harmon, 261 Lawsuits Filed].
4. SBC Online Music Case Moved to Washington, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at C3 (re-
porting that the RIAA has issued thousands of subpoenas since spring 2003).
5. Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters, CNET NEWS.COM (May
13, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-1001319.html; see also Declan McCullagh;
RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, CNET NEWS.COM (May 12, 2003), at http://news.
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strong-arm tactics have alienated many of the industry's customers and
political supporters6 and, to some extent, have backfired by driving unau-
thorized copying underground.7 Digital piracy remains rampant today,
and billions of music files are traded every month. 8
Since the beginning of the P2P file-sharing controversy, com-
mentators have discussed the radical expansion of copyright law, 9
the recording industry's controversial enforcement tactics, 10 the
need for new legislative and business models, 11 the changing social
com.com/2100-1025-1001095.html. For a discussion of take-down notices, see infra text ac-
companying notes 35-46.
6. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 442-43 (2003).
7. See id. at 443.
8. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907
(2004) [hereinafter Yu, Escalating Copyright Wars].
9. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS
IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the recent expansion of intellectual property
laws have stifled creativity and innovation); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001)
(detailing the expansion of copyright laws in the past two centuries); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT
THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) [hereinafter VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS] (describing how the increasing corporate control over the use of software,
digital music, images, films, books and academic materials has steered copyright law away
from its original design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy); James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 33 [hereinafter Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement] (describing
the recent expansion of intellectual property laws as "the second enclosure movement").
10. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297
(2003).
11. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 79-83 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA] (discuss-
ing the business models and technological protection mechanisms that can be used to address
the digital piracy problem); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004) (proposing to set up a governmentally
administered system that rewards copyright holders for commercial and noncommercial uses);
Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?,
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2004) (proposing to establish a system that distributes rewards
based on a virtual market); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (pro-
posing to impose statutory levies on Internet service subscriptions and the sales of computer,
audio, and video equipment); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership:
Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121 (2003) [hereinafter Zim-
merman, Authorship Without Ownership] (discussing the Street Performer Protocol); Jessica
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Litman,
Sharing and Stealing] (offering a proposal that combines blanket fees or levies, digital rights
management, and an opt-out mechanism that allows copyright holders to withhold music from
the system); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 673 (2003) (proposing to revamp the copyright system by embracing the doctrine of
derivative work independence and by consolidating all exclusive rights under existing copy-
right law into a single "right to commercially exploit" copyrighted expressions); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
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norms, 12 and the evolving interplay of politics and market condi-
tions. 13 Although these discussions have delved into the many as-
pects of the controversy, none of them presents a big picture of the
issues or explains how they fit within the larger file-sharing debate.
That is the task of this Article, which takes a holistic approach to
bring together existing scholarship while offering some thoughts on
the future of private copying. The Article does not seek to advance
a new theory or model, which could quickly become obsolete, given
the rapid advance of digital and P2P technologies. Rather, it pro-
vides guidelines to help policymakers to craft an effective solution
to the unauthorized copying problem.
Part I of this Article traces the major developments in copyright law
in 2003. Since the emergence of the Internet, the recording industry has
employed five different strategies to alleviate the threat created by digital
technology: lobbying, litigation, self-help, education, and licensing. Al-
though the industry has used a combination of these strategies over the
years, it focused primarily on litigation and licensing in 2003. Part I de-
tails the industry's enforcement tactics and the various legal setbacks the
industry suffered at the end of that year. It also discusses the ninety-
nine-cent-song business model pioneered by the iTunes Music Store,
launched by Apple Computer in April 2003.
Part II focuses on the aftermath of the 2003 P2P file-sharing wars
and outlines challenges the entertainment industry will face in the next
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813 (2001) (discussing the benefit of private file
sharing and contending that a levy-based approach would be preferable to a strong encryption-
based approach if the harm of private copying were to be addressed); Neil W. Netanel, Impose
a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1 (2003) [hereinafter Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy] (offering a blueprint for the estab-
lishment of a "noncommercial use levy"); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED,
Mar. 1994, at 84 (discussing the obsolescence of intellectual property law in the digital world),
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html; Esther Dyson,
Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136 (contending that it will be more efficient to dis-
tribute content free-of-charge and charge for follow-up services instead), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.07/dyson.html; ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A BETTER
WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING OF MUSIC FILE SHARING (2004)
[hereinafter EFF WHITE PAPER] (recommending that the recording industry adopt a voluntary
collective licensing model similar to the one used by radio stations today), available at
http://www.eff.org/share/collective-lic wp.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emer-
gence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505 (2003) (discussing
the change of social norms in light of the proliferation of file-sharing technologies).
13. See, e.g., DEBORA J. HALBERT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE: THE POLITICS OF ExPANDING OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 78-81 (1999); G. Prem Premkumar,
Alternative Distribution Strategies for Digital Music, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2003, at 89 (discuss-
ing possible distribution strategies for digital music and their implications for the political in-
terplay of consumers, artists and songwriters, record companies, and retailers).
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few years. Section A discusses challenges within the United States-the
proliferation of new P2P technologies, the increasingly transnational na-
ture of the copyright wars, the decreasing support the industry receives
from its customers and political allies, and the counterattacks and set-
backs the industry is likely to suffer as a result of its aggressive tactics.
Section B highlights international challenges, including the heightened
tension between the United States and less developed countries, the se-
vere criticisms of U.S. copyright policy in foreign countries, and the di-
version of public attention from domestic copyright issues. Section C
explores the spread of the P2P file-sharing wars from record companies
to other media industries. It suggests that the publishing, television, and
motion picture industries may adopt less confrontational strategies be-
cause of their differing structures and the lessons they may have learned
from the recording industry.
Part III brings together the many proposals that commentators have
put forward to solve the unauthorized copying problem. It categorizes
them according to their underlying models and enforcement techniques
and highlights their advantages and limitations. In particular, Part III
critically evaluates eight categories of proposals: (1) mass licensing, (2)
compulsory licensing, (3) voluntary collective licensing, (4) voluntary
contribution, (5) technological protection, (6) copyright law revision, (7)
administrative dispute resolution proceeding, and (8) alternative compen-
sation. Acknowledging the provisional nature of these proposals, this
Part contends that policymakers need to adopt a range of solutions-both
short- and long-term-if they are to address the unauthorized copying
problem.
Part IV challenges policymakers and commentators to step outside
their mental boundaries to rethink the P2P file-sharing debate. By pre-
senting thought experiments that compare the ongoing P2P file-sharing
wars to (1) a battle for self-preservation between humans and machines,
(2) an imaginary World War III, and (3) the conquest of Generation Y,
this Part demonstrates that policymakers should not focus on legal solu-
tions alone. Instead, they should pay more attention to market forces,
technological architectures, and social norms, which also play very im-
portant roles in crafting an effective solution to the unauthorized copying
problem. The Article concludes by offering some guidelines that may
point the way to this solution.
2005]
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I. THE 2003 COPYRIGHT WARS
In 1999, the recording industry was growing at an annual rate of
over six percent, totaling $14.6 billion in business. 14 After the emer-
gence of Napster and P2P file sharing, however, CD sales plunged by
more than six percent in 2001, nearly nine percent in 2002, and slightly
more than seven percent in 2003.15 To stem its losses, the industry has
employed five different strategies: lobbying, litigation, self-help, educa-
tion, and licensing. 16 In 2003, however, the industry focused its efforts
primarily on litigation and licensing. 17
The year started off with a ruling favoring the recording industry.
In January 2003, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California ruled that KaZaA's parent company, Sharman Networks,
could be sued for copyright infringement in the United States. 18 Head-
quartered in Australia and incorporated in the South Pacific tax haven of
Vanuatu, Sharman Networks claimed that it did not have substantial con-
tacts with California and thus should not be subject to the court's juris-
14. Jefferson Graham et al., Hammering Away at Piracy, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at
ID.
15. RIAA, The Recording Industry Association of America's 2003 Yearend Statistics,
available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/2003yearEnd.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2005). But see SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE CLASH
BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE
SYSTEM 44 (2004) [hereinafter VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY] (noting
that "[record] sales and revenues in 2003 were comparable to 1997, suggesting that the mas-
sive sales increase in 1998, 1999, and 2000 may be the anomaly"); FELIX OBERHOLZER &
KOLEMAN STRUMPF, THE EFFECT OF FILE SHARING ON RECORD SALES: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS (2004) (showing that file sharing has only had a limited effect on record sales),
available at http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March2004.pdf As Professor
Vaidhyanathan questioned:
Does each downloaded song equal a lost sale? I am not convinced. I would not
consider buying ninety-nine out of one hundred songs I download. Many of them
are garbled, low-quality recordings. Some are partial files. Some turn out to be
lame songs. Mostly, I download songs to see if I want to buy them. I also get songs
I can't buy, for example, out-of-print stuff from cult bands like Too Much Joy or
rare live cuts of "Jersey Girl" sung by Bruce Springsteen and Tom Waits.
Id. at 41-42.
16. See generally Yu, Escalating Copyright Wars, supra note 8.
17. One might include education if one agrees with RIAA President Cary Sherman that
"lawsuits are a very potent form of education." Benny Evangelista, Online Music Finally
Starts to Rock 'n' Roll, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2003, at El (quoting RIAA President Cary
Sherman).
18. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073
(C.D. Cal. 2003), aff/d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004);
see also Declan McCullagh, Judge: Kazaa Can Be Sued in U.S., CNET NEWS.COM (Jan. 10,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-980274.html.
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diction. 19 The court emphatically rejected this argument, observing that
it could hardly be doubted that a company whose software had been
downloaded more than 143 million times by California residents had
"knowingly and purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in California" and had established the required minimum con-
tacts with California residents. 20 The court also found that Sharman
Networks was "at least constructively aware" of the many agreements it
had entered into with users authorizing and limiting the use of the Ka-
ZaA software. 21 Noting that "many, if not most, music and video copy-
rights are owned by California-based companies," 22 the court allowed
the plaintiff copyright holders to proceed with the lawsuit.
Within two weeks, the RIAA obtained another favorable ruling, this
time from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.23
In In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc. ("Verizon ') the RIAA sought to
enforce a subpoena it had served on Verizon, an Internet service provider
("ISP"), in July 2002. That subpoena sought to obtain the identity of a
subscriber who allegedly had used the KaZaA software to make more
than six hundred copyrighted songs available for downloading over the
Internet. 24 Verizon fought enforcement on the grounds that the subpoena
was related to materials transmitted over, rather than stored on, its net-
work, and that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA")
does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting solely as a
conduit for communicating content determined by others.25 The district
court ordered that the subpoena be enforced, and Verizon appealed the
ruling.26
While In re Verizon was on appeal, the major record labels, in April
2003, filed high-profile lawsuits against four college students-two at
Princeton University, one at Michigan Technological University, and one
at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 27 The labels alleged that the students
19. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
20. Id. at 1087 (footnote omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id at 1089.
23. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter Verizon
1], rev'd, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 29.
26. See discussion infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
27. Ahrens, 4 Students Sued over Music Sites, supra note 1; Healey, Students Hit with
Song Piracy Lawsuits, supra note 1. Although Verizon allowed the recording industry to serve
subpoenas on Internet service providers, the record companies did not use the subpoena proc-
ess to obtain identities of these four students. As the Washington Post reported, "the networks
named in the lawsuits are internal college networks, known as local area networks, or LANs,
2005]
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had infringed upon the companies' copyrights by running file-sharing
engines that helped others on campus to share copyrighted songs. The
record companies not only asked the courts for permanent injunctions to
shut down the networks but also sought the maximum statutory damages
afforded by the 1976 Copyright Act-$150,000 for each illegal
download. 28 Such awards could run to billions of dollars, even though
the students did not reap any financial gain from their actions. 29
Although the lawsuits raised public awareness of the illegality of
online file trading, the recording industry soon found itself confronted
with bad publicity and harsh criticism. In less than a month, the labels
settled with the students, each of whom agreed to pay damages that
ranged from $12,000 to $17,500.30 The students did not admit any
wrongdoing but agreed not to infringe or support infringement of copy-
rights owned by the record companies. 31 These settlements were a mile-
stone for the major labels; never before had they recovered money from
individuals they had accused of online piracy.32 Some commentators
applauded the settlement, noting that the damage amounts were "high
enough to catch the attention of file swappers" and intimidate them from
continuing their illegal practices.33 Others, however, predicted that the
and are not seen by the RIAA software. Instead, the RIAA discovered them by reading college
newspapers, in which the LANs are discussed." Ahrens, 4 Students Sued over Music Sites,
supra note 1. As the RIAA noted in its complaints, "[t]he four defendants were chosen be-
cause the RIAA found their sites to be among the most active, enabling thousands of songs to
be freely shared." Id.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2002) (stipulating that "the court in its discretion may in-
crease the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000" in willful in-
fringement cases).
29. Ken Hamner, Entertainment Industry Goes After Little Guy, HARV. CRIMSON, Apr. 9,
2003, at 4 (reporting that the Michigan Technological University student "stored 650,000
songs on his server" and would have been liable for a maximum of $97.5 billion in damages at
$150,000 per song).
30. Jon Healey & P.J. Huffstutter, 4 Pay Steep Price for Free Music, L.A. TIMES, May 2,
2003, at Al.
31. Id.
32. See id (noting that "[t]he settlements mark[ed] the first time the record companies
have recovered money from individuals in the United States accused of piracy on file-sharing
networks").
33. Id. Matthew Oppenheim, the former senior vice president of business and legal af-
fairs for the RIAA, said the settlements were "the right amount given the situation," although
they were well below what the record companies had asked for. Id. Another copyright attor-
ney added, "I'd personally think twice about doing something that would cost me $12,000 to
$17,500 to avoid spending 12 to 15 bucks on the occasional CD." Id. Within six weeks of the
settlement, however, one of the student defendants raised the entire amount of his $12,000 set-
tlement by contributions from supporters over the Internet. Jefferson Graham, Fined Student
Gets Donations to Tune of $12K, USA TODAY, June 25, 2003, at 4D. By the end of 2003, an-
other student had similarly raised two-thirds of the $15,000 he owed the record companies.
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settlements would backfire on the industry by alienating paying custom-
ers who were disgusted by the industry's strong-arm tactics.
34
Following the settlements, the recording industry expanded its en-
forcement practice, sending out countless cease-and-desist letters and
take-down notices. Under section 512 of the DMCA, a representative of
a copyright holder may send a notice, the so-called "take-down notice,"
to an ISP requesting that infringing copyrighted material be removed.
35
Any ISP that "responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to the
material," will be eligible for the provision's safe harbor and thus will
avoid legal liability.36
To seek out information about infringing material, the RIAA has
used automated Web crawlers and other computer programs to scour the
Internet for what it believed to be illegally traded songs. 37 Although
these automated Web crawlers drastically reduced the costs of policing
copyrights, they also yielded false positives that caused the industry pub-
lic embarrassment. For example, during the second week of May 2003,
the RIAA issued an erroneous take-down notice to Speakeasy, a national
broadband provider, alleging that the FTP site of one of its subscribers
illegally offered copyrighted sound files for download.38 According to
the form letter, many of the "approximately 0" files on the Web site
"contain recordings owned by our member companies, including songs
by such artists as Creed."'39 The subscriber's FTP site was not devoted to
Creed or other musicians but focused on the Commodore Amiga com-
puter, collecting "demo" files designed to show off the Amiga's superior
graphic capabilities.40 As the site administrator noted, "There are some
files with the suffix mp3 but there is nothing I could find that I could as-
sociate with any artist that I know of."'4 1
That same week, the RIAA's crawlers confused Peter Usher, a re-
tired professor of astronomy and astrophysics at Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, with Usher Raymond, the best-selling rhythm-and-blues per-
See Daniel Peng, Legal Fees and $15,000 RIAA Settlement, at http://arbomet.org/-danpeng
(last updated July 12, 2004).
34. According to Howard Ende, attorney for defendant Daniel Peng, "This case had very
little to do with [the defendant] and everything to do with the recording industry's attempt to
intimidate Internet users around the country and college students in particular.... They looked
to instill fear, but instead they got fear and loathing." Healey & Huffstutter, supra note 30.
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
36. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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former.42 After the crawler located on the university's departmental
server a directory named "usher" that contained a sound file in MP3 for-
mat, the RIAA sent Professor Usher a cease-and-desist letter. The sus-
pect file, it turned out, was a recording by The Chromatics, an a cappella
group of Penn State astronomers and astrophysicists, of a song about the
Swift gamma ray satellite that Penn State had helped to design. The
RIAA later withdrew the notice and apologized to Professor Usher, of-
fering to send him a compact disc and T-shirt "in appreciation of his un-
derstanding." 43 According to the RIAA, the dozens of faulty copyright
infringement notices that went out during that week were sent by a tem-
porary worker who failed to follow regular protocol to confirm the con-
tent of the suspect files. 44
While this type of problem is unavoidable considering the large
number of unlicensed songs traded on the Internet every day, the current
copyright regime does little to protect innocent individual end-users from
bogus take-down notices. Under the DMCA, the copyright holder will
be liable for damages and attorney's fees if he or she "knowingly materi-
ally misrepresents" information in the notice.45 However, if the holder
has a good-faith belief that material stored on the system infringes on its
copyright, those injured by the faulty notices will have no legal recourse
for compensation. Drafted before the emergence of P2P networks, this
take-down provision was primarily designed to balance the interests of
copyright holders and ISPs. Because the DMCA did not take into ac-
count extensive private copying by individual end-users, it failed to in-
clude any safeguard to protect these users against overreaching by copy-
right holders and their overzealous representatives.
The Penn State incident demonstrates the chilling effect of the take-
down provision. When the university's central computing office re-
ceived the RIAA's letter on May 8, it notified the Department of Astron-
omy and Astrophysics that it would shut down the department's Internet
connection, right in the middle of spring-semester final examinations,
unless the infringing material was removed within forty-eight hours.46
Fortunately, the manager of the departmental server was able to locate
Professor Usher's a cappella MP3 and convince the central computing
office not to shut down the connection. Had he failed, some students in
42. Complaint from Recording Industry Almost Closes Down a Penn State Astronomy
Server, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 23, 2003, at A27 [hereinafter Complaint from Recording
Industry]; see also Editorial, Close Loophole in Copyright Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 6,
2003, at 18A.
43. McCullagh, R/AA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, supra note 5.
44. Id.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 512(0.
46. Complaint from Recording Industry, supra note 42.
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the department would have been unable to take finals or complete other
end-of-term assignments. Research would have come to a halt, and grant
applications for some cutting-edge projects may have been fatally de-
layed. Unfortunately, the DMCA would not have provided any legal re-
dress in any of these scenarios unless the victims could show that the
RIAA had knowingly materially misrepresented information in the take-
down notice.
In late April, the recording industry won a second lawsuit against
Verizon.47 While Verizon was fighting the first subpoena, the RIAA
served a second subpoena on the ISP. This time, Verizon challenged the
subpoena on constitutional grounds, contending that the district court
lacked Article III jurisdiction to issue a subpoena without a pending fed-
eral case or controversy. 48 It also maintained that the subpoena provi-
sion violated the First Amendment rights of Internet users because it
lacked sufficient safeguards to protect users' ability to speak and associ-
ate anonymously. 49 The district court again rejected Verizon's argu-
ments. The court held that the DMCA's subpoena provision, which "as-
signs only a ministerial function" to judicial officers, "presents neither a
danger of encroachment nor some other threat to the institutional integ-
rity and independence of the judiciary."50 Finding that the DMCA pro-
vides adequate First Amendment safeguards, 51 the court refused to quash
the subpoena or stay its execution pending appeal.
52
Taking advantage of the subpoena power granted under the DMCA
and the precedent set by the Verizon cases, the RIAA launched a mass-
litigation campaign against file-swappers who made large numbers of
songs available in P2P networks. 53 By mid-July, the industry had sent
out 871 federal subpoenas, and roughly seventy-five new subpoenas had
been approved every day.54
In September, the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against individuals who
downloaded music illegally via P2P networks. 55 Unlike in April, this
time the industry not only threatened with the stick of litigation but also
dangled the carrot of amnesty. The RIAA offered to forgo suing any in-
47. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter Verizon
11], rev'd, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
48. Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 246-48.
49. Id. at 257.
50. Id. at 256 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 260-64.
52. Id. at 275.
53. See Jefferson Graham, Swap Songs? You May Be on Record Industry's Hit List, USA
TODAY, July 22, 2003, at ID.
54. See Hundreds of Subpoenas in Net Piracy, SEATTLE TIMES, July 19, 2003, at A8.
55. Harmon, 261 Lawsuits Filed, supra note 3.
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dividuals who removed all illegal music files from their computers and
signed an affidavit promising not to download music illegally again.56
On its surface, the RIAA's amnesty program was quite attractive
and creative. In reality, it represented another ineffective, costly, and
disturbing attempt by the recording industry to fight the copyright wars.
The most egregious copyright inflingers were unlikely to participate in
the program, as they typically did not believe, or did not care, that what
they were doing was illegal. The RIAA was likely to end up enlisting
mostly minor offenders in whom the recording industry had limited in-
terest. Moreover, the amnesty program protected its participants only
from suit by the RIAA on behalf of its members, not from suit by repre-
sentatives of other powerful industries, like the movie or software indus-
tries. Nor did the amnesty program shield individuals from civil actions
brought by music publishers and independent labels not represented by
the RIAA and from federal criminal prosecution.57
Even worse from the file-traders' perspective, the participants
would have admitted past illegal file-trading activities by signing the af-
fidavits. If they were to commit any future infringement, no matter how
trivial, the affidavits would provide evidence that the infringement was
willful. 58 The affidavits would also create a potential blacklist of habit-
ual offenders whose online activities the recording industry might moni-
tor.59 Finally, the participants' broad promises to refrain from copying
and posting may have gone beyond what copyright law requires. 60 By
signing the affidavits, the participants therefore may have contractually
given up valuable rights that are available under existing law.
Concerned about these problems, a California resident filed a law-
suit on behalf of the general public of his state, asking the RIAA to shut
down its amnesty program and inform the public that its offer was
56. Information about the RIAA's Clean Slate Program is available at
http://www.musicunited.org. See generally Peter K. Yu, Music Industry Hits Wrong Note
Against Piracy, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 14, 2003, at 13A (criticizing the Clean Slate Program).
57. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Why the RJAA 's "Amnesty" Offer Is a Sham, at
http://www.eff.org/share/amnesty.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
58. See Bill Holland, File Traders May Be Eligible for Amnesty, BILLBOARD, Sept. 13,
2003, at 8 (stating that "[t]hose who renege on their promise [made in the affidavit] could be
referred to the Department of Justice for willful copyright infringement"); Record Labels to
Offer Amnesty Program, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB,, Sept. 6, 2003, at C3 (stating that "Internet
users who continue to copy music online after signing the affidavit could face possible crimi-
nal charges for willful copyright infringement").
59. See Benny Evangelista, RIAA to Offer File Sharers Amnesty, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6,
2003, at BI (stating that it remains unclear as to "what steps the RIAA would take to monitor
and enforce the amnesty agreements").
60. See Record Labels to Offer Amnesty Program, supra note 58 (quoting Gigi Sohn,
president of Public Knowledge, as expressing concern "that people may give up rights they
may have, such as the right to limited sharing").
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"false" and "misleading." 61 In April 2004, the trade group announced
the discontinuation of the controversial program. In a document filed to
dismiss this lawsuit, the RIAA claimed that "the program is no longer
necessary or appropriate" in light of the fact that public awareness of the
illegality of online file trading has increased substantially since the group
launched the individual lawsuits and the amnesty program. 62
From the recording industry's perspective, the many lawsuits it filed
against individual file-swappers were necessary but costly-in financial,
political, and public relations terms. For example, the September law-
suits created difficult cases with sympathetic defendants and wrongfully
sued victims. One of the lawsuits targeted a seventy-one-year-old man
whose teenage grandchildren downloaded music via P2P networks.63
Another went after a twelve-year-old honors student living in public
housing who had paid $29.99 for the KaZaA software and might not
have been able to distinguish between KaZaA and PressPlay or other le-
gal music subscription services. 64 A third lawsuit, which the industry
subsequently dropped,65 accused a sixty-six-year-old Boston woman of
offering hardcore rap songs for download although her computer, as it
turned out, could not run the file-swapping software she was alleged to
be using.66
The lawsuits raised concerns not just with the public but also among
congressional representatives, especially those whose constituents had
been sued. In September 2003, Senator Norm Coleman of Minnesota
called for congressional hearings to investigate the recording industry's
enforcement tactics. 67 In response to Senator Coleman's harsh criticism,
61. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against Fraudulent Business Prac-
tices (Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et. seq.) and Demand for Jury Trial at 25,
Parke v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin County), available at
http://www.boycott-riaa.com/pdf/AmnestyComplaint.pdf (last visited December 30, 2004); see
also Jon Healey, RIAA Sued over Amnesty Program, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at C3.
62. See Matt Hines, RIAA Drops Amnesty Program, CNET NEWS.COM (Apr. 20, 2004),
at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5195301 .html (quoting the RIAA's legal memo).
63. Chris Gaither, Group Sues 261 over Music-Sharing, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2003,
at Al.
64. Tim Arango et al., Music-Thief Kid Sings Sorry Song, N.Y. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at
21. The RIAA eventually settled with the student for $2,000. John Borland, R!AA Settles with
12-year-old Girl, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 9, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-
5073717.htrnl.
65. See John Borland, RIAA's Case of Mistaken Identity?, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 24,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5081469.html.
66. John Schwartz, Record Industry Warns 204 Before Suing on Swapping, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2003, at C 1.
67. Amy Harmon, In Court, Verizon Challenges Music Industry's Subpoenas, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at C2 [hereinafter Harmon, Verizon Challenges Music Industry's Sub-
poenas] (reporting that Senator Coleman had scheduled a congressional hearing to privacy is-
sues as well as the broader effect of technology on copyright enforcement). As Senator Cole-
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the RIAA modified its enforcement policy. Although the industry con-
tinued with its mass-litigation campaign, it announced that it would be-
gin notifying suspected infringers before suing them. This new policy
held out hope of benefiting both the industry and prospective defendants.
It gave record companies a chance to avoid the bad publicity that
stemmed from suing innocent or sympathetic users and spared some us-
ers the cost and embarrassment of defending a lawsuit. 68
In early October, the RIAA threatened to sue another 204 file-
sharers, more than half of whom had approached industry lawyers for
settlements. 69 On Halloween, the industry followed up these threats by
filing eighty lawsuits around the country.70 A month later, the RIAA
filed forty-one more lawsuits while indicating that the association
planned to warn another ninety file-sharers that they might be sued.71 In
sum, by the end of November the RIAA had filed three rounds of law-
suits targeting 382 individuals in 2003.
So far, the RIAA had only targeted egregious offenders. 72 Those
named in the lawsuits had distributed on average more than one thousand
copyrighted songs via P2P networks. 73 Given the amount of music
swapped and downloaded, these individuals were unlikely to become the
industry's customers. Even if they were purchasing CDs, there was no
man noted: "If you're taking someone else's property, that's wrong, that's stealing.... But in
this country we don't cut off people's hands when they steal. One question I have is whether
the penalty here fits the crime." Amy Harmon, Efforts to Stop Music Swapping Draw More
Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at Cl.
68. Schwartz, supra note 66.
69. See id.
70. Record Industry Files 80 More Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at C6.
71. Music Industry Files More Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at C9.
72. Targeting these egregious offenders is very important, as committed free riders can
induce noncooperative behavior by others. As Dan Kahan explained, drawing on reciprocity
literature:
No matter how cooperative the behavior of others, the committed free riders will
always free ride if they can get away with it. Indeed, the committed free riders'
shirking could easily provoke noncooperative behavior by the less tolerant recipro-
cators, whose defection in turn risks inducing the neutral reciprocators to abandon
ship, thereby prompting even the tolerant reciprocators to throw in the towel, and so
forth and so on. If this unfortunate chain reaction takes place, a state of affairs once
characterized by a reasonably high degree of cooperation could tip decisively to-
ward a noncooperative equilibrium in which only the angelic, Kantian, uncondi-
tional cooperators are left contributing (probably futilely) to the relevant public
good.
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 71, 79 (2003).
73. See Benny Evangelista, RAA Warns 204 More People It Plans to Sue, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 18, 2003, at BI (quoting the RIAA in saying that the lawsuits they planned focused on
file-sharers who "were offering an average of more than 1,000 songs on their computers for
others to download").
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guarantee that they would buy them from the major labels, which primar-
ily distribute mainstream artists. Moreover, as studies have shown, a
small percentage of P2P file sharers was responsible for almost all the
music files shared.74 By targeting egregious offenders, the industry
therefore sought to alleviate the unauthorized copying problem.
To earn public support for its mass-litigation campaign, the industry
had repeatedly compared unauthorized copying to theft and likened file-
sharers to shoplifters. Unfortunately, the industry's analogy was far from
correct. First, the law on copyright infringement is not as clear and well
settled as laws against theft and shoplifting. Copyright law is "notori-
ously complex and subtle."75 It includes many "muddy rules," such as
the idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use privilege, the first sale doc-
trine, and various statutory exemptions that allow for limited sharing of
copyrighted works. 76 Indeed, the RIAA and civil liberties groups have
significant disagreements over the extent of legitimate private copying. 77
Second, unlike theft, copyright infringement does not necessarily
deprive copyright holders of the use of their copyrighted materials. As
the United States Supreme Court observed in Dowling v. United States,78
a case involving the manufacture and distribution of bootleg recordings
74. See Eytan Adar & Bemardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, FIRST MONDAY
(Oct. 2000), at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue5-10/adar/index.html (citing a study by re-
searchers at Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center showing that the top twenty percent of
Gnutella users were responsible for ninety-eight percent of all the files shared), cited in Peter
S. Mcneil, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 161
(2002); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1399 & n.219 (2004) (citing other
studies that suggest that a small percentage of P2P file sharers was responsible for almost all
the music files shared).
75. Menell, supra note 74, at 67-68.
76. See generally Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 121
(1999).
77. As the RIAA wrote on its Web site:
First, for your personal use, you can make analog copies of music. For instance,
you can make analog cassette tape recordings of music from another analog cas-
sette, or from a CD, or from the radio, or basically from any source. Essentially, all
copying onto analog media is generally allowed.
Second, again for your personal use, you can make some digital copies of mu-
sic, depending on the type of digital recorder used. For example, digitally copying
music is generally allowed with minidisc recorders, DAT recorders, digital cassette
tape recorders, and some (but not all) compact disc recorders (or CD-R recorders).
As a general rule for CD-Rs, if the CD-R recorder is a stand-alone machine de-
signed to copy primarily audio, rather than data or video, then the copying is al-
lowed. If the CD-R recorder is a computer component, or a computer peripheral
device designed to be a multipurpose recorder (in other words, if it will record data
and video, as well as audio), then copying is not allowed.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 47.
78. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
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by Elvis Presley, "interference with copyright does not easily equate with
theft, conversion, or fraud."'79 According to the Court,
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the
copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over
the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While
one may colloquially link infringement with some general notion of
wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more com-
plex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conver-
sion, or fraud.80
Although the industry is correct in theory that each copy of a re-
cording could translate into royalties and profits, the public has little
sympathy for the recording industry when it hears artists repeatedly
complain that they have not received royalties owed to them by their re-
cord companies.81 The industry's image was also hurt by the widely
held belief that it engages in collusive pricing to overcharge consum-
ers.82 As Paul Goldstein observed, "Public respect for the rights of en-
tertainment companies cannot be separated from the public's perception
of the respect these companies pay to the rights of the authors and artists
who are the source of their products." 83 File-sharers may not be con-
79. Id. at 217.
80. Id. at217-18.
81. Artist Courtney Love said it best in the Digital Hollywood Conference in New York
in May 2000:
What is piracy? Piracy is the act of stealing an artist's work without any intention
of paying for it. I'm not talking about Napster-type software. I'm talking about ma-
jor label recording contracts.... Although I've never met anyone at a record com-
pany who 'believed in the Internet,' they've all been trying to cover their asses by
securing everyone's digital rights. Not that they know what to do with them. Go to
a major label-owned band site. Give me a dollar for every time you see an annoying
'under construction' sign. I used to pester Geffen (when it was a label) to do a bet-
ter job. I was totally ignored for two years, until I got my band name back. The
Goo Goo Dolls are struggling to gain control of their domain name from Warner
Bros., who claim they own the name because they set up a shitty promotional Web
site for the band.
JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC 126
(2001). The unedited transcript is available at http://www.goteamfrog.org/gotohell/gthvol4/
fall2000/swindlefall2000.html. See generally FREDRIC DANNEN, HIT MEN (1991) (providing
a portrayal of the inner workings of the music industry).
82. See Benny Evangelista, $143 Million Settlement in CD Price-Fixing Suit, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 1, 2002, at BI (reporting that the five major labels and three national retail
chains "have agreed to pay $143 million in refunds or free CDs to settle a price-fixing lawsuit
by California and 39 other states").
83. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 216 (rev. ed. 2003).
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cerned about ripping off an anonymous corporation, but they may "think
twice if the victim of their predation has a human face." 84
While the industry was busy throughout 2003 filing lawsuits and
planning new enforcement strategies, a new business model took off. In
late April of that year, Apple Computer unveiled a new online music ser-
vice, the iTunes Music Store, offering low-priced music downloads from
the five major record labels. 85 The store charged ninety-nine cents for
individual songs and $9.99 for most albums. In 2003 alone, Apple sold
more than 30 million music downloads 86 (including at least some silent
tracks). 87 Fortune named iTunes the "Product of the Year," and Time
christened it the "Invention of the Year." 88
In October 2003, Roxio, which purchased Napster's name and intel-
lectual property assets in the service's bankruptcy proceedings, 89 re-
launched the service on a subscription basis, featuring music from the
major record labels. 90 A mix between PressPlay and the iTunes Music
Store, the new Napster offers ninety-nine-cent downloads of single songs
to anyone who downloads the free software. The service also gives those
who pay a monthly subscription fee of less than $10 access to an unlim-
ited number of music streams and "tethered" downloads that expire when
a user stops subscribing to the service. To compete with Apple, Napster
entered into agreements with Samsung to co-market the Samsung Nap-
84. Id.
85. Laurie J. Flynn, Apple Offers Music Downloads with Unique Pricing, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2003, at C2.
86. Frank Ahrens, Music Fans Find Online Jukebox Half-Empty, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
2004, at Al.
87. See Ina Fried, Paying for the Sound of Silence, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 6, 2004, at B 1 (not-
ing that "[a]mong the hundreds of thousands of downloadable songs for sale at Apple's online
music store are at least nine tracks of silence"). As the San Francisco Chronicle reported:
Apple treats the silent songs just like any piece of music. The silent tracks sell for
the same 99 cents, feature free 30-second previews and are all wrapped in Apple's
usual digital-rights management software to prevent unauthorized copying.
Apple said most of the songs are there because the artists wanted silence to be
part of the albums and because the recording industry provided the songs to Apple
as sellable tracks.
Id.
88. Peter Lewis, Product of the Year, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 188; Chris Taylor, The
990 Solution, TIME MAG., Nov. 17, 2003, at 66, 68.
89. For a discussion of the lawsuits involving the old Napster, see Yu, The Copyright Di-
vide, supra note 6, at 388-91. See generally ALL THE RAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN
FANNING'S NAPSTER (2003) for a recent history of Napster.
90. John Borland, Napster Launches, Minus the Revolution, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 9,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5088838.html.
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ster player and with Gateway Computers to preload the Napster software
on selected personal computers.91
A month later, Napster announced a deal with Pennsylvania
State University to provide students with campus-wide subscrip-
tions.92 Funded by student information technology fees, the service
allows access to unlimited streams of music and tethered
downloads. 93 The recording industry was excited about this deal
because, from its standpoint, the service offered a legal alternative
to Grokster, iMesh, KaZaA, Morpheus, and other allegedly illegal
file-sharing networks while at the same time helping students to de-
velop habits that the industry hopes will continue after the students
graduate. 94 By the end of the year, Apple's success with iTunes had
attracted competition from brick-and-mortar companies. Shortly be-
fore Christmas, Wal-Mart, the self-proclaimed low-price leader, un-
dercut Apple and other fee-based download sites by offering eighty-
eight-cent downloads. 95
Although it is too early to evaluate iTunes's new business model,
customers seem to be satisfied with the service. 96 As one customer told
a reporter, "It's solved all my problems. It's so fast, and there's no guilt,
no recriminations." 97 By using legitimate services, customers also save
time and avoid those annoying decoy files, spyware, viruses, and com-
puter crashes that often come with illegal downloads.98 Nevertheless,
91. Id.
92. John Borland, Napster to Give Students Music, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 6,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5103557.html; see also John Borland, Col-
leges Explore Legal Net Music Setups, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 1, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5059030.html.
93. If a student wants to keep a permanent download or burn the song to a CD, the
student can pay ninety-nine cents for the song.
94. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
95. Chris Cobbs, File Swapping Goes Corporate, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11,
2004, at HI.
96. But see Chris Ayres, Apple Acts After Battery of iPod Complaints, TIMES
(London), Jan. 12, 2004, at 9 (discussing the battery problems of the iPod); Rene
A. Guzman, Apple's Portable iPod Rotten to Some, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Feb. 20, 2004, at IF (discussing the class action lawsuits filed against Ap-
ple Computer alleging that the company misrepresented the battery life of its
iPod).
97. Amy Harmon, In Fight over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a Car-
rot, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at § 1 (quoting a regular user of file-sharing soft-
ware).
98. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6, at 432-33 (discussing the frustra-
tion in locating what one wants in illegal Web sites); see also DIGITAL DILEMMA, su-
pra note 11, at 80-81.
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there remain questions as to whether the purchased songs are resal-
able99 and whether the delivery format is secure. 100
Although the recording industry received several favorable rulings
and benefited from the iTunes business model, it also suffered some ma-
jor setbacks in 2003. A day after the RIAA's triumph in Verizon II, the
industry got slammed in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd.101 The United States District Court for the Central District of
California ruled that Grokster and Morpheus/Music City, two P2P net-
works, were not liable for the unauthorized copies made by individual
end-users. Noting a "seminal distinction between Grokster/StreamCast
and Napster," 10 2 the court found "substantial noninfringing uses for De-
fendants' software-e.g., distributing movie trailers, free songs or other
non-copyrighted works; using the software in countries where it is legal;
or sharing the works of Shakespeare."' 10 3 As the court explained:
While Defendants, like Sony or Xerox, may know that their products will
be used illegally by some (or even many) users, and may provide support
services and refinements that indirectly support such use, liability for
contributory infringement does not lie "merely because peer-to-peer file-
sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights." 104
The court also maintained that the defendants were not obliged to
"police" the networks, as such a duty "arises only where a defendant has
the 'right and ability' to supervise the infringing conduct."10 5 Unlike
Napster, the distributors of Grokster and Morpheus do not have control
over who uses the networks or what is shared through them. Thus, the
court was unwilling to impose the additional burden on the defendants.
99. See, e.g., Ina Fried & Evan Hansen, Apple: Reselling iTunes Songs "Impractical,"
CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 8, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5072842.html (quot-
ing Peter Lowe, Apple's director of marketing for applications and services, who remarked
that "Apple's position is that it is impractical, though perhaps within someone's rights, to sell
music purchased online"); Alorie Gilbert, iTunes Auction Treads Murky Legal Ground, CNET
NEWS.COM (Sept. 3, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-5071108.html (discussing
the legal and technical challenges concerning the resale of iTunes through Internet auctions);
Evan Hansen, Apple Customer Resells iTunes Song, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5074086.html (reporting a customer's successful resale of
online song he purchased from Apple Computer's iTunes Music Store).
100. See, e.g., John Borland, Program Points Way to iTunes DRM Hack, CNET
NEWS.COM (Nov. 24, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5111426.html (discussing a
program that "served as a demonstration of how to evade, if not exactly break, the anticopying
technology wrapped around the songs sold by Apple in its iTunes store").
101. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
102. Id. at 1041.
103. Id. at 1035.
104. Id at 1043 (quotingA&MRecords,Inc.v.Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1020-21 (9gh Cir. 2001)).
105. Id. at 1045.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. 106
Focusing on the relationship between the software and its users, the court
avoided its precedents by distinguishing Grokster and StreamCast Net-
works from Napster. As the court reasoned, "the software design is of
great import," 10 7 and the networks were capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses, such as "significantly reducing the distribution costs of
public domain and permissively shared art and speech, as well as reduc-
ing the centralized control of that distribution." 108 Writing for a unani-
mous panel, Judge Sidney Thomas explained why courts should be cau-
tious when adjudicating claims that involve rapidly developing
technology:
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old mar-
kets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold
through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has
shown that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in bal-
ancing interests, whether the new technology be a player piano, a
copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a kara-
oke machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to ex-
ercise caution before restructuring liability theories for the purpose of
addressing specific market abuses, despite their apparent present
magnitude. 109
In the last month of 2003, the recording industry suffered three
more major unfavorable rulings. In early December, the Copyright
Board of Canada declared that downloading files via P2P technologies
does not violate Canadian law. 110 To compensate artists and copyright
holders, the board imposed a tariff of up to $25 on portable MP3 play-
106. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); see also John Borland, Judges Rule File-Sharing Software Le-
gal, CNET NEwS.COM (Aug.19, 2004), at http://news.com.coin/210-1032-3-5316570.html.
107. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 380 F.3d at 1163.
108. Id. at 1164. To illustrate the substantial noninfringing use, the Ninth Circuit used the
popular band Wilco:
One striking example provided by the Software Distributors is the popular band
Wilco, whose record company had declined to release one of its albums on the basis
that it had no commercial potential. Wilco repurchased the work from the record
company and made the album available for free downloading, both from its own
website and through the software user networks. The result sparked widespread in-
terest and, as a result, Wilco received another recording contract.
Id. at 1161.
109. Id. at 1167; see also Peter K. Yu, Innovation Gains Edge in Music, Movie Battle,
DETROIT NEws, Aug. 29, 2004, at 15A (discussing Grokster).
110. COPYRIGHT BD. OF CAN., PRIVATE COPYING 2003-2004, at 22 (2003) (stating that
"[a]ll private copying is now exempt, subject to a corresponding right of remuneration"),
available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c 12122003 -b.pdf.
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ers, II thus putting the device in the same category as audiotapes and
blank CDs. This tariff was struck down a year later by a federal Cana-
dian court. 112 Although the court held that the Copyright Board did not
have authority to impose such a tariff, it agreed with the board that mak-
ing private copies of copyrighted works was legal. 13
In mid-December, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit overruled the lower court's decisions in the two
Verizon cases, 114 which required ISPs to turn over subscriber informa-
tion to copyright holders without a pending lawsuit. As the appellate
court maintained, "the overall structure of § 512 [the subpoena provi-
sion] clearly establish[es that the statute] ... does not authorize the issu-
ance of a subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere conduit for the transmis-
sion of information sent by others."1 15 The D.C. Circuit also pointed out
111. Id. at56.
112. John Borland, Judge Tosses Canada's 'iPod Tax,' CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 17,
2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5495715.html.
113. In BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, a Canadian federal court used similar reasoning to reject
the request of Canadian record labels for authorization to identify alleged file-sharers. No. T-
292-04 (Can. Mar 31, 2004), available at http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca/bulletins/whatsnew/T-292-
04.pdf. See generally John Borland, Judge: File Sharing Legal in Canada, CNET NEWS.COM,
at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5182641.html (Mar. 31, 2004). As the court noted, the
Canada Supreme Court's decision in CCH Canada Ltd v. Law Society of Canada established
that setting up facilities to allow copying does not amount to authorizing infringement. BMG
Canada Inc. 27 (quoting CCH Canada Ltd v. Law Society of Canada, [2004] S.C.C. 13).
The court therefore did not find any "real difference between a library that places a photocopy
machine in a room full of copyrighted material and a computer user that places a personal copy
on a shared directory linked to a P2P service." Id. According to the court:
In either case the preconditions to copying and infringement are set up but the ele-
ment of authorization is missing.... The mere fact of placing a copy on a shared
directory in a computer where that copy can be accessed via a P2P service does not
amount to distribution. Before it constitutes distribution, there must be a positive
act by the owner of the shared directory, such as sending out the copies or advertis-
ing that they are available for copying. No such evidence was presented by the
plaintiffs in this case.
Id. 27-28.
114. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 347 (2004).
115. Id. at 1237. As the court explained:
This argument borders upon the silly. The details of this argument need not burden
the Federal Reporter, for the specific provisions of § 512(h), which we have just re-
hearsed, make clear that however broadly "[Internet] service provider" is defined in
§ 512(k)(1)(B), a subpoena may issue to an ISP only under the prescribed conditions
regarding notification. Define all the world as an ISP if you like, the validity of a §
512(h) subpoena still depends upon the copyright holder having given the ISP, how-
ever defined, a notification effective under § 512(c)(3)(A). And as we have seen,
any notice to an ISP concerning its activity as a mere conduit does not satisfy the
condition of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) and is therefore ineffective.
Id. at 1236.
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that "P2P software was 'not even a glimmer in anyone's eye when the
DMCA was enacted'... [and that] Congress had no reason to foresee
the application of § 512(h) to P2P file sharing, nor did they draft the
DMCA broadly enough to reach the new technology when it came
along." 116 Thus, copyright holders cannot use the DMCA to force ISPs
to turn over subscriber information without filing a lawsuit. The court,
nevertheless, ended the opinion by acknowledging the industry's concern
and suggested that copyright holders might seek Congress's assistance to
address their economic woes. As the court wrote:
We are not unsympathetic either to the RIAA's concern regarding the
widespread infringement of its members' copyrights, or to the need
for legal tools to protect those rights. It is not the province of the
courts, however, to rewrite the DMCA in order to make it fit a new
and unforseen [sic] intemet architecture, no matter how damaging
that development has been to the music industry or threatens being to
the motion picture and software industries. The plight of copyright
holders must be addressed in the first instance by the Congress; only
the "Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional
ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology."
1 17
The recording industry immediately claimed that the decision would
make the process more intrusive, because it prevents the RIAA from con-
tacting suspected copyright infringers to try to reach a settlement and
avoid filing a lawsuit. 118 The industry may be right, but it is cold com-
fort to individual file-sharers if their contacts with the RIAA would only
result in expensive settlements that wipe away their savings or force
them into bankruptcy. In fact, the Verizon ruling is likely to benefit file-
sharers in three ways. First, although the decision did not determine
whether it is legal to upload or download music, it slows the industry's
mass-litigation campaign. Instead of suing file-sharers en masse, the in-
dustry now has to file John Doe actions against each individual file-
sharer suspected of illegally trading music. 119 The process therefore will
116. Id. at 1238 (quoting In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38
(D.D.C.), rev'd, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
117. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431
(1983)).
118. See John Borland, Court: RIAA Lawsuit Strategy Illegal, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 19,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5129687.html.
119. See Katie Dean, One File Swapper, One Lawsuit, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 08, 2004), at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62576,00.html (reporting a ruling in Philadel-
phia that required the RIAA to file separate lawsuit for each defendant, rather than bundling all
the defendants in a single lawsuit); Florida Court Sends RIAA Away, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62915,00.html (Apr. 1, 2004) (reporting a simi-
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become more expensive, labor-intensive, and time-consuming, and the
industry will have to be more selective about whom to sue. Second, the
decision forced the industry to sue file-sharers without the benefit of
weeding out sympathetic defendants or false positives. Even worse, the
decision might generate public relations disasters should the industry sue
the daughter or son of a record label executive or a close relative of a
senator. 120 Third, the John Doe process will be more protective of pri-
vacy and other constitutional rights, as it will prevent ISPs from disclos-
ing subscriber information without a pending lawsuit.
Just before Christmas, the industry received its final blow of the
year, this time from across the Atlantic. On December 24, an appellate
court in Norway affirmed a lower court's decision that Jon Johansen, a
teenaged programmer, did not violate the Norwegian Criminal Code1 21
by co-writing the DeCSS program, which circumvented the copy protec-
tion technology used by the U.S. motion picture industry. 122 This deci-
sion was subsequently reinforced by a California Court of Appeals deci-
sion that reversed an earlier order enjoining the publication of the DeCSS
program on the Internet. 123
lar ruling in Orlando). For a discussion of John Doe lawsuits, see Verizon , 240 F. Supp. 2d at
39-41.
120. Declan McCullagh, FAQ: How the Decision Will Affect File Swappers, CNET
NEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5130033.html.
121. The Code punishes "any person who by breaking a protective device or in a similar
manner, unlawfully obtains access to data or programs which are stored or transferred by elec-
tronic or other technical means." Declan McCullagh, Teen on Trial in DVD Hacking Case,
CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-976687.html; see also
Jon Bing, A Legal Perspective on the Norwegian DeCSS Case, at http://www.eff.org/IPiDRM/
DeCSSprosecutions/JohansenDeCSS_case/20000125_bingjohansen casesummary.html
(Jan. 25, 2000) (stating that "[i]t is... unsettled whether the Criminal Code sect 145(2) can
apply to a situation where someone breaks a code or other security measure in order to access
material on a device of which that person is the owner").
122. Evan Hansen, Will DVD Acquittal Mean Tougher Copyright Laws?, CNET
NEWS.COM (Dec. 24, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5133152.html. For a discus-
sion of the DeCSS Program, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
123. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 (Ct. App. 2004); see also
Evan Hansen, Court: DeCSS Ban Violated Free Speech, CNET NEWS.COM (Feb. 27, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1026-5166887.html. As the court explained: "The preliminary in-
junction.., burdens more speech than necessary to protect DVD CCA's property interest and
was an unlawful prior restraint upon Bunner's right to free speech." Id. In Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), eight major movie studios successfully
enjoined the hacker magazine 2600: The Hacker Quarterly from posting the DeCSS program
and related hyperlinks, citing the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA. Id. As a result
of the reversal in DVD Copy Control Ass 'n v. Bunner, Corley remains the only precedent in
which copyright holders successfully enjoined third parties from disseminating information
concerning how to circumvent encryption technology used to protect copyrighted works.
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On the whole, 2003 was a turbulent year for the recording industry.
It started with considerable fanfare when the industry successfully pur-
sued KaZaA in U.S. courts while launching high-profile, unprecedented
lawsuits against college students who offered copyrighted music for oth-
ers to download. It ended, however, with four unfavorable court deci-
sions that had the industry singing the blues.
II. THE FUTURE P2P FILE-SHARING WARS
As the P2P file-sharing problem spreads to other media industries,
the copyright wars are likely to escalate. This Part first discusses the
challenges confronting the recording industry at the domestic and inter-
national levels. Domestically, the industry will have to deal with a pro-
liferation of new P2P technologies, the increasingly transnational nature
of the copyright wars, the decreasing support the industry receives from
its customers and political allies, and the counterattacks and setbacks the
industry suffers due to its aggressive tactics. Internationally, the indus-
try's increasing push for stronger intellectual property protection abroad
will heighten the tension between the United States and less developed
countries, invite criticisms of U.S. copyright policy in foreign countries,
and result in the diversion of public attention from domestic copyright
issues. This Part concludes by exploring the spread of the P2P file-
sharing wars to the publishing, television, and motion picture industries.
It suggests that other industries may adopt less confrontational strategies
because of their differing structures and the lessons they may have
learned from the recording industry.
A. Domestic Challenges
1. Proliferation of New P2P Technologies
Unlike MP3.com and Napster, all of the new P2P technologies, such
as Grokster, iMesh, KaZaA, and Morpheus, do not have centralized serv-
ers. 124 Instead, they allow users to transfer files from one location to an-
other while accommodating users' needs to employ different hardware
and software. As a result, enforcement is likely to become difficult.
There will be no deep pocket to sue, no chokepoint to target, and no hu-
man face to blame.
124. See generally Gene Kan, Gnutella, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2, for a discussion
of Gnutella-based engines.
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Even worse, the industry's strong-arm tactics will threaten to drive
unauthorized copying underground, forcing file-sharers to turn to proxy
servers, offshore Web sites, and encrypted P2P systems. 125 Indeed, a
wide variety of anonymizing technologies already exists. For instance,
Freenet software allows file-swappers to encrypt download requests by
passing them from one computer to another without disclosing how and
where the user obtains the files. 126 Programs like Red Rover, Publius,
and Free Haven provide attractive alternatives for file-sharers to avoid
censorship and recrimination by remaining anonymous. 127 If the indus-
try drove all the file-sharers to these anonymous networks, its enforce-
ment efforts would be futile and would ultimately backfire on the con-
stituents whom it was charged to protect-record companies, musicians,
artists, songwriters, engineers, producers, retailers, and truck drivers.
2. Transnational Nature of the Future Copyright Wars
The future P2P file-sharing wars are likely to be transnational.
Most of the existing networks already involve parties residing in foreign
countries. The KaZaA software, for example, was originally developed
by young Estonian programmers working for a Dutch company and now
belongs to an Australian company incorporated in Vanuatu. 128 Although
courts have allowed record companies and movie studios to proceed in
the United States with their lawsuit against KaZaA's parent company,
Sharman Networks, the multinational involvement has made the litiga-
tion process difficult. 129 Instead of relying on domestic enforcement,
copyright holders now have to rethink their enforcement and litigation
strategies from a global perspective. 130
125. See Saul Hansell, Crackdown on Copyright Abuse May Send Music Traders into
Software Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C1.
126. See generally Adam Langley, Freenet, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2, at 123 for a
discussion of Freenet software.
127. See generally Alan Brown, Red Rover, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2, at 133 (de-
scribing Red Rover); Roger Dingledine et al., Free Haven, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2, at
159 (describing Free Haven); Marc Waldman et al., Publius, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2,
at 145 (describing Publius).
128. Ariana Eunjung Cha, File Swapper Eluding Pursuers, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at
Al.
129. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d
1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004) (rejecting the defendant's claim that the company did not have substantial contacts with
California and thus should not be subject to the court's jurisdiction).
130. In Australia, for example, the U.S. recording industry applied for an Anton Pilar order
to raid Sharman Networks' Australian offices and the homes of its key corporate executives.
See James Pearce, Piracy Fighters Raid Offices of Sharman, Others, CNET NEWS.COM (Feb.
6, 2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5154506.html. An Anton Pilar order allows
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Moreover, if copyright holders had to litigate in foreign forums,
they would have to deal with challenging problems commonly associated
with transnational litigation, such as jurisdictional and conflict-of-law is-
sues, 131 unexpected outcomes due to the application of foreign laws, and
differing interpretations of comparable laws in foreign courts. Judges, in
particular those trained in civil law countries, may interpret laws differ-
ently, especially in areas where fundamental philosophical differences
exist. 132 They may also come to different conclusions even though they
apply identical laws, 133 as they sometimes have to apply law by refer-
ence to national market conditions, social contexts, and local prac-
tices. 134 As a result, foreign litigation sometimes leads to outcomes un-
expected by copyright holders. For example, in March 2002, the Dutch
appellate court ruled that KaZaA was not liable for copyright infringe-
ment committed by users of its software. 135 In addition, subsequent rul-
ings by the Norwegian courts found Jon Johansen innocent of charges
concerning circumvention of the copy protection technology used by the
U.S. movie industry. 136
Even more problematic for copyright holders, some foreign coun-
tries, like China, do not have a sophisticated legal system or a strong re-
spect for the rule of law. Although judicial reforms have taken place in
copyright holders to enter premises to search for and seize infringing material without alerting
the target through court proceedings.
131. Cha, supra note 128. But see Michael Geist, In Web Disputes, U.S. Law Rules the
World, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 24, 2003, at Dl (noting that United States laws were applied in
most Internet disputes).
132. See generally George C. Christie, Some Key Jurisprudential Issues of the Twenty-first
Century, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 217, 218-23 (2000) (discussing the different approaches
to judicial interpretation by common law and civil law judges).
133. See COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 114 (2003) (noting that "it is not uncommon for different
courts in Europe, even when applying identical law, to come to different conclusions on
whether a patent is or is not obvious"); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Prop-
erty Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 436
(2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation] (noting that
"even identical rules of law may lead to different results when applied in different social con-
texts by different tribunals"); see also Christie, supra note 132, at 217 (noting that "the deci-
sions in concrete legal cases will be influenced as much by what we believe to be the proper
method for deciding legal disputes as by the views that we entertain on the merits of the con-
troversies before us").
134. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation, supra note 133, at 436-37.
For an insightful analysis of how American and foreign judges conceive fairness differently,
see George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 683,
699-700 (1998).
135. John Borland, Ruling Bolsters File-Traders' Prospects, CNET NEWS.COM (Mar. 28,
2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-870396.htrnl.
136. Hansen, Will DVD Acquittal Mean Tougher Copyright Laws?, supra note 122.
[Vol. 76
P2P AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COPYING
China, especially in the wake of its accession to the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"), these reforms have not kept pace with the country's
economic growth. As a result, the judiciary remains underfunded, enjoys
limited judicial independence, and continues to be vulnerable to outside
influence, corruption, and local protectionism. 137 The shortage of law-
yers, in particular intellectual property lawyers, also makes it difficult for
foreign firms to secure protection and competent legal advice. 138 More-
over, in a country where local conditions, customs, and personal connec-
tions (guanxi) are important to successful commercial dealings, copy-
right holders who intend to continue doing business in the country have
been reluctant to sue local companies. 139
3. Increased Political Alienation of the Recording Industry
As the recording industry continues to pursue individual file-
sharers, it is likely to face harsh criticism from commentators, civil liber-
ties groups, and the public. Since the MP3.com and Napster battles, the
public has become increasingly aware of copyright issues, and a growing
portion has viewed copyright law with disdain. The situation worsened
after the United States Supreme Court upheld the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft in January 2003.140 Reacting
137. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 217-18 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pi-
rates to Partners] (discussing the weaknesses of Chinese courts). For discussions of the de-
velopment of the rule of law and Chinese courts in China, see, for example, RONALD C.
BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURT AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS (1997); CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996); DOMESTIC
LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); RONALD C. KEITH,
CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW (1994); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN
CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF
LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
(1999); Stanley Lubman, Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities and
Strategy, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 293 (1991).
138. Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach About Intellec-
tual Property and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218, 240 (2003) [hereinafter
Yu, The Harmonization Game].
139. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 137, at 210 (discussing the importance
of guanxi to conducting business in China); Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and
the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China's In-
tellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 415, 451 (1996) (contending that "it
may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue doing business in China to sue be-
cause doing so may wreck their 'guanxi'-personal contacts or favors-that are integral for
doing business in the PRC").
140. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For discussion of the Eldred decision, see Marci Hamilton,
Now That the Supreme Court Has Declined to Limit Copyright Duration, Those Who Want to
Shorten the Term Need to Look at Other Options, Including Constitutional Amendment,
FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY (Feb. 13, 2003), at http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/
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bitterly to the decision, supporters of the public domain movement have
accused the Court of selling out to private corporations. A radical few
even advocated civil disobedience in the form of hacking and free distri-
bution of copyrighted music and movies. 14 1 Even Mickey Mouse, the
protagonist of the copyright term extension drama, could not help but
give an interview blasting his owner:
For almost 70 years, I've only been allowed to do what the Disney
people say I can do. Sometimes someone comes up with a new idea,
and I think to myself, "Great! Here's a chance to stretch myselfl"
But of course they won't let me leave the reservation. If I do, they
send out their lawyers to bring me home .... Do you have any idea
what it's like to have to greet kids at Disneyland every single day,
always smiling, never slipping off for a cigarette? 142
To make matters worse, the RIAA's aggressive litigation tactics
have antagonized many CD-buying music lovers who did not even use
P2P networks, as they watched the industry file lawsuits against their
children, friends, and relatives. As the defendant Jesse Jordan's father,
who owns thousands of records and CDs, declared:
[The RIAA] ha[s] sued one of their most avid customers. The RIAA
says that they wanted to teach these kids and their families a lesson.
The lesson we learned is that we will never, ever buy another product
from any of those companies again. That's the lesson we're going to
tell everyone. 14 3
hamilton/20030213.html; Peter K. Yu, Four Remaining Questions on Copyright Law After
Eldred, GIGALAW.COM (Feb. 2003), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2003/yu-2003-
02.html; Peter K. Yu, Mickey Mouse, Peter Pan, and the Tall Tale of Copyright Harmoniza-
tion, IP L. & BUS., Apr. 2003, at 24.
141. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, After the Copyright Smackdown: What Next?, SALON.COM
(Jan. 17, 2003), at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/Ol/17/copyright/print.html (re-
counting the radical reaction of some members of the public). As Glynn Lunney explained,
"civil disobedience may offer the only effective means for ordinary consumers to express their
political discontent with copyright's excessive scope," in light of the decided political advan-
tage of copyright holders as a concentrated, well-organized constituency and the courts' gen-
eral abdication of their duty to police copyright's boundaries. Lunney, supra note 11, at 869-
70; see also Lord Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), re-
printed in THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, PROSE AND POETRY 743 (G.M. Young ed.,
1952). But see Vaidhyanathan, supra (discouraging acts of civil disobedience by noting that
"[w]hile disobedience might be more fun, the power of civil discourse remains" in the post-
Eldred era).
142. Jesse Walker, Mickey Mouse Clubbed, REASON, Jan. 17, 2003, available at
http://reason.com/links/linksOl1703.shtml.
143. Healey & Huffstutter, supra note 30.
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Even worse, in its desperate attempt to protect itself against
digital piracy, the recording industry has sued, or threatened to sue,
virtually everybody 144-telecommunications service providers, 145
consumer electronics developers, 146 new media entrepreneurs, 147
venture capitalists, 148 corporate employers, 149 universities, 150 law-
yers, 151 college researchers, 152 hackers and cryptographers, 153 and
144. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 7-8 (noting that the P2P
file-sharing wars represent "the copyright industries' increasingly brazen-some say desper-
ate-attempts to shut down P2P file-swapping networks, disable P2P technology, and shift the
costs of control onto third parties, including telecommunications companies, consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers, corporate employers, universities, new media entrepreneurs, and the
taxpayers"); Yu, Escalating Copyright Wars, supra note 8, at 944 (noting that the RIAA's
"war on piracy has now become a war against the whole world").
145. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing the recording
industry's conflict with telecommunications companies); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
146. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (lawsuit to enjoin the manufacture and distribution of the Rio portable
MP3 player); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073
(C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
147. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (law-
suit against Napster); TeeVee Toons v. MP3.com, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(lawsuit against MP3.com); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (lawsuit against MP3.com); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Replay TV, Inc.,
No. 2:01-CV9358, 2002 WL 1301268 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2002) (lawsuit concerning the ille-
gality of Replay TV).
148. See Joseph Menn, Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003,
pt. 3, at 1 (reporting the suit Universal Music and EMI filed against Hummer Winblad Venture
Partners and two of the San Francisco firm's general partners).
149. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 16 (discussing the recording
industry's conflict with corporate employers).
150. See Benny Evangelista, Metallica Suit Rocks Napster, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14, 2000, at
B3 (discussing the lawsuit Metallica filed against the University of Southern California, Indi-
ana University, Yale University, and other educational institutions).
151. See Sonia K. Katyal, A Legal Malpractice Claim by MP3.com, FINDLAW'S WRIT:
LEGAL COMMENTARY (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020207
katyal.html (discussing the malpractice lawsuit MP3.com filed against its former attorney).
152. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6, at 395 (discussing the RIAA's threat of
lawsuit against Professor Edward Felten of Princeton University).
153. As Joseph Liu noted:
The [recording industry's lawsuits], along with the criticisms of the encryption
research exemption, have led to a good deal of concern within the encryption re-
search community. In particular, a number of encryption researchers have refused
to publish their research results in response to concerns about DMCA liability. For
example, the Dutch cryptographer Niels Ferguson declined to publish the results of
research he had conducted regarding High Bandwidth Digital Content Protection, a
system used by Intel to encrypt video. Ferguson, an independent cryptography con-
sultant, indicated that he had found weaknesses in that system, but decided not to
publish the results and removed all references to this research from his website for
fear of DMCA liability. Other researchers have similarly indicated that they have
withheld or declined to publish their research results out of the same concern.
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students. 154 In doing so, the industry has lost major political allies
on Capitol Hill and has become increasingly isolated, especially af-
ter it sued individual citizens en masse.
When the Senate convened a hearing to examine the industry's en-
forcement tactics and associated privacy problems in September 2003,155
RIAA President Cary Sherman was forced to defend his organization's
actions and tactics instead of telling Congress what his industry needed.
The trade group also had to deal with an adverse bill that Senator Sam
Brownback introduced shortly before the hearing, 156 which sought to re-
peal the DMCA's controversial subpoena provision. As the senator ex-
plained:
I support strong protections of intellectual property, and I will stand
on my record in support of property rights against any challenge....
But I cannot in good conscience support any tool such as the DMCA
information subpoena that can be used by pornographers, and poten-
tially even more distasteful actors, to collect the identifying informa-
tion of Americans, especially our children. 157
Senator Brownback's concern was understandable, as gay-porn pro-
ducer Titan Media attempted to use copyright law to rid the Internet of
the unauthorized distribution of its copyrighted works over P2P net-
works. 158 Because anybody who has written a letter or composed an e-
mail can claim copyright holder status, snoops and stalkers, by claiming
Professional associations and conferences have also modified their practices in
response to the fear of DMCA liability. Some encryption researchers have sug-
gested boycotting encryption research conferences held in the United States. Some
conference organizers have decided to hold their conferences outside the U.S., in
order to minimize concerns about liability. In addition, in November 2001, the In-
stitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a major publisher of com-
puter science journals, began requiring that all authors indemnify the IEEE for
DMCA liability resulting from the publication of their research in the journal. The
IEEE later withdrew this requirement in response to widespread objections.
Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
501, 514-15 (2003); see also Peter K. Yu, Chilling Effect, IP L. & BUS., Mar. 2004, at 27.
154. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the RIAA's mass litigation campaign).
155. See Harmon, Verizon Challenges Music Industry's Subpoenas, supra note 67 (report-
ing that Senator Coleman had scheduled a congressional hearing regarding privacy issues as
well as the broader effect of technology on copyright enforcement).
156. Consumers, Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act of
2003, S. 1621, 108th Cong. (2003).
157. Declan McCullagh, In DMCA War, a Fight over Privacy, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept.
18, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5078609.html.
158. Id.; see also John Schwartz, File-Swapping Is New Route for Internet Pornography,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2001, at Cl (reporting the popularity of trading pornography over P2P
networks).
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copyright infringement, can freely exploit the DMCA subpoena process
to obtain their targets' personal information.
The recording industry has also lost support from the computer and
consumer electronics industries. Although these former allies backed the
enactment of the DMCA and collaborated with the industry on the Se-
cure Digital Music Initiative, 159 they are now concerned that increased
copyright protection would stifle innovation and the development of new
technology and have since expressed regret and disappointment over the
development and interpretation of the DMCA. 160
Their concerns are understandable. From an economic standpoint,
copyright law creates a limited monopoly that allows copyright holders
to charge consumers economic rents without making any additional in-
vestment. 161 Forced to pay supracompetitive prices for copyrighted
products, consumers have fewer resources to invest in new technology
and other products. As a result, technology developers do not have ade-
quate incentives to innovate, and copyright holders have very few incen-
tives to improve products and services unless those improvements will
allow them to make even more profits (and collect more economic rents).
Even worse, copyright holders lobby Congress hard to protect their
royalty streams and lock up political gains. By controlling access to
critical content, incumbent media industries have sought to slow the de-
velopment of competing new technologies. For example, as Mark Nadel
pointed out, "the film industry tried to stymie television by denying
broadcasters access to films, . . . broadcasters constrained cable televi-
sion systems' access to broadcast programming, and cable programmers
tried to deny satellite companies access to cable networks." 162 Today,
the incumbent industries are using similar strategies to "hinder[] the roll-
out of broadband, digital video recorders, and Internet distribution tech-
nologies." 163
In recent years, the media industries have lobbied Congress persis-
tently for more protective standards in the hope that these efforts will
159. See Menell, supra note 74, at 163-78 (discussing the deepening conflict between the
content and technology sectors). The Secure Digital Music Initiative is an association of elec-
tronic companies that were involved in designing copy protection technologies that protect
copyrighted works against unauthorized access.
160. See DRM Foes Turn Aside Hollywood Peace Gestures, WASH. INTERNET DAILY,
Aug. 5, 2002.
161. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 304 (Aspen 5th ed. 1998)
(discussing how copyright holders appropriate much of the consumer surplus).
162. Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The
Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 808-09 (2004) (footnotes
omitted); see also Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278
(2004) (discussing the copyright's role in regulating competition among rival disseminators).
163. Nadel, supra note 162, at 809.
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give them more control over copyrighted works. 164 Recent examples in-
clude the Serial Copy Management System mandated by the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992,165 the Secure Digital Music Initiative, 166
the abandoned Hollings bill,167 and the motion picture industry's request
for the placement of broadcast flags in digital broadcasts. 168 Although
heightened standards are necessary to protect copyright interests, at some
point these standards will prevent U.S. technology companies from com-
peting with their counterparts in Asia and Europe, which are not subject
to similar constraints unless they intend to import the concerned technol-
ogy into the U.S. market. It is small wonder that the district court in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. reminded the in-
dustry that "using the software in countries where it is legal" can be con-
sidered a substantial noninfringing use of P2P software. 169
As the interests of the computer, consumer electronics, and re-
cording industries diverge, there may be a point where the computer and
consumer electronics industries find it too costly to support the recording
industry. If these industries were to flex their political muscles, the re-
cording industry might have awakened a sleeping giant. After all, these
industries are many times more powerful economically than the re-
cording and motion picture industries combined. As Susan Crawford
noted:
Despite the recent slump ... activity in the consumer electronics
market directly or indirectly impacts ten percent of U.S. economic ac-
tivity (GDP)-producing nearly $950 billion in commerce yearly.
Revenues for consumer electronics products are expected to total a
record $99.5 billion in 2003, marking a 3.5 percent increase over
2002. The information technology industry (computer hardware,
software, and services) was the engine of economic growth in the
164. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 93 (stating that "control of a standard, par-
ticularly a proprietary standard, puts some degree of control over publishing into the hands of
the standard owners"); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technolo-
gies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1644-45 (2001) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Copyright and Control] (contending that copyright holders are likely to persuade consumers to
switch to a new access- and copy-protected format).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (2000). The Serial Copy Management System provides copy-
right and generation status information and prevents the recording devices from producing a
chain of perfect digital copies through "serial copying."
166. See discussion supra Part I.
167. Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong.
(2002) (enabling the Federal Communications Commission to mandate a security standard that
is protective of digital content for all digital media devices).
168. See generally Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603 (2003) (discussing the broadcast flag controversy).
169. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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1990s. While IT-producing industries represent only 7 percent of all
U.S. businesses, they accounted for roughly 28 percent of overall real
economic growth between 1996-2000. IT'.s share of GDP rose from
3.2 percent in 1990 to 4.9 percent at the peak in 2000, and still ac-
counts for 4.2 percent. These numbers overshadow the revenues of
the movie and video industry over the same period. While it is im-
portant to ensure the proper functioning of the copyright system, it is
fair to ask whether shifting encryption and design costs to the infor-
mation technology industry, and constraining this industry's ability to
innovate, makes sense. 170
4. Counterattacks and Setbacks
As the recording industry continues its fight against individual file-
sharers, it is likely to suffer counterattacks from civil liberties groups and
ISPs. In September 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union responded
to the industry's mass litigation campaign by filing a lawsuit against the
RIAA, claiming that the trade group's subpoena suffered from "proce-
dural deficiencies" and violated constitutional due process and free ex-
pression guarantees. 171 A month later, Charter Communications filed a
lawsuit challenging the RIAA's subpoenas before the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. 172 In mid-November,
SBC Communications also challenged the legality of RIAA's subpoena,
contending that the process was unconstitutional because the RIAA had
yet to file a lawsuit. 173
While each of these lawsuits may be insignificant compared to the
many complaints the RIAA has filed against individual file-sharers, the
combined lawsuits may create a multiplier effect that makes the indus-
try's litigation campaign very expensive and time-consuming. As the
plaintiffs in these actions-telecommunications providers and civil liber-
170. Crawford, supra note 168, at 635.
171. Declan McCullagh, ACLU Takes Aim at Record Labels, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 29,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5083800.html. As the ACLU noted: "The conse-
quences from this lack of procedural protections are far from trivial.... In addition to being
deprived of one's constitutional rights, there is nothing to stop a vindictive business or indi-
vidual from claiming copyright to acquire the identity of critics." Id.
172. Stefanie Olsen, Charter Files Suit Against RIAA, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 6, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5087304.html. In January 2005, the Eighth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision to issue the subpoena and remanded the case to the lower court. In
re Charter Communications, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005).
173. John Borland, SBC Challenges RIAA over Subpoenas, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 20,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5110296.html.
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ties groups-are repeat players, 174 they may carefully select cases to
maximize the number of obstacles to the industry's enforcements efforts.
In addition, some courts may be sympathetic toward individual file-
sharers who downloaded music for noncommercial purposes. Others
have become concerned about the privacy intrusions associated with the
industry's enforcement tactics. In February 2004, for example, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania re-
quired that the RIAA file separate lawsuits against each defendant rather
than bundling all the defendants in a single action. 175 Other courts have
since followed its lead.176 As the industry continues its pursuit of indi-
vidual file-sharers, such unfavorable rulings are likely to increase.
B. International Challenges
1. Heightened Tension Between the United States and Less
Developed Countries
In the near future, developers of new P2P networks may consider
relocating abroad, as many foreign countries offer lower copyright pro-
tection than the United States. 17 7 To eliminate these pirate havens, the
recording industry has worked very closely with foreign copyright hold-
ers and trade associations. In March 2004, the International Federation
of the Phonographic Industry unleashed its first wave of international
lawsuits, against file-sharers in Canada, Denmark, Germany, and It-
aly. 178
Meanwhile, the recording industry heavily lobbies the U.S. gov-
ernment to strengthen intellectual property protection abroad through in-
ternational treaties and free trade agreements. In November 2003, for
example, lawmakers established an anti-international piracy caucus in
Congress to induce other countries to enforce copyright laws and to stop
174. For an excellent discussion of the differences between "one-shot" and repeat players
in the litigation world, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97-114 (1974).
175. Dean, One File Swapper, One Lawsuit,, supra note 119; see also Katie Dean, New
Flurry of RIAA Lawsuits, WIRED NEWS (Feb. 17, 2004), at http://www.wired.com/news/digi-
woodI0, 1412,62318,00.html.
176. See, e.g., Florida Court Sends RIAA Away, supra note 119, at http://www.wired.com/
news/digiwood/0,1412,62915,00.html (reporting that the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida has made a similar ruling).
177. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
178. Mark Landler, Fight Against Illegal File Sharing Is Moving Overseas, N.Y. TIMES,
March 31, 2004, at W1.
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sales of counterfeit CDs, DVDs, books, software, and video games. 179
To strengthen collaboration, lawmakers and industry leaders also formed
the Entertainment Industry Coalition for Free Trade. 180
Unfortunately, the United States did not fare well in international
trade forums in 2003. In October, the WTO ministerial meeting ended
prematurely in Cancun after member countries failed to reach a consen-
sus over issues concerning investment, competition policy, government
procurement, and trade facilitation. 181 A month later, the United States
was forced to table many difficult and sensitive issues in its negotiation
over the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 182 which sought to extend the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") to all of the coun-
tries in North and South America except Cuba.
As a result of these international setbacks, U.S. trade officials have
shifted their focus to bilateral, plurilateral, and regional arrangements. 183
As then-United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick declared, it
is important to distinguish the can-do countries from the won't-dos. 184
Using a divide-and-conquer strategy, U.S. trade officials now seek to un-
dermine the efforts by Brazil, India, and other less developed countries in
the Group of 21 to establish a united negotiating front.
By October 2004, the United States had concluded bilateral or re-
gional free trade agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Guatemala,
179. Internet Piracy Not to Be Overlooked by Antipiracy Caucus, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, Oct. 22, 2003. The Caucus also seeks to influence trade agreements, educate other
members of Congress, and demonstrate new technologies that reduce piracy. See Adam Jones,
New Caucus to Fight International Intellectual Piracy, COX NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 21, 2003.
180. Bill Holland, The Hill Did Little with Music, BILLBOARD, Dec. 20, 2003.
181. Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks over World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2003, at Al; Editorial, The Cancun Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A24.
182. See Paul Blustein, Free Trade Area of Americas May Be Limited, WASH. POST, Nov.
19, 2003, at El; Simon Romero, Trade Talks in Miami End Early, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003,
at Cl; see also Editorial, Free Trade, i la Carte, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A14; Peter K.
Yu, Globaphobia: Why the Arguments Against the FTAA Were Flawed, CNN.COM (Nov. 25,
2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/ll/25/findlaw.analysis.yu.ftaa (discussing criti-
cisms of the Free Trade Area of the Americas).
183. See generally Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellec-
tual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004) (discussing the increasing focus of the
United States trade officials on bilateral, plurilateral, and regional free trade agreements). For
excellent discussions of the recent bilateral free trade agreements, see generally DAVID VIVAS-
EUGUI, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE
TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) (2003), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/
pdf/FTAA(A4).pdf, Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings
in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004).
184. See Robert Zoellick, US Commitment to Transparent Global Trade Negotiations
Must Be Reciprocated by Others, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at 20; see also Becker, supra note
181; Simon Romero, Frustrated, U.S. Will Seek Bilateral Trade Pacts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2003, at C2.
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El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Australia, Morocco, the
Dominican Republic, and Bahrain 185 (in addition to NAFTA with Can-
ada and Mexico 86). Trade talks are underway with Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama, Peru, Thailand, and the Southern African Customs Union (in-
cluding Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland). 187
On their face, bilateral and regional arrangements are not bad, as
long as they are not coercive. 188 At times, they may be more effective
than multilateral agreements in addressing local concerns and circum-
stances. 189 Such agreements may facilitate the gradual inclusion of trad-
ing partners into the global economy. Interjurisdictional competition in
trade rules may also encourage countries to try out new ideas, which in
turn improves the quality and diversity of available legal and regulatory
solutions. 190
Nevertheless, intellectual property agreements can create tension
among foreign countries, especially if the recording industry and U.S.
policymakers do not recognize the changing geopolitical landscape.
When less developed countries signed on to the WTO agreements a dec-
ade ago, they were divided and unclear as to what they wanted. Some of
the issues involved in the agreements-such as intellectual property
rights-were relatively new and arguably of low priority to these coun-
tries. 19 1 These days, however, less developed countries have become
more vigilant, organized, and sophisticated. Led by such heavyweights
185. Office of the USTR, Press Release, United States and Bahrain Sign Free Trade
Agreement, available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/
September/UnitedStates.Bahrain.SignFreeTrade._Agreement.html (Sept. 14, 2004) [here-
inafter USTR Press Release].
186. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
187. USTR Press Release, supra note 185.
188. See Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual
Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and Interna-
tional Relations Theorists, 70 U. CiN. L. REV. 569, 573-82 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Toward a
Nonzero-sum Approach] (discussing and criticizing the coercive approach); see also Yu, The
Copyright Divide, supra note 6, at 437-44 (discussing the limitation of coercion).
189. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversitv in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685, 703-06 (2002) (discussing how legal variation permits each jurisdiction to
match its laws to the unique tastes and preferences of its population).
190. See id. at 707-09 (discussing interjurisdictional competition and legal experimenta-
tion).
191. For background on the history of the TRIPs Agreement, see generally DANIEL
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003);
MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and
Global Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL
INTEGRATION 39 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997); A. Jane Bradley, Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Investment and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the
Foundation, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
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as Brazil and India and supported by China, 192 which remains a sleeping
giant, these countries now have a better sense of what they want. 193
They understand the importance of intellectual property bargains and are
willing to take a more aggressive collective stance.
Contrary to what the trade officials and other commentators have
claimed, 194 this changing stance of less developed countries may benefit
the United States and result in a more harmonized international trading
system. After all, it is more efficient and effective to negotiate with
players who know what they want than with those who do not. 195 As the
managements of some corporations have acknowledged, providing stra-
tegic planning to help labor unions organize is beneficial because it en-
ables the unions to understand the preferences of their members. Such
assistance, in turn, will speed up the negotiation process and perhaps lead
to an outcome that is more satisfactory to both sides. 196
Cognitive psychologists have shown that decision makers tend to
devalue proposals offered by their adversaries even when they would ac-
cept identical proposals from allies or neutral parties. 197 Because many
less developed countries view the United States as their adversary, they
are likely to devalue U.S. proposals. The frustration that less developed
countries have built up at recent WTO and FTAA meetings in Seattle,
Cancun, and Miami can only have made matters worse.
Moreover, as less developed countries believe they received a bad
bargain in the Uruguay Round and were forced to adopt trade legislation
that ignored their needs and interests, their policymakers would be par-
192. China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. For a discus-
sions of China's entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING
COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2002); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO:
CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Symposium, China and the WTO:
Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003).
193. For a discussion of the position taken by less developed countries and the Group of
21, see, for example, Editorial, Lessons from the Cancun Debacle, Bus. TIMES SING., Sept. 16,
2003; David Greising & Andrew Martin, U.S. to Pursue Regional, Individual Trade Talks,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2003, at C1; Hopes Dashed for Poor at WTO, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 18,
2003, at P2.
194. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 181.
195. See Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach, supra note 188, at 603 (discussing the
strategic partnership between management and a labor union).
196. See STEPHEN M. DENT, PARTNERING INTELLIGENCE: CREATING VALUE FOR YOUR
BUSINESS BY BUILDING STRONG ALLIANCES 131-32 (1999).
197. "Reactive devaluation" refers to the tendency to "devalue a proposal received from
someone perceived as an adversary, even if the identical offer would have been acceptable
when suggested by a neutral or an ally." ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 165 (2000); see id. at 165-66 (dis-
cussing reactive devaluation); see also Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach, supra note 188,
at 594 & n. 155 (discussing cognitive barriers in negotiation).
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ticularly cautious about proposals introduced by the United States (and
the European Union). Thus, the U.S. government is likely to face
staunch resistance, or even opposition, from less developed countries
when it seeks stronger intellectual property protection in bilateral treaty
negotiations, even if such protection would be in the best interest of the
less developed countries. 198
2. Severe Criticisms of U.S. Copyright Policy in Foreign
Countries
Through international trade negotiations, the United States has suc-
cessfully pushed many countries to accept intellectual property provi-
sions that are controversial on U.S. soil. For example, it strong-armed
Chile and Singapore to adopt the controversial provisions of the DMCA
in their free trade agreements. 199 Likewise, even though many Ameri-
cans fiercely opposed the recent copyright term extension, 200 the U.S.
government included the extension in free trade agreements with Singa-
pore and Australia.20 1 Small countries like the Dominican Republic
have also been willing to accept the U.S. demands for stronger copyright
protection in exchange for other more tangible trade benefits and conces-
sions. 202
Ultimately, the increasing pressure for stronger intellectual property
protection abroad will hurt the United States. First, the bad publicity and
local resistance created by the agreements will reduce the appeal of U.S.
intellectual property laws. 20 3 So far, intellectual property laws have ap-
198. See Hansen, Will DVD Acquittal Mean Tougher Copyright Laws?, supra note 122
(quoting Professor Peter Jaszi as noting that "there is an increasing sense within that commu-
nity that the U.S. has a very strong protectionist agenda and that may not be in every case the
best approach for countries at different stages of development").
199. Capitol Hill, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 19, 2003.
200. See supra text accompanying note 141.
201. Emma Caine et al., Copyright "Harmony" Profits US Firms, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov.
19, 2003, at 71; Eddie Lee, Taking the Mickey Out of Innovation, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan.
20, 2004.
202. Michael Geist, Why We Must Stand on Guard over Copyright, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
20, 2003, at D3.
203. As Michael Geist wrote in an excellent opinion piece that called for caution in Can-
ada:
The reticence to adopt the WIPO [copyright] standard is understandable. Many be-
lieve the U.S. experience illustrates the dangers of adopting copyright protections
that may ultimately stifle innovation. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the
U.S. statute that implements the WIPO standard, has led to scholars declining to
publish their research out of fear of lawsuits, hundreds of individual Internet users
having their privacy rights ignored, and copyright law being strangely applied to ga-
rage door openers and computer printers.
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pealed to leaders of less developed countries because they hold out
promise of new jobs, foreign investments, tax revenues, technology
transfer, and the development of local artists, inventors, and indigenous
industries. 204 Policymakers and commentators at times have attributed
the prosperous U.S. entertainment, computer, pharmaceutical, and bio-
technology industries to strong intellectual property laws. However, this
perception might change if the laws the United States forced on them
through the free trade agreements turn out to stifle innovation and
threaten the survival of local establishments.
Eventually, the agreements will reduce the United States' hard-
earned soft power by making American ideas and concepts less appeal-
ing. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explained, soft power allows a
country to transform the preferences of other countries by appealing to
ideas and culture rather than by threatening military action.20 5 This in-
tangible power is particularly important in today's globalized world as
countries increasingly need to cooperate to resolve difficult cross-border
problems, such as illicit drug trafficking, refugees and illegal immigra-
tion, environmental degradation, illegal arms sales, nuclear proliferation,
terrorism, and corruption.
Second, the controversial intellectual property provisions in the free
trade agreements are likely to result in local discontent-at least in the
short run before the long-term benefits materialize. Such discontent in
turn will threaten the established relationships of local governments and
businesses. To reduce the impact of these provisions, government lead-
ers may relax enforcement or become cautious about the efforts they un-
dertake to combat piracy. For example, in the 1980s, the South Korean
government took very seriously the political threat made by college stu-
dents who feared that the government's antipiracy efforts would increase
textbook prices. 20 6 In the early 1990s, Chinese leaders also acted quite
cautiously when they signed intellectual property agreements with the
Id.
204. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 137, at 192-93; Yu, The Harmoniza-
tion Game, supra note 138, at 246-47.
205. ROBERTO. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 220 (3d ed.
2001) (defining soft power as "the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what
you want" and "the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coer-
cion"); see generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2004) [hereinafter NYE, SOFT POWER]; see also id. at 55 ("Perceived hypocrisy is
particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values. Those who scorn or de-
spise us for hypocrisy are less likely to want to help us achieve our policy objectives.");
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE xvi (2002) (noting the increasing importance of soft
power).
206. See RYAN, supra note 191, at 75.
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United States so that the Chinese people would not perceive their leaders
as bowing to U.S. pressure. 20 7 In Thailand, Prime Minister Prem Tinsu-
lanond's administration was even ousted in a no-confidence vote in 1987
after his administration attempted to strengthen the country's copyright
law. 208
Third, the push for stronger intellectual property protection abroad
may lead to unexpected outcomes that adversely affect U.S. economic
interests. For example, despite the inclusion of stronger copyright pro-
tection in the U.S.-Vietnam free trade agreement, software companies
like Microsoft did not receive the intended benefits. Instead of proprie-
tary software, Vietnam now embraces open source software as its solu-
tion to software piracy. In 2003, the country announced its plan to re-
quire all state-owned companies and government ministries to use open-
source software within a year.209 Other less developed countries that are
concerned about their intellectual property-related obligations under the
free trade agreements may follow its lead.
Finally, despite the agreements, copyright holders may not receive
the protection that the U.S. government negotiated on their behalf. There
are no universally accepted intellectual property principles, and countries
signing the bilateral or regional agreements may not agree with the
United States on the extent of intellectual property protection. Unless
U.S. negotiators are able to show foreign government leaders why it is in
their interest to adopt higher intellectual property standards, it is unlikely
that they will be willing to accept the agreements-or, more importantly,
to commit scarce resources to support the implementation and enforce-
ment of those agreements.
Indeed, negotiators from less developed countries have become in-
creasingly skeptical of the U.S. position because of successful challenges
to U.S. laws before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. For ex-
ample, in 2000, the European Union successfully challenged section
207. For the cautious approach taken by Chinese leaders in negotiating the intellectual
property agreements with the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 137, at 140-51. As one commentator noted, the careful ap-
proach taken by Chinese leaders "goes some way towards explaining much of the brinkman-
ship which has characterised the negotiations between China and the United States on this [in-
tellectual property] issue." Robert Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The
Imposition of Copyright on China by the West, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 207
(Lionel Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998); see also SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND
IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 215 (1998)
(noting that if the leaders of these countries "succumb to U.S. pressure, they are subject to
criticisms of selling out sovereignty to foreign interests").
208. See SELL, supra note 207, at 192.
209. Lee, Taking the Mickey Out of Innovation, supra note 201.
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110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,210 which exempted U.S. restaurants,
bars, and retail stores that use "homestyle" audio and video equipment to
play broadcast music from the obligation to pay royalties.211 In a
slightly earlier WTO panel decision, the European Union effectively cur-
tailed the ability of the United States Trade Representative to impose
sanctions under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, including those re-
lated to intellectual property protection. 2 12 If the media industries are to
lobby for an international regime that targets digital piracy, they must
take into account the United States' international treaty obligations and
domestic controversies when they design their proposals. 213
3. Diversion of Public Attention from Domestic Copyright
Issues
As the P2P file-sharing problem grows, some U.S. policymakers,
industry executives, and media pundits may seek to divert public atten-
tion from the privacy intrusions associated with industry's enforcement
tactics to piracy of copyrighted materials in foreign countries. For ex-
210. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000).
211. United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act: Report of the Panel, WTO
Doc. WT/DS/160iR (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispue/1234da.pdf. The European Union contended that the Fairness in Music Licensing Act
and the homestyle exemption of the United States Copyright Act violated United States' obli-
gations under the TRIPs Agreement. The United States defended that the exemption was valid
under article 13 of the Agreement. Ultimately, the dispute settlement panel held for the Euro-
pean Union, maintaining that the FIMLA violated articles 1 lbis(1)(iii) and 1 l(l)(ii) of the
Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement. For excellent discussions of the
dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of Interna-
tional Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R.
Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness
in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REv. 93 (2000). Notwithstanding the loss before the WTO
dispute settlement panel, the United States did not amend the Copyright Act. For a discussion
of the implications of the United States' action, see Richard Owens, TRIPs and the Fairness in
Music Arbitration: The Repercussions, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 49 (2003).
212. United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R
(Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/1 52R.doc.
213. Many commentators already recognized these needs by including discussion of the
United States' international treaty obligations in their proposals. See FISHER, supra note 11, at
248-49 (contending that his proposal would require treaty modifications because it would not
be limited to noncommercial uses); Eckersley, supra note 11, at 153-58 (discussing the inter-
action between his virtual market proposal and the three-step test as enunciated in Article 13 of
the TRIPs Agreement); Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 11, at 45-46 (contending
that her proposal would comply with the United States' treaty obligations under the Berne
Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty); Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note
11, at 60 n.199 (maintaining that "there is a colorable argument that [his proposal] would
comport with [United States obligations under intellectual property treaties], and in particular
would fall within the scope of permissible limitations to copyright holder rights under Article
13 of TRIPS").
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ample, they may discuss how the unauthorized copying problem in the
United States is miniscule as compared to piracy problems abroad. 214
They may also emphasize the textbook215 or software piracy problems in
Africa, Asia, and South America.216 As Rick McCallum, the producer of
the latest Star Wars trilogy, put it, the drive to protect copyrighted works
needs to be "as concentrated an international event as the war on terror-
ism." 2 1
7
To some extent, this strategy resembles the tactics of the Reagan
and first Bush administrations in the face of a growing domestic budget
deficit in the 1980s and early 1990s.2 18 Instead of discussing domestic
problems and looking for a solution within the country, policymakers
and the public media focused on countries with which the United States
had large trade imbalances, such as China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.219
Although the administrations threatened to impose sanctions on these
countries, they ultimately abandoned their threats. If policymakers and
industry executives were to divert public attention to international piracy,
they would make the same mistake. Although it is true that piracy
abroad is a serious problem, piracy at home is just as serious. Until the
media industries are able to reduce domestic piracy, their sales are
unlikely to increase, as U.S. businesses tend to focus on the domestic,
rather than foreign, markets.
International copyright piracy has been a long-standing problem.
From nineteenth-century book piracy in Belgium, Holland, and the
United States to unauthorized private copying over P2P networks today,
the efforts of copyright holders to eradicate piracy have been futile.220
Although the copyright industries successfully lobbied their governments
for favorable terms in international agreements 22 1 and bilateral trea-
214. See, e.g., Mark Landler, For Music Industry, U.S. Is Only the Tip of a Piracy Iceberg,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2003, at Al (noting that "the recording industry's problems with the
illegal online distribution of music in the United States pale beside the rampant piracy that
goes on overseas").
215. See, e.g., Metin Munir, A Tale of Thefts and Pirates, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at 2.
216. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL PLANNING & RESEARCH CORPORATION, EIGHTH ANNUAL
BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY: TRENDS IN SOFTWARE PIRACY 1994-2002 (2003),
available at http://global.bsa.org/globalstudy/2003_GSPS.pdf.
217. Lynden Barber, Net Raiders Zap Film-makers, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 15, 2002, at 5,
quoted in Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in Interna-
tional Copyright, 43 IDEA 630 (2003).
218. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 137, at 178 (discussing the United
States-China trade deficit).
219. See generally RYAN, supra note 191, at 67-89.
220. See generally Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6 (comparing piracy in nine-
teenth-century America, twentieth-century China, and twenty-first-century cyberspace).
221. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
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ties222 and for unilateral sanctions,223 international piracy remains a ma-
jor problem. In light of this history, it would be a waste for copyright
holders to devote vast resources to combating international piracy, in-
stead of directing them toward stemming piracy at home.
C. P2P File-Sharing Wars in Other Industries
Although the P2P file-sharing wars began in the recording industry,
they already have spread to the publishing, television, and motion picture
industries. 224 Pirated books are now widely traded online. Shortly after
the release of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, the fifth in-
stallment of the best-selling Harry Potter series, unlicensed reproductions
of the book were distributed on the Internet.225 Although many people
find it uncomfortable to read books online, electronic books are attractive
to experienced file-sharers because book files are small and fast to
download, and they allow users to conduct text searches, highlight, anno-
tate, and perform other research tasks. Thus, some commentators have
claimed that the publishing industry may ultimately be the most vulner-
able to digital piracy, 226 and that such piracy would harm writers the
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994);
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, last revised
at Paris July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; International Convention for the Protection of Per-
formers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted Oct. 26, 1961,
496 U.N.T.S. 43; WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/94
(Dec. 23, 1996); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (Dec. 23, 1996).
222. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United
States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 677
(1995); Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, P.R.C.-U.S., 34
I.L.M. 881 (1995).
223. See Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright
Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 29, 39 (1995)
(discussing the United States' use of Special 301 actions on Taiwan, China, and Thailand); Yu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra note 137, at 140-48 (discussing the United States' success in
using § 301 sanctions to pressure China to reform its intellectual property regime).
224. For a discussion of why digital piracy began within the recording industry, see
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 77-78.
225. See Amy Harmon, Harry Potter and the Internet Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003,
at Cl; Michael Pollitt, Like Music, Books Have Now Fallen Prey to Internet Pirates,
INDEPENDENT (London), July 30, 2003, at 11.
226. As Peter Menell pointed out:
[U]ltimately the publishing industry may be the most vulnerable content industry to
unauthorized reproduction and distribution because the content (text) will always be
directly perceptible (and hence subject to copying, even if through scanning or re-
typing). Furthermore, libraries have become interested in distributing eBooks
through their websites.... Whereas music and audiovisual content can be encrypted
in such a way that the user cannot see the content without authorization, the essence
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most, as writers "rely far more completely on copyright royalties than
musicians ... or film producers." 227
Like books, movies and television programs will not be immune to
widespread digital piracy. Lower-quality copies of feature films have al-
ready appeared in P2P networks, sometimes soon after their box-office
release or even before release. 228 Likewise, episodes of prime-time tele-
vision series like The Sopranos, The West Wing, and Sex and the City
have appeared online before they were exported abroad or put on DVDs
and videos.229
So far, the low bandwidths and the long downloading time, along
with protected formats used in videos and DVDs, have prevented wide-
spread file sharing of movies and television programs. However, with
increased broadband deployment, higher bandwidths, and more advanced
compression technologies, downloading of audiovisual files is likely to
be as commonplace as music downloading. Indeed, the movie industry,
mindful of the threat, is already experimenting with legitimate online
movie downloads via Movielink and CinemaNow.230 Only heavy re-
strictions and unsatisfactory user experience have kept these services
from taking off.
Ultimately, these industries, especially the motion picture industry,
may respond to P2P file sharing differently, for two reasons. First, they
may have learned from mistakes made by the recording industry. Sec-
ond, the unique structure of these industries protects them against wide-
spread file sharing. As Peter Menell explained, the motion picture indus-
try's "tight controls over theatrical release, pay-per-view, and premium
channel distribution ... will continue to work into the digital future. ' '231
While the video market's prior experience with encryption offers some
protection against unauthorized distribution, the "competitive pricing of
DVDs and the potential for directors' cuts (with previously unreleased
scenes), behind-the-scenes footage, game and merchandising tie-ins, and
other added features will keep many consumers within the legitimate
of books (the text) will always be available to the extent that the books are sold in
hard copy form. Therefore, would-be copyists will be in a position to scan such
content into digital form within hours of a book's release.
Menell, supra note 74, at 128-29.
227. Eckersley, supra note 11, at 112.
228. See, e.g., Jon Healey & Richard Verrier, Latest Plot Twist for 'Star Wars': Attack of
the Cloners, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2002, pt. 1, at 1 (reporting that the new "Star Wars" episode
appeared on the Internet a week before the movie's release); Laura M. Holson, Studios Moving
to Block Piracy of Films Online, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at Al (reporting suggestion by
industry analysts that "there could be as many as 500,000 copies of movies swapped daily").
229. Brian Buchanan, Move with the TV Times, GUARDIAN (London), May 1, 2003, at 19.
230. Jon Healey, Piracy Fears Limit Film Downloads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at Cl.
231. Menell, supra note 74, at 124.
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market for content .... [In fact], digital technology may significantly im-
prove the film industry's delivery and revenue models. 232
Since early 2004, record sales have rebounded, and the recording
industry seems to have mounted a comeback. For the first time in years,
the continuous sharp decline of record sales has slowed down. A recent
study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project showed that music
downloads fell drastically, by more than fifty percent in spring 2003,233
while a study commissioned by the recording industry showed that more
than sixty percent of the respondents, as compared to thirty-five percent
prior to the lawsuits, now understand the illegality of online file trad-
ing.234 Although these recent developments could be attributed in part to
many other factors, such as an improving economy, a better selection of
artists and albums,235 and an increasing tendency to deny downloading
activities, 236 recent developments are encouraging-although the indus-
try's mass-litigation strategy remains disturbing.
232. Id. at 124-25; see also Crawford, supra note 168, at 607 (listing domestic and inter-
national box office, airline performances, pay-per-view, rental, home sale, satellite, premium
and basic cable, over-the-air broadcast among the distribution windows for the motion picture
industry).
233. See PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, SHARP DECLINE IN Music FILE
SWAPPERS: DATA MEMO FROM PIP AND COMSCORE MEDIA METRIX (2004) (reporting a sur-
vey that showed that the percentage of music file downloaders had fallen to 14 percent (about
18 million users) from 29 percent (about 35 million)), available at http://www.pewinternet.
org/PPF/r/109/report.display.asp. But see Marguerite Reardon, Oops! They're Swapping
Again, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5142382.html (Jan. 16, 2004)
(reporting survey by The NPD Group, an independent market research firm, that "peer-to-peer
usage was up 14 percent in November 2003 from September").
234. John Borland, RLAA Embarks on New Round of Piracy Suits, CNET NEWS.COM (Jan.
21, 2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5144558.html.
235. Chris Nelson, CD Sales Rise, but Industry Is Too Wary to Party, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 2004, at C1.
236. As Siva Vaidhyanathan queried:
Clearly the music industry has lost sales in the years since it killed off Napster. Is
this lull a historical anomaly? Is it the result of alienating consumers? Is it the re-
sult of fewer titles for sale? Are compact discs overpriced? Do consumers have
fewer marginal entertainment dollars to send to the recording companies, and do
they have more entertainment options? If downloading is pervasive and detrimental
to music sales, why aren't these companies doing worse than they are? Why does
anyone who has a networked computer buy music at all?
VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY, supra note 15, at 42. The recent study
by the Committee for Economic Development concurred and attributed the recording indus-
try's recent revenue decline to the following additional factors:
The consolidation of ownership of radio outlets and the increasing importance of
mass market retailers (as opposed to specialty stores), who have doubled their share
of the market, has led to a smaller number of artists receiving air play and having
their materials available to a mass audience. The industry significantly reduced the
number of new releases from 38,900 in 1999 to between 27,000 and 31,000 in
2001-a 20-25 percent drop. Cyclical changes in musical tastes also seem to have
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III. EIGHT MODEST PROPOSALS
For economic incentives to work appropriately, property rights must
protect the rights of capital assets.... At present ... severe eco-
nomic damage [is being done] to the property rights of owners of
copyrights in sound recordings and musical compositions[;]... un-
der present and emerging conditions, the industry simply has no
out... Unless something meaningful is done to respond to the...
problem, the industry itself is at risk.
- Alan Greenspan23 7
Since the beginning of the P2P file-sharing controversy, commenta-
tors have proposed a whole host of solutions. Part III sorts these solu-
tions into eight categories based on their underlying models and en-
forcement techniques: (1) mass licensing, (2) compulsory licensing, (3)
voluntary collective licensing, (4) voluntary contribution, (5) technologi-
cal protection, (6) copyright law revision, (7) administrative dispute reso-
lution proceeding, and (8) alternative compensation. After evaluating the
benefits and limitations of each category of proposals, this Part contends
that policymakers need to embrace a range of solutions, as each individ-
ual solution will target only part of the unauthorized copying problem.
A. Mass Licensing
The mass-licensing model was pioneered by Apple Computer when
it launched its iTunes Music Store in April 2003. Roxio relaunched
Napster six months later as a legitimate music subscription service and
had an impact. Even prior to Napster, the industry was experiencing a substantial
decline in 1995-2000 sales to 14-19 year-olds, traditionally its highest-spending
group. In addition, during the boom years of the 1990s the industry continued to
raise prices, with the average CD increasing in cost from approximately $12 to $15.
This overall price increase may well have affected sales as the U.S. entered an eco-
nomic downturn-indeed, the industry has continued to raise prices in the 2000s.
Another factor may have been fierce competition for the discretionary consumer en-
tertainment dollar: DVD sales rose by 61 percent in 2002, and video games are
competing directly for the attention of the crucial 14-19 year old purchaser.
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE SPECIAL
PROBLEM OF DIGITAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20-21 (2004) (footnotes omitted), available
at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-dcc.pdf.
237. Hearings on the Home Recording Act Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights,
and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1983) (testimony of Alan
Greenspan), quoted in STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, RE-THINKING THE NETWORK ECONOMY: THE
TRUE FORCES THAT DRIVE THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 144 (2002).
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entered into agreements shortly afterwards with Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity and the University of Rochester to provide students with unlim-
ited access to the music service.238 Since then, more than twenty col-
leges and universities have signed on to legal music downloading
services such as MusicNet, Napster, and Rhapsody. 239 Buy.com, Mu-
sicmatch, Sony, and Microsoft have also announced their intention to
open similar stores.240
The popularity of iTunes, 125 million of which were sold in its first
fifteen months, 241 has made the mass-licensing model seem attractive.
However, like copy-protected CDs, iTunes have been hacked and traded
without authorization. 242 The mass-licensing model therefore comes
with several challenges. First, unless record companies are willing to
provide content, these services may eventually meet the same fate as
other earlier and failed music subscription services. While it is impres-
sive that the iTunes Music Store offers more than 500,000 songs, this
figure pales when compared with the tens of millions of songs traded on
other P2P networks. 243
In fact, record companies may not have the rights to release all the
content they want on the Internet. 24 4 For example, they may have only
238. See supra Part I.
239. See John Borland, College P2P Use on the Decline?, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 24,
2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5322329.html (citing a report of the Joint Com-
mittee of the Higher Education and Entertainment Communities); Jefferson Graham, Students
Score Music Perks as Colleges Fight Piracy, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at 1A [hereinafter
Graham, Students Score Music Perks] (reporting about arrangements universities and colleges
made with the record industry for their students).
240. See John Borland, Sony to Launch Net Music Service, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 4,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5071475.html; John Borland & John G. Spooner,
MusicMatch, Dell to Launch Music Stores, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 26, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5082948.html; Ina Fried & John Borland, Microsoft Consid-
ering Music Store, CNET NEWS.COM (July 25, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-
5055392.html; Sandeep Junnarkar, Buy.com Founder Launches Music Service, CNET
NEWS.COM (July 22, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5051609.html.
241. Apple to Pay for Referrals to iTunes Site, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at C9.
242. See Lars Pasveer, Hacker Takes Bite Out of Apple's iTunes, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug.
12, 2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1002_3-5308337.html (reporting that Jon Johansen,
the Norwegian programmer who circumvented the copy protection technology used to protect
DVDs, had revealed the public key that Apple AirPort Express uses to encrypt music sent be-
tween iTunes and a wireless base station).
243. See EFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 11.
244. As Professor Loren explained:
Anytime a downstream user reproduces copies or distributes copies of a sound re-
cording, or publicly performs that sound recording, or makes a derivative work of
that sound recording, authorization from not only the sound recording copyright
owner is needed, but authorization must be obtained from the musical work copy-
right owner as well. Unless one of the limitations on the rights granted to copyright
owners applies, multiple clearances will be needed, particularly if the use involves
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the copyright in the sound recording but not the one in the underlying
composition, even though they may obtain a statutory license to use the
composition. They may have the right to release a song on a compact
disc or a cassette tape, but not in digital format online.245 As digital re-
lease involves rights in both the sound recording and the underlying
composition, confusion over overlapping rights has made it difficult for
record companies to clear rights for online releases. 246 As Mark Lemley
more than one right. For example, in webcasting a sound recording, not only will
the webcaster need to have authorization the public performance (for both the sound
recording copyright and the musical work copyright), but the webcaster will also
need to have authorization for the reproductions of both copyrighted works that are
made in the process of webcasting.
Loren, supra note 11, at 697-98.
245. See John Borland, Beatles Catalog Headed for Digital Distribution?, CNET
NEWS.COM (June 8, 2004), at http://news.com.com//2100-1027-3-5228914.html (reporting
that The Beatles were exploring arrangement to sell its songs online).
246. As Professor Litman explained:
[Iln many if not most cases, it can be difficult and sometimes impossible to discover
who the copyright owners of all of those rights are. One of the more disturbing
revelations of the Napster litigation was that record companies insisted that they
were unable to generate a list of the copyrighted works they claimed to own. (This
is particularly disquieting because one would assume they kept records in order to
send out those royalty checks they're supposed to be sending out, but apparently
not.) Some of the problem, apparently, is record keeping, but not most of it. In ad-
dition to difficulties caused by lost or misfiled records, there is significant legal un-
certainty about the ownership of rights to control digital exploitation of works that
are subject to contracts contemplating conventional exploitation. Record compa-
nies, for example, have claimed to own all copyright rights in the recorded music
they distribute under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, but most experts agree that
those claims are unpersuasive.... New York Times v. Tasini and Random House v.
Rosetta Books teach us that contractual assignments of copyright may not necessar-
ily include the electronic rights. We'd have to examine the contracts to be sure. We
might need to know whether the case would be coming up on the east coast or the
west coast. We'd also need to see the contract between the composer and the music
publisher for each song on the recording, and the contracts between each of the mu-
sic publishers and the record company that recorded each song. Those contracts
aren't publicly available. One suspects that a large number of them are no longer in
anyone's file cabinets either. Bottom line: we don't know with any certainty who
owns the digital rights in any number of recorded musical performances. That may
be why record companies have scrambled to settle cases when their ownership of
sound recordings is actually put in issue.
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 11, at 21-22 (footnote omitted); see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that contractual assignments of copyright may not
include electronic rights); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying a request for preliminary injunction enjoining book company from
selling e-books of novels whose authors had granted the plaintiff exclusive right to publish,
print, and sell their copyrighted works "in book form"), aJfd, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002);
John Schwartz, Music-Sharing Service at MIT. Is Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at
C 13 (reporting that MIT shut down its groundbreaking Library Access to Music System be-
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pointed out, some of the confusion over these rights may be resolved not
as a contract issue but as a policy matter:
[C]onsider the licensing of rights to musical works. ASCAP controls
and licenses the right to publicly perform most musical compositions,
while a different group (the publishers or record labels) generally
controls the right to reproduce such works. These groups will likely
fight vigorously over who has the right to license the network trans-
mission of musical compositions (and to receive revenue from that
transmission). The answer cannot be found in the license agreement,
nor is it likely to be found in some presumed "intent" of the parties.
The question will have to be answered as a policy matter, by courts
or by Congress.247
Out-of-print songs, many of which are currently available in P2P
networks, present especially difficult copyright clearance problems for
record companies. 248 It may be unclear who, if anyone, has the right to
reissue the song. For example, the copyright in the composition may
have reverted to the music publisher or the recording artist. The record
company that originally released the song may have gone bankrupt or
have lost or misfiled the original recording contract. The company may
simply refuse to grant digital rights because it prefers projects with a
wider audience and a larger profit margin. As a result, many of the songs
available on the P2P networks may never be released.
Second, the many restrictions that copyright holders place on li-
censed downloads make the switch to licensed services less desirable.
For example, iTunes and Napster offer only "tethered" downloads, which
limit use of music files to selected computers for the monthly subscrip-
tion period.249 As the recent National Research Council study noted,
cause of confusion over licensed rights). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Over-
lapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 547 (1997).
247. Lemley, supra note 246, at 574.
248. As one commentator wrote passionately:
It wasn't just free instant access to big hits; it was that you could discover things
that no radio would play, uncover songs from years old memories. If online music
were shut down altogether there would be no more tracking down the song your
mother used to sing to you, no more Fat Albert theme song, no more lost television
live bootlegs from 1975, no more Jim Morison at a moment of unreleasable vulgar-
ity jamming with Jimi Hendrix.
ALDERMAN, supra note 81, at 169; see also Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11,
at 3 (contending that "P2P file-sharing is not just downloading music and movies for free...
[but] a vehicle for finding works that are otherwise not available, discovering new genres,
making personalized compilations, and posting creative remixes, sequels, and modifications of
popular works").
249. See discussion supra Part I.
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"Buy a book and you own it forever; pay for a service and when the pe-
riod of service is over, you (typically) retain nothing." 250
Indeed, by converting the product into a service, the mass-licensing
model may take away protections afforded to consumers under existing
copyright law, such as the first-sale doctrine, which allows a person who
legally acquires a copy of a copyrighted work (say, a book or CD) to
trade or resell that copy. Moreover, problems will arise when consumers
replace their computers or move music from one home entertainment
system to another. Unless music content is released without restrictions,
consumers are unlikely to be satisfied and will eventually turn to black
markets in the Darknet or use illegal means to relocate their legally pur-
chased music files. 251
Third, in times of budget crisis for most public universities, it is un-
clear whether tuition should be allocated for entertainment. There is also
a wide disagreement among students and administrators over how
schools should select a service and how much they should pay for one.
A heavy metal fan may find unappealing a service that focuses primarily
on classical and jazz music. Likewise, a fan of rap and hip-hop music
may find unattractive a service that focuses largely on alternative rock.
Until a single service can satisfy the wide range of musical tastes on
campus, there will be serious questions concerning the type of service to
which the university has subscribed, the cost of that service, and the fair-
ness of asking non-file-sharing students to subsidize their file-sharing
counterparts.
This debate about allocating campus-wide computing resources for
music downloads is not new. During the height of the Napster boom,
many colleges and universities were concerned about the costs of com-
puting resources that were allocated to music downloads and the result-
ing network congestion that interferes with teaching and research.252 As
250. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 101 (comparing the impact on libraries of can-
cellation of hardcopy and electronic journal subscriptions).
251. Such black markets flourish in countries whose government maintains a stringent in-
formation control policy, such as China. See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspec-
tives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property De-
bate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 28-32 (2001) (discussing China's censorship and information
control policy). For discussions of regulation of media and audiovisual products in China, see
generally Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for Media Products in China,
in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997);
Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
LAW AND PRACTICE 355 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
252. As one commentator explained:
Napster users eat up large and unbounded amounts of bandwidth. By default, when
a Napster client is installed, it configures the host computer to serve MP3s to as
many other Napster clients as possible. University users, who tend to have faster
[Vol. 76
P2P AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COPYING
an article in the Indiana University student newspaper put it, "Students
attempting to hunker down to coursework should not have to be incon-
venienced by a strain on the network. '253
Eventually, some universities banned Napster, and many of those
who did not were sued. In April 2000, the heavy-metal rock band Metal-
lica filed lawsuits against the University of Southern California, Indiana
University, Yale University, and other educational institutions for violat-
ing copyright and racketeering laws by allowing students to use Napster
to share music performed by the band. 254 In response to these lawsuits,
more than 200 colleges and universities banned the use of Napster over
their networks, while others, like MIT, Princeton, and Stanford, refused
to follow along, citing concerns over free speech and academic free-
dom. 255
Once music downloading is legitimized, questions about allocation
of computing resources will resurface. As a result of this legitimization,
the number of music downloaders will increase, as will the frequency of
network congestion. The service may also attract those who otherwise
would not download music because they believed such action was ille-
gal.256 Indeed, due to high bandwidth and reliable service, universities
are likely to become targets-or supernodes-for file-sharing soft-
ware. 257 Ultimately, students not only will have to pay for a campus-
wide music service about which they have reservations but also will have
to bear the cost of increased computing resources and higher bandwidth
needed for music downloads unless the music downloading services pro-
vide alternate servers outside the campus network.
connections than most others, are particularly effective servers. In the process,
however, they can generate enough traffic to saturate a network. It was this reason
that Harvard University cited when deciding to allow Napster, yet limit its band-
width use.
Roger Dingledine, Accountability, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2, at 271.
253. ALDERMAN, supra note 81, at 112.
254. Evangelista, Metallica Suit Rocks Napster, supra note 150.
255. As James Bruce, vice president of MIT, wrote to Metallica's attorney, "MIT has had
a long history of providing its faculty, staff, and students with uncensored access to the Inter-
net and its vast array of resources. This policy is consistent with MIT's educational mission
and our deeply held values of academic freedom." ALDERMAN, supra note 81, at 112.
256. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 70.
257. See Dingledine, Accountability, supra note 252, at 271 (noting that University users
tend to be targeted in a P2P system because they tend to have faster connections than most
others).
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B. Compulsory Licensing
To compensate artists and copyright holders for the revenue losses
caused by private, noncommercial digital copying, some commentators
have proposed compulsory licensing schemes by which the government
would impose fees on P2P goods and services. For example, Raymond
Ku proposed statutory levies on Internet service subscriptions and the
sales of computers and audio and video equipment. 258 Under his plan,
the government would collect and distribute the proceeds to artists, as
compared to copyright holders, based on aggregate Internet use. Glynn
Lunney favored levy-based compulsory licensing over strong encryption-
based copyright protection as a fairer and more efficient means to regu-
late the market in creative works. 259 According to Lunney, unauthorized
private copying and sharing may be a positive market force, as it
"will... enable consumers to recapture a portion of the excess incentives
otherwise associated with the production of more popular, non-marginal
works... [and thus]... reduce the corrupting influence that excess in-
centives would otherwise exert on the authorship process." 260
Neil Netanel advanced the compulsory licensing model by drawing
a comprehensive blueprint for establishing and administering a "non-
commercial use levy" ("NUL"). 261 As he described the proposal:
The levy... would be imposed on the sale of any consumer product
or service whose value is substantially enhanced by P2P file sharing
(as determined by a Copyright Office tribunal). Likely candidates in-
clude Internet access, P2P software and services, computer hardware,
consumer electronic devices (such as CD bumers, MP3 players, and
digital video recorders) used to copy, store, transmit, or perform
downloaded files, and storage media (like blank CDs) used with
those devices. In return for imposing the NUL, the law would pro-
vide copyright immunity for individuals' noncommercial copying
and distribution of any expressive content that the copyright owner
258. SeeKu, supranote 11, at 311-22.
259. Lunney, supra note 11, at 916 (stating that "a government-set levy is likely to be
more fair and efficient than prices set by the copyright industry and enforced through strong
encryption-based protection").
260. Id. at 869. As Mark Nadel explained:
[P]rotection against unauthorized copying provides dramatically disproportionate
benefits to the most popular creations: it enables the publishers seeking to create
blockbusters to finance enormous promotional campaigns, which drown out valu-
able, artistic creations that lack competitive marketing efforts. In this way, § 106 of
the Copyright Act may actually serve to raise entry barriers for many new creations
by diminishing expected profits for these economically marginal works.
Nadel, supra note 162, at 790.
261. Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 4.
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has previously released to the public. Individuals' noncommercial
adaptations and modifications of such content would also be nonin-
fringing as long as the derivative creator clearly identifies the under-
lying work and indicates that it has been modified. 262
William Fisher, in his book Promises to Keep, recommended re-
warding copyright holders for both commercial and noncommercial
uses.2 63 As he summarized his proposal:
A creator who wished to collect revenue when his or her song or film
was heard or watched would register it with the Copyright Office.
With registration would come a unique filename, which would be
used to track transmissions of digital copies of the work. The gov-
ernment would raise, through taxes, sufficient money to compensate
registrants for making their works available to the public. Using
techniques pioneered by American and European performing rights
organizations and television rating services, a government agency
would estimate the frequency with which each song and film was
heard or watched by consumers. Each registrant would then periodi-
cally be paid by the agency a share of the tax revenues proportional
to the relative popularity of his or her creation. Once this system
were in place, we would modify copyright law to eliminate most of
the current prohibitions on unauthorized reproduction, distribution,
adaptation, and performance of audio and video recordings. Music
and films would thus be readily available, legally, for free. 264
Whether you call these proposals taxes, levies, or tariffs, they all are
derived from the compulsory licensing model, which has been used re-
peatedly in the past to settle copyright disputes over new media and
technologies. In 1909, after the Supreme Court declined to extend copy-
right protection to player piano rolls, 2 65 Congress amended the copyright
statute to grant compulsory licenses that enable record companies, artists,
and others to produce and distribute "mechanical reproductions" of
nondramatic musical works. 2 66 Congress soon expanded this provision
to include "covers" (musical works composed by somebody other than
the performer and previously released by another recording artist).2 67 As
the Internet emerged, Congress amended the statute even further to in-
262. Id. (footnote omitted).
263. FISHER,supra note 11, at 199-258.
264. Id. at 202.
265. White-Smith Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (rejecting the extension of
copyright to player piano rolls).
266. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
267. Id. § 115(c)(3)(A).
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clude the distribution of sound recordings via digital transmission and the
transmission of sound recordings by Webcasters. 268
Moreover, Congress has used compulsory licensing to nurture the
development of new, emerging technologies. In the early decades of
television, all programming was publicly broadcast over the airwaves,
and consumers were able to see the copyrighted telecasts without paying
any service fees.269 When cable television emerged as a fee-based ser-
vice in the late 1960s, however, copyright holders in the telecasts sued
the operators to collect a share of the service fees. The Supreme Court
ultimately decided the issue in favor of the cable industry, holding in two
cases that cable transmissions did not implicate the copyright laws be-
cause cable operators did not engage in the public performance of trans-
mitted works. 270 In response to these cases, which were handed down
during the time when the 1909 Copyright Act was being revised, copy-
right holders lobbied Congress for changes to bring cable transmissions
under the new statute. The resulting 1976 Copyright Act therefore in-
cluded a compromise that requires cable operators to pay copyright hold-
ers statutory royalties in exchange for the retransmission of broadcast
signals under limited conditions. 27 1 As satellite television became popu-
lar, Congress further extended compulsory licenses to cover satellite re-
transmission of television programming into private homes.272
In the 1980s, the emergence of digital audio recording technology,
which allows consumers to reproduce unlimited, near-perfect copies of
prerecorded music, posed a substantial threat to the recording industry.
In 1992, Congress responded by enacting the Audio Home Recording
Act ("AHRA"). 273 Using the compulsory licensing model, the AHRA
prohibits legal actions for copyright infringement based on the manufac-
ture, importation, or distribution of digital audio equipment or media for
private, noncommercial recording.274 The provision also immunizes
consumers for the use of digital audio recording equipment or media for
noncommercial, analog, or digital home audio taping. In return, AHRA
requires manufacturers and importers of digital hardware and blank digi-
tal media to pay compensatory royalties to copyright holders injured by
268. Id. § 114(d)(2).
269. See JULiE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 423
(2002).
270. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Telepromp-
ter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
271. 17U.S.C. § 111.
272. Id. § 119.
273. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
274. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
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the new technology. 275 The act also mandates that all digital audio re-
cording machines be equipped with a Serial Copy Management Sys-
tem,276 which provides copyright and generation status information
while preventing recording devices from producing a chain of very high-
quality digital copies that could supplant factory copies. Although the
AHRA was created to alleviate the digital threat, courts have found the
statute inapplicable to P2P networks and audiovisual works.277
Compulsory licenses not only have been used in the United States
but also are popular in Canada, Germany, and many other European
countries, which have imposed taxes on blank recording media and
equipment to compensate artists and songwriters injured by the unauthor-
ized reproduction of their works.278 In addition, many of these countries
have imposed levies on portable MP3 players and P2P goods and ser-
vices. For example, Germany imposed a tax of C7.50 on PC-integrated
CD burners, 279 and the Copyright Board of Canada sought to impose a
275. Id. § 1003.
276. Id. § 1002(c).
277. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (issuing prelimi-
nary injunction against P2P service and holding that the AHRA does not immunize the service
from making music files available for others to copy on the network).
278. See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT 10-31 (2003) (discussing the private copying levy provisions of the European
Union), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&evies-report.pdf; Ysolde
Gendreau, Canada, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 8[2][f][ii] (Paul
E. Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 2002) (discussing the private copying levy provisions of
Canada). As the EC Information Society Directive stated:
Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right
provided for in Article 2... in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a
natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly
commercial, on condition that the rightholders receive fair compensation which
takes account of the application or non-application of technological measures re-
ferred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter concerned.
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society art. 5(2), 2001
O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter EC Information Society Directive] (emphasis added); see also Pe-
ter K. Yu, An Overview of the EU Information Society Directive, GIGALAW.COM (Nov. 2001),
at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001 -all/yu-2001-11 -all.html (discussing the EC Informa-
tion Society Directive).
279. See FISHER, supra note 11, at 312 n.27; see also HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note
278, at 25-27 (discussing the extension of private levies to digital media and equipment);
Lunney, supra note 11, at 853-55 (discussing the use of levies in Europe); Netanel, Noncom-
mercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 32 & n.109 (discussing the Germany's levy provisions).
See generally Reinhold Kreile, Collection and Distribution of the Statutory Remuneration for
Private Copying with Respect to Recorders and Blank Cassettes in Germany, 23 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 449 (1992).
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levy of $15 on portable MP3 players with up to ten gigabytes of nonre-
movable memory and $25 on devices with more memory.280
In sum, the compulsory licensing model has a wide variety of bene-
fits. It rewards copyright holders while permitting the public to have un-
restricted access to copyrighted works for private, noncommercial use. It
also harmonizes U.S. copyright law with that of many foreign countries.
It may even "fund a broader spectrum of creators than under our current
copyright system," as Neil Netanel suggested. 281
Notwithstanding these benefits, the model presents a number of
challenges and concerns. First, it is not easy to determine how to divide
the royalty pool. Commentators have suggested solving this problem by
employing new technologies such as digital watermarking, digital sam-
pling, metering software, and monitoring tools. However, these tech-
nologies-at least at their current state-are far from reliable and accu-
rate. Fans are able to abuse the system by repeatedly downloading songs
of their favorite artists or by inflating download counts using "ballot-
stuffing" programs or mistaken identities. 282
In fact, some artists may feel cheated, as the system may not accu-
rately reflect the market value of many downloaded songs. 283 Moreover,
subsequent uses are sometimes more valuable than initial downloads,
many of which amount to only music sampling. A mechanical system
that counts all downloads equally therefore may skew the results, leading
to improper and disproportionate compensation to some artists and
songwriters. Although a more sophisticated digital monitoring system
may alleviate this weakness, the new system may raise consumer con-
280. See COPYRIGHT BD. OF CAN., supra note 110, at 56. This tariff was recently struck
down by a federal Canadian court, which held that the Copyright Board did not have authority
to impose such a tariff. See supra Part I.
281. Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 6.
282. But see Eckersley, supra note 11, at 104-06 (discussing precautionary measures
against "identity rental"); Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 55-57 (dis-
cussing why efforts to game the system are unlikely to undermine the integrity of his pro-
posal).
283. Professor Netanel designed his proposal so that it could distinguish subsequent uses
from initial downloads. As he explained:
Subsequent uses, which might entail viewing or listening to a work or copying it
onto an MP3 player or other portable device, should be given greater weight than
initial downloads. Metering such uses would more accurately reflect each work's
value to users than merely counting the number of downloads or even the number of
hard copy purchases. Certain types of works tend to be subject to more repeated
viewing, reading, or listening than others, and such ongoing use is an important
component of a work's value. In addition, it appears that users often download
works from P2P networks merely to determine whether they like the work, not be-
cause the user knows that she values the work in advance of downloading.
See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 53.
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cerns if it does not have sufficient safeguards to protect individual end-
users against privacy intrusions.284
Second, compulsory levies may not generate sufficient funds to
compensate artists, songwriters, and copyright holders, especially when
playback devices become cheaper and memory capacity larger.285 Con-
sider, for example, a one-terabyte (thousand-gigabyte) MP3 player,
which enables most consumers to store their entire CD collection. How
much levy can the law impose on the manufacturer of this device? If the
levy is higher than what consumers can afford-say, $10,000-very few
people will buy the device, and the development of this technology will
be stifled. However, if the levy is set at an affordable price-say,
$500-it is unlikely to sufficiently compensate artists, songwriters, and
copyright holders. At most, these rights holders will collectively receive
$500, assuming manufacturers will give away devices free of charge
(which is very unlikely to happen unless the manufacturers are also the
copyright holders).
Third, a levy system may create cross-subsidization problems by re-
quiring low-volume users, such as those who rarely use P2P networks, to
subsidize copyright holders and high-volume users.286 As Jane Ginsburg
284. See FISHER, supra note 11, at 228 (discussing the privacy implications of his pro-
posal); Eckersley, supra note 11, at 160-61 (same); Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra
note 11, at 55 (same).
285. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 855 (noting that private copying levies received by the
Society for Musical Performing Rights and Mechanical Reproduction Rights (GEMA), one of
Germany's collective rights organizations, "amounted to roughly 2.6% of its total revenues
both in 1998 and 1999" even though Germany has one of the most extensive private levy sys-
tems). But see Ku, supra note 11, at 313 (contending that "[a] 2 percent levy on these sales
would yield approximately $1.3 billion for distribution to artists per year... [which] repre-
sents the projected revenues for the entire digital downloading market under copyright in 2002,
or roughly $48,000 per new release"); Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at
60-67 (explaining why private copying levies would generate sufficient funds to satisfy copy-
right holders without imposing price increases that consumers deem unacceptable).
286. But see Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 67-74 (challenging the
cross-subsidization argument and offering measures to reduce cross-subsidization). As Profes-
sor Netanel pointed out:
The low-volume user subsidy problem is somewhat overstated, however. For one,
many low-volume users will happily pay a surcharge for the possibility of unlimited
file sharing even if they don't actually engage in much file sharing. After all, con-
sumers regularly buy computers with far more memory and processing capacity
than they actually use ....
Further, imposing the levy will encourage some low-volume users to become
high-volume users. If paying an extra $35 for a personal computer enables me le-
gally to use it to trade music and video files, I will be more likely to use the com-
puter for that purpose and I might find that I enjoy doing so.
Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 70; see also Eckersley, supra note 11, at
15 (noting that cross-subsidies may not present a major problem, because "[i]ncentives to pro-
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wrote when she discussed Bertlesmann-Napster's proposal of a $4.95
monthly surcharge, "From the user's point of view, 'all you can eat' is
not necessarily the best formula, at least not for those whose diet of
copyrighted works is modest."'287 By increasing monthly subscription
fees, the private copying levies will also make Internet service less af-
fordable, thus threatening to slow down broadband deployment while
widening the digital divide.288
Fourth, the levies may drive consumers to switch to alternative (and
often cheaper) products that do not bear the levy. 289 By creating an arti-
ficial price increase, the levy system discourages the creation and dis-
semination of new distribution technologies, resulting in a suboptimal
use of scarce resources. 290 The artificial price increase may also facili-
tate the creation of gray markets in countries that do not impose similar
levies.291 When these cheaper gray-market goods are imported to com-
duce digital writing and music will (almost always) result in great numbers of cheaper works
in tangible form").
287. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 164, at 1644.
288. The digital divide is the proverbial gap between those who have access to information
technology and digital content and those who do not. For discussions of the digital divide, see
generally THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FACING A CRISIS OR CREATING A MYTH? (Benjamin M.
Compaine ed., 2001); RANETA LAWSON MACK, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: STANDING AT THE
INTERSECTION OF RACE & TECHNOLOGY (2001); PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE (2001); MARK
WARSCHAUER, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: RETHINKING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
(2003); Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002); Peter K. Yu, Digital Revolution Would Help Connect
Detroit and Suburbs, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 17, 2004, at 11 A.
289. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 68.
290. As Professor Lunney explained in economic terms:
[A] levy discourages the creation and dissemination of new distribution technolo-
gies. With the introduction of innovative copying technology, a manufacturer is
likely to enjoy some market power with the new technology, whether as a result of a
patent or simple lead-time advantage. This market power offers the manufacturer
the opportunity to earn rents on the new technology that serve in turn as the incen-
tive for developing and producing the new technology. If a levy is imposed on such
technology, the levy will increase the price of the technology to consumers, creating
an artificial price increase and its resulting inefficiencies, as it would for existing
technologies. The levy will also reduce the rents available to the manufacturer for
introducing the new technology. With a levy, part of the rents otherwise available
to the manufacturer will be collected through the levy and turned over to copyright
owners. Reducing the rents available reduces, in turn, the manufacturer's incentive
to innovate. Reduced incentives, together with an increased price to consumers for
the new technology, are likely to slow the creation and introduction of new copying
and distribution technologies.
Lunney, supra note 11, at 856-57.
291. See Declan McCullagh, Cyberpiracy North of the Border, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct.
27, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2008-1028-5097180.html (interviewing Professor Michael
Geist about the gray market issue); see also Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the
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pete with the indigenous originals, the compulsory levies will hurt local
retailers without providing benefits to artists, songwriters, and copyright
holders. 292
Finally, as many copyright holders and commentators have noted
(and feared), compulsory licensing may create a culture that assumes
everything should be licensed.293 Even worse for the copyright holders,
a levy system, by expressly authorizing private copying, may "move pri-
vate copying from the margins into the mainstream, converting private
copying from a minor annoyance into a major threat to copyright reve-
nues." 294 Such a system also "would... limit the ability of copyright
owners to price discriminate and otherwise price their works as they see
fit." 2 9 5
Digital Biosphere: How the Internet Is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CoNN. L. REv. 333, 342
(2002) (noting that "information goods that attract taxation may shift to the lowest tax jurisdic-
tion because it is almost costless to do so"). For a discussion of gray-market goods, see gener-
ally Margreth Barrett, The United States' Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of Patented
Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911 (2000); Carl Baudenbacher, Trademark Law and Parallel Im-
ports in a Globalized World-Recent Developments in Europe with Special Regard to the Le-
gal Situation in the United States, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 645 (1999); Shubha Ghosh, An
Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 373 (1994); Seth Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray Market Equiva-
lents: Should Product Differences Result in the Barring of Unauthorized Goods from the U.S.
Markets?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1029 (1990).
292. Nevertheless, unless the levy imposed on the P2P goods and services is prohibitively
high, it is unlikely that many consumers will travel abroad primarily to avoid the levy. More-
over, most consumers will be concerned about the inconvenience and complication created by
foreign ISPs, even though it is technically possible to subscribe to these services.
293. See Evan P. Schultz, Jane Says, IP L. & BUS., June 2003, at 24 (interview with Pro-
fessor Jane Ginsburg of Columbia Law School, who expressed her concern that "a generaliza-
tion of the levy technique could lead to an even greater feeling on consumers' parts that
they're entitled to copy and 'share' anything they want"). Lydia Loren, however, noted that
the sense of entitlement can go in the other direction:
It may not be an exaggeration to say that the compulsory license is the root of the
problem in the music industry. Because of the mechanical license and its statutorily
provided royalty rate, there exists a sense of entitlement across the music publishing
industry: musical work copyright owners are entitled to eight cents per "mechani-
cal" copy of their work, regardless of the form that copy takes, the manner of the
distribution, or the price charged for the distribution. After all, musical work copy-
right owners are not permitted to refuse to license these derivative works, so they
dam well should be paid for any and all copies that are distributed.
Loren, supra note 11, at 710.
294. Lunney, supra note 11, at 857.
295. Id. at 857-58. As Professor Lunney explained:
With a levy-based approach, responsibility for setting prices would no longer reside
with copyright owners alone, subject only to the market; the government and
equipment manufacturers would also play a central role. Whether set by statute or
by negotiation with the manufacturers, copyright owners worry that the resulting
levies will prove inadequate to compensate them for lost sales should private copy-
ing become widespread.
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Under existing copyright law, copyright holders have the exclusive
right to decide whether, when, how, and to whom they want to license
their creative works.296 Except for a few minor statutory exceptions,
there is no requirement that copyright holders release their works against
their wishes. If a copyright holder believes that it would be less profit-
able to release a DVD version of his or her work along with a VHS ver-
sion, the right holder can choose to release only one of the two formats.
With a levy system, however, copyright holders would have no choice
but to release the product in exchange for a statutorily determined com-
pulsory licensing fee. From the industry's perspective, such a system
would set a bad precedent by requiring copyright holders to conform
their business plans to behavior that they believe is illegal and illegiti-
mate. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
was concerned about this type of precedent when it refused to impose a
compulsory royalty payment scheme in lieu of an injunction in A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.297 As the court noted:
Imposing a compulsory royalty payment schedule would give Nap-
ster an "easy out" of this case. If such royalties were imposed, Nap-
ster would avoid penalties for any future violation of an injunction,
statutory copyright damages and any possible criminal penalties for
continuing infringement. The royalty structure would also grant
Napster the luxury of either choosing to continue and pay royalties or
shut down. On the other hand, the wronged parties would be forced
to do business with a company that profits from the wrongful use of
intellectual properties. Plaintiffs would lose the power to control
their intellectual property: they could not make a business decision
not to license their property to Napster, and, in the event they planned
to do business with Napster, compulsory royalties would take away
the copyright holders' ability to negotiate the terms of any contractual
arrangement. 2 98
C. Voluntary Collective Licensing
In February 2004, the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") re-
leased a white paper recommending that the recording industry adopt a
voluntary collective licensing model similar to the one used by radio sta-
tions.29 9 The document outlined the proposal as follows:
Id. at 858.
296. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
297. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
298. Id. at 1028-29 (emphasis added).
299. EFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 11.
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[T]he music industry forms a collecting society, which then offers
file-sharing music fans the opportunity to "get legit" in exchange for
a reasonable regular payment, say $5 per month. So long as they
pay, the fans are free to keep doing what they are going to do any-
way-share the music they love using whatever software they like on
whatever computer platform they prefer-without fear of lawsuits.
The money collected gets divided among rights-holders based on the
popularity of their music.
In exchange, file-sharing music fans will be free to download
whatever they like, using whatever software works best for them.
The more people share, the more money goes to rights-holders. The
more competition in applications, the more rapid the innovation and
improvement. The more freedom to fans to publish what they care
about, the deeper the catalog. 30 0
Under this voluntary licensing scheme, "[a]rtists and rights holders
would have the choice to join the collecting society, and thereby collect
their portion of the fees collected, or to remain outside the society." 30 1
Before the EFF released its white paper, Daniel Gervais submitted a
similar proposal to the Department of Canadian Heritage of the Canadian
government. 30 2 Based on copyright models from Scandinavian coun-
tries, Gervais's proposal calls for an extended collective licensing system
in which rights holders opt out of a P2P licensing system while remain-
ing inside on default.30 3 As Professor Gervais explained:
[T]he extended collective licence system.., offers many benefits.
Users gain peace of mind, as they sign a contract giving them unre-
stricted access to a CMO's repertoire apart from specified exclusions.
In other words, they will not have to face a lawsuit from a rights
holder who turns up after the contract is signed and was neither rep-
resented nor expressly excluded from the system. Rights holders
have the advantage of better protection of their rights, and by present-
ing a united front they increase their clout in negotiations with users.
Finally, non-represented rights holders also have their rights pro-
300. Id. at 1; see also Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability
Regime for File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 73 n.23 (2004) (contending that $5/month
"is clearly an optimal price point, i.e., one that accelerates adoption (or reduces the transition
period) and generates maximum income").
301. EFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 5.
302. DANIEL GERVAIS, APPLICATION OF AN EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING REGIME
IN CANADA: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION (2003), available at
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/regime/regime-e.pdf.
303. Id. at 5.
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tected and can benefit from the remuneration they deserve, since their
works are being used for the benefit of the general public.304
Both proposals are strongly supported by existing systems used by
collective rights organizations, such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, and
by copyright clearinghouses. 30 5 By paying a flat fee, anybody can make
a public performance of songs in the repertories of these organizations,
which will collect the license fees and distribute the proceeds to their
members. Although the Copyright Act does not stipulate the fees an or-
ganization can charge, ASCAP and BMI are subject to court-
administered antitrust consent decrees that allow users to petition a judge
for a binding determination of "reasonable fees" should the licensee and
the organization disagree on the amount of the license fees.306
The voluntary collective licensing model is attractive for two rea-
sons. First, it allows consumers to determine whether they want to par-
ticipate in the system. Given the industry's aggressive approach, most
consumers are likely to participate regardless of the volume and fre-
quency of their file-sharing activities. Five dollars a month is nothing
compared to the severe penalty a consumer would face in an industry
lawsuit and to the increasingly high transaction costs due to spoofing and
other technological protection measures.
Second, the model permits copyright holders to determine whether
they want to participate in the regime. This allows them to continue to
maintain strong control over the licensing of their creative works while
reducing the chance of creating a new copyright culture that assumes the
licensability of all works-a danger, as we have seen, of compulsory li-
censing. The exclusive control of the copyright holders is important, for
the scope of fair use is partly defined by acceptable norms and customary
practice. 307
Nevertheless, the collective licensing proposals discussed in this
section may turn out to be more expensive to implement than their pro-
ponents anticipated. Consider, for example, the EFF's proposal. As P2P
304. Id. at 44.
305. See Loren, supra note 11, at 683-86 (discussing collective rights organizations).
306. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 1t, at 31; see also Michael A.
Einhom, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting, 24
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349 (2001) (discussing ASCAP and BMI's antitrust consent de-
crees).
307. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1137, 1160 (1990) (stating that a use should be found to be fair if it is "within... ac-
cepted norms and customary practice"); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (suggesting that "the fair use doctrine was predicated on the
author's implied consent to 'reasonable and customary' use when he released his work for
public consumption").
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file sharing spreads to other industries, those industries are likely to ask
for the establishment of a similar system to compensate for the damages
they sustain from online file trading. As Jane Ginsburg noted when
Bertlesmann proposed to place a monthly surcharge on Napster:
Pricing the surcharge may be problematic .... For example, a pro-
posed component of the Napster-Bertelsmann settlement would give
Napster subscribers a license to copy anything from the Bertelsmann
catalogue for $4.95 a month. But will it still be only $4.95 if other
record producers join in? And what about other kinds of works po-
tentially subject to file sharing, such as text, photographic images,
and audiovisual works? What sum will seem reasonable to the con-
sumer, yet generate enough return to make a blanket license fee ap-
peal to an increasingly broad class of copyright owners? 308
Moreover, voluntary collective licenses may suffer from the many
weaknesses associated with compulsory licenses. 30 9 These include the
difficulty in dividing the royalty pool; the lack of sufficient funds to
compensate artists, songwriters, and copyright holders; the requirement
that low-volume users subsidize copyright holders and high-volume us-
ers; and the creation of a copyright culture that assumes everything
should be licensed.
Being voluntary, such a system will also encourage free riding.
Many end-users may choose to stay outside of the system, "borrowing"
songs from their friends and from strangers they meet on the Internet.
Eventually, the system will break down. Thus, it remains questionable
whether voluntary collective licenses will provide effective compensa-
tion to artists and songwriters injured by widespread unauthorized copy-
ing on the Internet.
D. Voluntary Contribution
Many commentators and industry executives believe that "most
consumers.., will infringe copyrights at every opportunity unless they
are dissuaded from doing so by the fear of punishment. ' '310 As economic
theory has shown, consumers have a narrow view of self-interest and
tend to maximize utility by free-riding on others' efforts. 311 From this
308. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 164, at 1642-43.
309. See discussion supra Part III.B.
310. Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a
Book, 48 VILL. L. REv. 18, 62 (2003).
311. See generally Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L.
& EcoN. 147 (1975).
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perspective, copyright is needed to generate incentives for authors to cre-
ate and disseminate works of social value, because free riding will ulti-
mately drive down prices and result in underproduction of copyrighted
works.
This conclusion, however, does not take into account the transaction
costs incurred in file-sharing activities. Anybody who has tried to
download music from unlicensed Web sites knows how time-consuming
and frustrating it can be to locate what you want. Just think of the typos
you have to make to find music you like, the "Host not responding" mes-
sages, or the slow connection speeds between the host and your com-
puter. You might even get a different song because the uploader has
used a disguised title. To a teenager, it is not cool to get Backstreet Boys
when she wants to listen to *NSYNC, or Britney Spears when she wants
to listen to Christina Aguilera. It would be even more disappointing for a
teenager to find Bach and Mozart when he wants to impress his friends
with Pink and Outkast (although some of his friends who have never lis-
tened to Bach and Mozart may come to appreciate their music).
Moreover, people do give and share. They cooperate, sacrifice
themselves, and make charitable donations. 312 They also pay for prod-
ucts that are available free of charge, such as drinking water and copy-
righted materials. 313 Over the years, economists and sociologists have
identified many factors that lead individuals to contribute voluntarily to a
public good. Examples include altruism, the "warm glow" effect, 314
long-term self-interest, reputation, and informal cooperation. 315 From
time to time, we also notice that "people contribute to public television
and radio, nonprofit theater groups, [public] museums, and a wide vari-
ety of other cultural activities that could probably not survive without
312. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 859-60.
313. The free versions of many of these products are not perfect substitutes. For example,
tap water is not a perfect substitute for bottled water. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the
free availability of many of these products in different form or under different packaging.
Consider books for example. The Digital Dilemma, the National Research Council's recent
study on digital copyright, is available free of charge at http://www.nap.edu/
html/digital -.dilemma. Yet, it is available for purchase in both physical and digital formats.
Most recently, Lawrence Lessig released his new book, Free Culture, under a creative com-
mons license on its Web site, http://www.free-culture.cc. Yet, many people, including the au-
thor and many of his colleagues, still purchased the book.
314. "Warm-glow preferences mean that the act of contributing, independent of how much
it increases group payoffs, increases a subject's utility by a fixed amount." Thomas R. Palfrey
& Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and
Why?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 829, 830 (1997), quoted in Lunney, supra note 11, at 861 n.162.
315. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 861.
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their voluntary support, even though in those cases... they cannot ex-
clude those who never pay a cent." 316
Indeed, the Internet started when users networked their computers,
offering information gratis to other users with no firewalls, no techno-
logical protection measures, and no intellectual property protection.317
Arguably, P2P technologies also started under the same principle. 318 As
Gnutella's developer, the late Gene Kan, wrote:
The basic premise underlying all peer-to-peer technologies is that in-
dividuals have something valuable to share. The gems may be com-
puting power, network capacity, or information tucked away in files,
databases, or other information repositories, but they are gems all the
same. Successful peer-to-peer applications unlock those gems and
share them with others in a way that makes sense in relation to the
particular applications. 319
316. Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership, supra note 11, at 1150.
317. As Professor Litman explained:
The most powerful engine driving this information space turns out not to be
money-at least if we're focusing on generating and disseminating the content
rather than constructing the pipes that it moves through. What seems to be driving
the explosive growth in this information space is that people like to look things up,
and they want to share. This information economy is largely a gift economy. The
overwhelming majority of the information I'm talking about is initially posted by
volunteers. Many of them are amateurs, motivated by enthusiasm for their topics, a
desire to share, and, perhaps, an interest in attention and the benefits it may bring.
When one is a volunteer, the time and effort one is willing to put into contributing to
the information space can seem limitless. Volunteers move on, of course: they get
bored, or broke, or caught up in other things, but there seems to be an inexhaustible
supply of new volunteers to take their places, and, luckily, the new volunteers are
able to build on earlier volunteers' foundations. I potentially know all of the infor-
mation the other participants know. Their knowledge can be my knowledge with a
few clicks of a mouse. In return, I make my knowledge available to anyone who
happens by. Each of us can draw on the information stores of the others.
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 11, at 8-9 (footnote omitted); id. at 4 (noting that
"[t]he information space that has grown up on the world wide web is largely the result of anar-
chic volunteerism").
318. "One of Fanning's avowed aims was to circumvent the established channels of com-
mercial CD distribution, offering garage bands and other new acts a ready, wired audience."
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, at 165.
319. Kan, supra note 124, at 122. One commentator described how Napster coordinates
externalities in a way that encourages altruism:
As long as Napster users are able to find the songs they want, they will continue to
participate in the system, even if the people who download songs from them are not
the same people they download songs from. And as long as even a small portion of
the users accept this bargain, the system will grow, bringing in more users, who
bring in more songs.
Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 2, at 21, 33.
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Commentators have discussed three possible models of voluntary
contribution. The first is the "ransom model. '320 Best-selling author
Stephen King experimented with this model by offering on the Internet
his novella Riding the Bullet,32 1 and installments of a full-length novel,
The Plant.322 Instead of demanding money up front, he asked readers
who downloaded his work to pay him $1 (and subsequently $2) per in-
stallment and announced that he would not finish the work unless he re-
ceived payments for at least three-quarters of the downloads.
When King released Riding the Bullet, more than 400,000 copies
were downloaded in the first twenty-four hours. 323 Unfortunately, the
book's copy protection mechanism was soon cracked, and unlicensed
copies appeared on the Internet. When he released The Plant, free riders
had already become abundant, and soon both the novella and the novel
chapters were freely distributed on the Internet. Even those who were
willing to continue to pay King his "ransom" became concerned that he
might not complete the novel despite their contributions. In the end,
King's fans were caught up in a threshold public goods game, 324 in
which many people found not paying contributions to be in their self-
interest. By the time the fourth installment was released, less than half of
the readers had paid for it.325 King eventually announced that he would
"temporarily suspend" the project and offered the sixth installment for
free. He has yet to finish The Plant, and the ransom experiment was
folded within less than a year.
Since King's experiment, commentators have explored modified
versions of the ransom model. Raymond Ku suggested that musicians
might improvise the model by putting out teasers and free samples while
withholding the full album or their tour until they had received sufficient
320. See Ku, supra note 11, at 310.
321. Evan Hansen, Simon & Schuster Offers Net-Only Stephen King Novel, CNET
NEWS.COM (Mar. 8, 2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1017.3-237756.html.
322. For a discussion of Stephen King's experiment, see Ku, supra note 11, at 310; Lit-
man, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 11, at 2 & n.2; Zimmerman, Authorship Without Own-
ership, supra note 11.
323. Sandeep Junnarkar, Horrors for Publishing Industry: King e-book Cracked, CNET
NEWS.COM (Mar. 31, 2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-238694.html.
324. As Professor Lunney described:
In a threshold public goods game, individuals in a group must decide whether to
contribute voluntarily to the provision of a public good. If enough contributions are
made, the public good is provided. If not, the public good is not provided and indi-
viduals lose any contributions they have made. All individuals are better off if the
public good is provided, but individuals who do not contribute are better off than
those who do contribute whether the public good is provided or not.
Lunney, supra note 11, at 862.
325. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Stephen King Puts "The Plant" on Ice, CNET NEWS.COM
(Nov. 28, 2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-249133.html.
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rewards. 326 The Street Performer Protocol, as endorsed by Diane Zim-
merman, provides a mechanism through which authors may withhold re-
leasing their works until consumers have contributed sufficient funds to
meet their asking price. 327 Open Culture pushes the ransom model even
further by requiring authors to release their works subject to permanent
free-use licenses once the asking price is met.328 Nevertheless, the fail-
ure of King's experiment casts doubt on the model's technical and finan-
cial feasibility. The model would also put artists in the awkward position
of having to decide between reneging on their promise to issue a work
and forgoing income. 329
Tipping is the second model of voluntary contribution. File-sharing
services like Espra and Snarfizilla allow users to tip artists while
downloading their songs. 330 Contrary to what many believe and some
commentators have argued in the P2P context, people do tip, and tip
handsomely when there is an established social norm supporting the
practice. According to Internal Revenue Service estimates, consumers
pay more than $20 billion in tips to waiters and other service personnel
every year.331
Today, file-sharers trade billions of songs on the Internet each
month. If individual file-sharers are willing to tip a penny a song-
assuming our existing credit system would support such micropay-
ments332 -the model will yield hundreds of millions of dollars a year.
This figure is considerable even compared to existing industry figures.
326. Ku, supra note 11, at 310.
327. John Kelsey & Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copy-
rights, FIRST MONDAY (June 7, 1999), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_6/kelsey/
index.html.
328. See Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership, supra note 11, at 1126. For details
of how Open Culture operates, see generally OpenCulture, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.openculture.org/About/faq.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
329. As one commentator noted:
I think that whole motto of sort of nickel-and-diming people of this per chapter basis
was a mistake.... Every chapter was another test of whether people would pay the
threshold that (King) determined. I thought it got in the way of the relationship be-
tween the writer and audience-it was too mercantile.
Mariano, supra note 325 (quoting Forrester analyst Dan O'Brien).
330. Ku, supra note 11, at 310 (discussing Espra and Snarfizilla); see also David Kushner,
Tipping for Tunes, ROLLINGSTONE.COM (Mar. 7, 2001), at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/
newsarticle.asp?nid= 13427.
331. See Dan Seligman, Why Do You Leave Tips?, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1998 at 138, cited in
Nadel, supra note 162, at 839 (reporting the IRS's estimate that tips would amount to $15-18
billion in 1996); Ofer H. Azar, The Social Norm of Tipping: A Review, Soc. SCI. RES.
NETWORK (Sept. 5, 2002), at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=370081 (estimating the total
amount of tips would reach $26 billion).
332. See generally Dingledine, Accountability, supra note 252, at 286-307 (discussing
micropayment schemes as accountability measures in P2P systems).
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Although the recording industry is presently worth tens of billions of dol-
lars, the billion-dollar figure does not take into account the industry's
cost savings on CD manufacturing, shipping, storage, shelf space, and
now enforcement and litigation, as a result of online distribution. As the
user base and file-sharing network expands, the tipping model will be-
come even more attractive.
Magnatune provides an exciting new business model by combining
tipping with dynamic pricing (as exemplified by eBay and Price-
line.com). Functioning as an on-demand radio station, the service allows
users to listen to an album free of charge by streaming it over the Inter-
net.333 If users want to burn the album on a CD, they have to buy it.
Magnatune displays a "suggested price" but allows users to pay as little
as $5 or as much as they want. In fact, Magnatune has received an aver-
age of $8.93 per CD, well above the $5 minimum.334
The Magnatune model may provide a solution that could salvage
Stephen King's ransom model. The problem with King's experiment
was that he expected every reader to pay him the same amount and ig-
nored the reality that different customers place different values on his
work. Some customers may be willing to pay $10 per chapter, while
others may be willing to pay only $1. (Obviously, some may prefer not
to pay any money even if they are very interested in King's works.)
Thus, if King uses the Magnatune model, he may be able to acquire
three-quarters of his total expected revenues even though fewer than
three-quarters of his readers make a contribution.
The final model is the honor system, familiar to most high school
and college students in the form of honor codes. Stephen King main-
tained that his ransom model was derived from the honor system used by
newspapers in New York City in the early twentieth century. 335 Like-
wise, in the eighteenth century, major publishing houses in the United
States abided by the courtesy copyright system, in which each publishing
house refrained from publishing editions of a foreign work if there was a
pre-existing publishing agreement between the author and another pub-
333. See Kevin Maney, Apple's iTunes Might Not Be Only Answer to Ending Piracy, USA
TODAY, Jan. 21, 2004, at 3B.
334. Id.; see also Lunney, supra note 11, at 863 (noting that economic studies and game
theory research "have shown that voluntary contribution rates can reach the level necessary to
ensure efficient production of a public good").
335. As Stephen King noted, "newsboys at the time were often blind, and had to rely on
the public's conscience to pay for the newspapers people took." Zimmerman, Authorship
Without Ownership, supra note 11, at 1125 n.17 (quoting Stephen King, How I Got That Story,
TIME EUR., Jan. 8, 2000, available at http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2001/0l08/
king.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005)).
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lishing house. 336 As students and teachers well know, honor codes have
not been effective in curbing cheating.337 Thus, it is no surprise that vol-
untary contributions have yet to yield any "meaningful remuneration" for
authors and artists.338
E. Technological Protection
To protect against widespread piracy on the Internet, the entertain-
ment industry has developed many copy protection technologies, such as
encryption, digital watermarking, and the use of trusted systems.339 The
industry has also explored the use of digital rights management-based
business models that allow copyright holders to manage access while re-
336. See VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 9, at 52; Sam
Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 13-14 (1986); Yu,
The Copyright Divide, supra note 6, at 342. By virtue of the "courtesy copyright" system,
some English authors, like Charles Dickens and Anthony Trollope, "received large sums in
respect of the American sales of their works, although they did not enjoy protection under
United States copyright law." Ricketson, supra, at 14. At that time, the United States had yet
to offer copyright protection to foreign authors. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6,
at 336-53 (discussing copyright protection for foreign authors in the United States in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). Unfortunately, the system soon became ineffective
as competition grew and publication was no longer limited to major publishing houses. With
the large number of cheap library editions published by smaller houses, the courtesy copyright
system eventually collapsed. As Professor Vaidhyanathan described the cheap library edition:
The paper was uniformly cheap and flimsy, the typesetting sloppy, and the format
hard to read. Some of the earlier editions lacked covers to keep their costs low. But
soon the cheap publishers realized that the spine was in many cases the most attrac-
tive-and most visible-part of a book. So by the 1880s, most of the cheap books
libraries appeared in cloth bindings at a slightly higher price, but with the same
cheap paper inside. Needless to say, none of these publishers were part of the east-
ern seaboard elite club of publishers who were led by Henry Holt [a leading pub-
lisher at the time]. So none of them conformed to the courtesy principle.
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, supra note 9, at 53.
337. See, e.g., Kim Breen, Public Schools Taking Interest in Honor Codes, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 18, 2004, at IB; Susan C. Thomson, Amid Wave of Cheating, Universi-
ties Push "Academic Integrity," ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2004, at A7.
338. Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 76; see also Janet Kornblum,
Ain't Too Proud to Beg on the Net, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2002, at 3D (noting that "tip jars
aren't likely to replace ads or other revenue sources"). Ironically, two of the defendants sued
by the RIAA in April 2003 have successfully used the Internet to raise money to pay for their
settlements. See discussion supra Part I.
339. "A trusted system is a system that can be relied on to follow certain rules. In the con-
text of digital works, a trusted system follows rules governing the terms, conditions and fees
for using digital works." Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital
Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137,
139 (1997). See generally DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 153-76 (discussing techno-
logical protection).
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quiring consumers to pay for content usage.340 Notwithstanding these
self-help measures, the industry remains vulnerable. Although copy pro-
tection technologies allow copyright holders to lock up creative works,
these technologies lose their protective function when they are decrypted.
Even worse, once the decryption key is disclosed, the copyrighted work
will become available not only to those "techies" who successfully broke
the code but also to unsophisticated users around the world.
As Edward Felten explained, there is no perfect encryption technol-
ogy, and "strong encryption" techniques that a moderately skilled person
cannot break do not exist in the real world.34 1 Even the best encryption
technology performs merely like "a speed bump that will frustrate people
who want to copy illegally." 342 Moreover, technology developers have
to struggle with the trade-offs between cost and effectiveness 343 and be-
tween protection and inconvenience. 344 If the copy protection technol-
340. For a collection of articles discussing digital rights management, see generally Sym-
posium, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
487 (2003).
341. See Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age: Is the Market-
place Working to Protect Digital Creative Works?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 89-92 (2002) (testimony of Edward W. Felten, Associate Professor of
Computer Science, Princeton University), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?Ipaddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=85758.pdf&directory-/diskc/wais/data/
107 senate-hearings; see also P. Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of Content Distri-
bution, at http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/ darknet5.doc (2002), quoted in Netanel, Non-
commercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 10 (noting that digital rights management systems "are
doomed to failure").
342. A "Speed Bump" vs. Music Copying, BUS. WK., Jan. 9, 2002, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf2002019_7170.htm, quoted in
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, at 184 (interview with Professor Edward Felten of Princeton Uni-
versity). Although no encryption technology can protect perfectly, such technology does not
need to be perfectly robust to have a positive effect. As the recent National Research Council
study observed:
Most people are not technically knowledgeable enough to defeat even moderately
sophisticated systems and, in any case, are law-abiding citizens rather than deter-
mined adversaries. TPSs [technical protection services] with what might be called
"curb-high deterrence"--systems that can be circumvented by a knowledgeable per-
son-are sufficient in many instances. They can deter the average user from engag-
ing in illegal behavior and may deter those who may be ignorant about some aspects
of the law by causing them to think carefully about the appropriateness of their
copying. Simply put, TPSs can help to keep honest people honest.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 218.
343. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 153 (noting "inherent trade-offs between
the engineering design and implementation quality of a system on the one hand and the cost of
building and deploying it on the other"); id. at 164 (stating that "[a] good mechanism is one
that provides the degree of disincentive desired to discourage theft but remains inexpensive
enough so that it doesn't greatly reduce consumer demand for the product").
344. See id. at 154 (contending that "the quality and cost of a TPS [technical protection
service] should be tailored to the values of and risks to the resources it helps protect").
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ogy were too complicated, it would jeopardize the user experience and
make content inaccessible. However, if the technology were too simple
and easy to break, it would not offer sufficient protection for copyright
holders. Thus, "overly stringent protection is as bad as inadequate pro-
tection" in the commercial context, because revenues will be zero in ei-
ther extreme. 345
To prevent the public from breaking the copy protection technology,
copyright holders must constantly upgrade their technology. Such up-
grading, unfortunately, will further attract the attention of hackers, who
are eager to tinker with the latest technology. Eventually, the repeated
encryption and decryption will create a vicious cycle in which the enter-
tainment industry and the hacker community engage in an endless copy
protection arms race.346 Instead of devoting resources to develop artists
and improve products, the industry will have to invest resources in de-
veloping encryption technology and preventing consumers from access-
ing copyrighted works. This strategy is counterproductive and will hurt
artists, the entertainment industry, and ultimately consumers.
Moreover, the growing use of encryption technologies in copy-
righted products has raised some consumer concerns. 347 An encrypted
CD may not perform all the functions to which consumers have become
accustomed, 348 including those to which they may have a legal right un-
345. Id.
346. As Professor Ku explained:
[C]opy protection for digital content necessitates an expensive technological arms
race .... Given the difficulty of protecting digital works from copying, copyright
holders will be forced constantly to spend significant resources developing technol-
ogy just to keep the cat in the bag. These costs will in turn be passed on to the pub-
lic, not to provide the public with access to new works, but for the sole purpose of
limiting access. Given that hackers appear to be as adept, if not more so, at picking
the locks of copyright protection as those trying to lock up digital works, the costs
associated with a copy protection arms race would be unending.
Ku, supra note 11, at 319-20 (footnote omitted); see also Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copy-
right) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 251 (discussing the "wasteful 'arms race' of
technological-protection schemes, with each side increasing its spending to outperform the
other's technology"); Peter K. Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Los-
ing the Copyright War by Fighting Misdirected Battles, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL
COMMENTARY, (Aug. 15, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020815-
yu.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording
Industries Are Losing].
347. See Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing, supra note
346; Kevin Hunt, Record Industry Opens Attack on Consumer Rights, HARTFORD COURANT,
May 23, 2002, at 21.
348. For example, in January 2001, BMG experimented with encrypted CDs by partnering
with Midbar, an Israeli firm, to release two albums using Midbar's Cactus Data Shield tech-
nology. That technology prevented CD owners from copying music with burners. After re-
leasing about 100,000 CDs in the new format, BMG got so many returns that it eventually
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der copyright law. It may not be playable on car stereos, some PCs, and
old CD players, forcing consumers to buy new hardware they do not oth-
erwise need or cannot afford. It is therefore no surprise that the re-
cording industry encountered a highly negative response-including a
class action lawsuit by two California consumers349-when Sony re-
leased Celine Dion's album as an encrypted CD in 2002.350 In response
to the industry's action, some consumer advocates have called for record
companies to label encrypted CDs properly to avoid confusion and to al-
low consumers to choose whether they want to purchase those CDs.
To strengthen protection, the entertainment industry has lobbied
Congress hard for laws to protect against the circumvention of copy pro-
tection technologies. The DMCA was the crowning achievement of this
effort. Since its enactment, the industry has used the statute repeatedly
against circumventors. For example, the industry cited potential viola-
tion of the DMCA when it asked Edward Felten, a computer science pro-
fessor at Princeton University, to withdraw from a scientific conference
his paper on how to break the copy protection technologies designed by
the Secure Digital Music Initiative.351 Using the DMCA, eight major
movie studios brought a lawsuit to enjoin a hacker magazine from in-
cluding on its Web site hyperlinks to other sites that posted the code of
the DeCSS program, which decrypts the encryption-based system used
by the motion picture industry to protect DVDs. 352 In July 2001, the
Russian cryptographer Dmitry Sklyarov was arrested and charged with
violating the DMCA in the United States for giving a presentation to a
computer hacker convention on the software that removed security pro-
canceled the experiment and replaced the returns with nonprotected discs. See ALDERMAN,
supra note 81, at 110.
349. Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2002, § 3, at 1 (reporting that "[tlwo California consumers... have filed a class-
action lawsuit against the five major record companies, alleging that copy-protected CDs are
defective products that shouldn't be allowed on the market").
350. See George Cole, Celine Dion and the Copycats, FrN. TiMES, July 19, 2002, at 11.
351. See David P. Hamilton, Digital-Copyright Law Faces New Fight, WALL ST. J., June
7, 2001, at B10; see also Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6, at 395 (discussing the
RIAA's threat of lawsuit against Professor Edward Felten of Princeton University); Letter
from Matthew J. Oppenheim, Senior Vice President-Business and Legal Affairs, Recording
Industry Association of America, to Professor Edward Felton [sic], Department of Computer
Science, Princeton University (Apr. 9, 2001) (asserting that Professor Felten's disclosure of
information that "would allow the defeat of [those technologies that were part of the Chal-
lenge] would violate both the spirit and terms of the Click-Through Agreement ... [and] could
subject [Professor Felten and his] research team to actions under the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act"), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten vRIAA/20010409_riaa_
sdmi letter.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
352. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Yu, The Copy-
right Divide, supra note 6, at 395-97 (discussing Reimerdes).
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tection from Adobe e-books. 353 In October 2003, SunnComm, the
manufacturer of copy protection technology used in BMG's CDs, threat-
ened to sue a Princeton University computer science graduate student
under the DMCA for posting a paper on his Web site explaining how to
disarm SunnComm's technology by pushing the shift key when loading a
CD into a computer.354
Although the entertainment industry's need for legislation to keep
hackers away from copyrighted content and to avoid a wasteful arms
race with the hacker community is understandable, the deleterious effects
of the ill-drafted DMCA are substantial. In addition, the statute has been
repeatedly misused to stifle innovation and competition over such prod-
ucts as printer toner cartridges, 355 garage door openers, 356 electronic
353. Jennifer 8. Lee, U.S. Arrests Russian Cryptographer as Copyright Violator, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2001, at C8 (reporting Sklyarov's arrest); see also Symposium, Implications of
Enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Case Study, Focusing on United States v.
Sklyarov, 12 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805 (2002); Yu, The Copyright Di-
vide, supra note 6, at 397 (discussing the Sklyarov incident). The charges against Sklyarov
were later dropped in response to strong protests in the United States and in light of his agree-
ment to testify for the United States government against his former employer, ElcomSoft. See
David Frith, A Promotion a Day Keeps Apple A-weigh, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Jan. 7,
2002, at A12 (reporting that Sklyarov was released in a deal that "saw him admit the facts of
the case but not any illegal activity"). Subsequently, his Moscow-based employer, ElcomSoft,
was prosecuted for illegally selling software that permitted users to circumvent security fea-
tures in an electronic book. See Matt Richtel, Russian Company Cleared of Illegal Software
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at C4. In December 2002, a federal jury acquitted Elcom-
Soft of all charges. See id.
354. John Borland, Student Faces Suit over Key to CD Locks, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 9,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5089168.html. The company reacted by threaten-
ing to sue the student under the DMCA, claiming that the student's revelation of this obvious
and well-documented limitation had cost the company millions of dollars. SunnComm even-
tually dropped the lawsuit. Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won't Sue Grad Student, CNET
NEWS.COM (Oct. 10, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5089448.html.
355. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D.
Ky., 2003) (granting preliminary injunction to Lexmark, which claimed that its competitor
copied the encrypted code used by computer chips in its cartridges to enable remanufactured
cartridges to work with its printers); see also Frank Ahrens, Caught by the Act, WASH. POST,
Nov. 12, 2003, at El (discussing the case); Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress, Recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights in RM 2002-4: Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies 172-83 (Oct. 21, 2003) (sug-
gesting that § 1201(f) would exempt Static Control from violating the DMCA), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). The case is currently on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
356. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill.
2003), affd, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18513 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2004) (dismissing Chamberlain
Group's lawsuit against its competitor for manufacturing a universal garage-door opener that
works with Chamberlain's products); see also John Borland, Judge Shuts Garage Opener
Copyright Suit, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 14, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-
5107779.html (discussing the dismissal).
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pets,357 and voting machines. 358 It has also upset the historical balance
between copyright interests and access to information, thus raising seri-
ous concerns about free speech, privacy, academic freedom, learning,
culture, and democratic discourse.359
In the past few years, the entertainment industry has deployed tech-
nology to protect its products and develop new markets. Spoofing is an
offensive technique recently used by the industry. By inserting fake or
corrupted files into P2P networks360 and thereby forcing file-sharers to
sort out genuine music files from a large number of decoys, spoofing in-
creases transaction costs substantially, 361 undermines consumer trust in
file-swapping networks, 362 and discourages unauthorized downloading.
The technique also enables copyright holders to insert educational
messages to remind file-sharers that unauthorized downloading is illegal
and that it harms artists and songwriters. Teenage file-sharers may ig-
nore RIAA warnings, but they may be receptive to personal pleas from
their favorite musicians telling them how hard these musicians have
worked to make the new album. An overaggressive message, however,
could backfire. Before releasing Madonna's album American Life, War-
357. Dave Wilson & Alex Pham, Sony Dogs Aibo Enthusiast's Site, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2001, pt. 3, at 1 (reporting about the threat of lawsuit by Sony against the owner of the Ai-
bohack.com Web site for offering upgrades to software used in Sony's electronic pet dogs).
By November 2001, the site was back up "with more cautions and legal mumbo jumbo." Ga-
reth Cook, High-Tech Pet Tricks, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Jan. 20, 2002, at 9.
358. See John Schwartz, File-sharing Pits Copyright Against Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2003, at Cl (reporting about lawsuits filed by Diebold Election Systems against those
who are posting on the Internet copies of the company's internal communications about the
flaws in its electronic voting machines).
359. For criticisms of the DMCA, see generally Liu, supra note 153; Lunney, supra note
11; David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 673 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 26
U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (2001); Yu, Escalating Copyright Wars, supra note 8.
360. See, e.g., Paul Bond, Mercenaries in P2P Tech War, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 22,
2003 (reporting that spoofmg "appears to be gaining traction in the entertainment industry as a
leading technology employed in the war on digital piracy"); Lev Grossman, It's All Free!,
TIME, May 5, 2003, at 66 (reporting about the spoofing technique concerning Madonna's sin-
gle, American Life).
361. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 81 (questioning who wants to "experience
30 minutes or an hour of frustration, if for a dollar or so you can have what you want easily,
reliably, and quickly?"). As the study stated: "[I]n the digital age, content industries may mu-
tate, at least in part, into service companies. The key product is not only the song; it is also the
speed, reliability, and convenience of access to it." Id.; see also Gervais, supra note 300 (not-
ing that "value comes from a combination of availability .. user-friendliness, price, and
quality (and security) of the product (file)").
362. See Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 53 1; see also LIEBOWITZ, supra note 237, at 175-
76 (discussing the economics of the use of "antifreeloading" tools in P2P networks).
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ner Brothers Records circulated a spoofed version on the Internet with
the singer calling out "What the f do you think you're doing?" 36 3 In
response, a hacker broke onto the Web site Madonna.com and posted
real, downloadable MP3s of every song on the album.364 Angry fans
pitched in to remix Madonna's tirade with other songs.365
Another technique the entertainment industry has used to develop
and segment its markets involves versioning technology. Through price
discrimination, such technology enables copyright holders to offer dis-
counted downloads to customers interested in a nonsharable version of
the song while charging premium prices for versions that are fully shar-
able or that include other valuable features. In doing so, it "increase[s
the copyright holders'] ability to profit from their works... [and] ex-
pand[s] consumers' access to copyrighted material by lowering the
minimum price that creators and distributors of copyrighted works must
charge to recoup their investment. '366 It also facilitates differential pric-
ing that frees low-usage customers from subsidizing their high-usage
counterparts while ensuring that they are not priced out of the market.
F. Copyright Law Revision
An overhaul of the 1976 Copyright Act is long overdue. The statute
is unwieldy, counterintuitive, and internally inconsistent.367 As Jessica
Litman put it, "We can continue to write copyright laws that only copy-
right lawyers can decipher, and accept that only commercial and institu-
tional actors will have good reason to comply with them, or we can con-
trive a legal structure that ordinary individuals can learn, understand and
even regard as fair." 368 For some commentators, the only solution is to
wipe the slate clean and start afresh.
As Lydia Loren pointed out, Congress has been tinkering at the
margins of copyright law each time a new technological development
occurs, and this process "has led to a cumbersome and complicated set of
rules that creates significant obstacles to dissemination [of copyrighted
363. Grossman, supra note 360.
364. Id.
365. See Nik Bonopartis, Firms Say the Swap Must Stop, POUGHKEEPSIE J., July 16, 2003,
at IA.
366. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, Preface to COPYRIGHT ISSUES
IN DIGITAL MEDIA ix (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-
Copyright.pdf.
367. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6, at 404.
368. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19,
39 (1996).
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works] rather than facilitating such dissemination." 369 In Loren's view,
three main problems in the copyright arena confront the music industry:
First, as a result of the dual layer of copyrights [in the sound re-
cording and the underlying composition] and the divided rights
granted to each owner, there are too many vested industry players for
downstream users to be able to efficiently obtain the authorizations
needed for downstream use of recorded music. Second, the divisible
yet overlapping rights granted to copyright owners leads to industry
gridlock and problems with holdout behavior. Finally, the demands
for payment from the downstream user by too many vested industry
players, combined with industry consolidation, result in the price be-
ing too high to achieve the goal of copyright. In the words of
economists, the music industry is full of market failures.370
Because of these market failures, industry players are eager to
"build[] up vested interests around different statutory rights and then
caus[e] trouble when distribution technology changes and each industry
player asserts a right to obtain royalties for the new methods of exploita-
tion."371 To avoid this trouble, Professor Loren maintains that Congress
needs to rewrite the Copyright Act to consolidate the six exclusive rights
into "one 'right to commercially exploit' the copyrighted expression"
and to recognize the independence of derivative works. 372
Notwithstanding her fresh and interesting proposal, revising copy-
right law is easier said than done. The last revision of the Copyright Act
started in the mid-1950s and took more than twenty years to complete. 373
Since then, Congress has been reluctant to undertake any major revision
of the copyright statute even in the face of the digital challenge created
by the Internet and new communications technologies. 374 In 1993,
President Clinton formed an Information Infrastructure Task Force to re-
examine intellectual property laws in light of this changing environment.
369. Loren, supra note 11, at 678-79.
370. Id. at 698-99.
371. Id. at678.
372. Id. at 703.
373. For comprehensive discussions of the copyright law revision process, see generally
LITMAN, supra note 9; Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987).
374. Congress's reaction is understandable given the great difficulty in obtaining sustained
support for a multi-year revision process, the rapid proliferation of new communications tech-
nologies, stakeholders, and media entrepreneurs, and the constant evolution of the market.
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Disappointingly, the group's final report concluded that the existing
copyright regime would work perfectly in the digital context.375
The biggest problem with the copyright system today is that the
public interest is not adequately represented in the legislative process.376
The situation may change, however, as the interests of the computer and
consumer electronics industries increasingly align with those of the con-
suming public. Unlike public interest groups, industry representatives
always find a way to inject their proposals into the political debate. Nev-
ertheless, copyright revision will remain difficult to accomplish, as it will
involve many different stakeholders-writers, performers, publishers, li-
braries, schools, and individual consumers-with many different inter-
ests.377 Consumers expect free, easy and unrestricted access to copy-
righted materials. Publishers are eager to maintain their existing
markets. Performers are concerned about their exposure and royalties.
Distributors want to protect the continued use of their trucks, ware-
houses, and workers. And retailers seek to maintain their existing profit
margins. It is virtually impossible to align all of these goals and inter-
ests. Even if parties were willing to compromise, reaching these com-
375. See INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995).
376. The need to protect the public interest has been emphasized repeatedly in academic
circles and the public debate. As the British Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ex-
plained:
Too often the interests of the "producer" dominate in the evolution of IP policy, and
that of the ultimate consumer is neither heard nor heeded. So policy tends to be de-
termined more by the interests of the commercial users of the system, than by an
impartial conception of the greater public good. In IPR discussions between devel-
oped and developing countries, a similar imbalance exists. The trade ministries of
developed nations are mainly influenced by producer interests who see the benefit to
them of stronger IP protection in their export markets, while the consumer nations,
mainly the developing countries, are less able to identify and represent their own in-
terests against those of the developed nations.
COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 133, at 7.
377. As the recent National Research Council study explained:
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone, from authors and
publishers, to consumers (e.g., the reading, listening, and viewing public), to librar-
ies and educational institutions, to governmental and standards bodies. Each of the
stakeholders has a variety of concerns... that are at times aligned with those of
other stakeholders, and at other times opposed. An individual stakeholder may also
play multiple roles with various concerns. At different times, a single individual
may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher, or shareholder in publishing or enter-
tainment companies; a member of an editorial board; or an officer of a scholarly so-
ciety that relies on publishing for revenue. The dominant concern will depend on
the part played at the moment.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 51.
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promises would require a Herculean effort, not to mention the fact that
many of these parties might leave the negotiation table unsatisfied.
Any structural change in the copyright statute would upset existing
contractual relationships, 378 and Congress typically hesitates to rock the
boat. When Congress deliberated on the proposal to enact the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, it was reluctant to
"upset[] the longstanding business and contractual relationships among
record producers and performers, music composers and publishers and
broadcasters." 379
Moreover, as it would take a substantial amount of time for a statu-
tory change to influence contracting behavior, such a change is unlikely
to provide a quick fix to the unauthorized copying problem.380 Even
worse, as the DMCA illustrated well, changes to copyright law may have
unintended consequences. A recent Congressional Budget Office study
called for legislative caution, noting that changes to the copyright statute
could "have ramifications that extend beyond the concerns of producers
and consumers of copyrighted material to the well-being of related sec-
tors of the economy" and could even "influence the nature and pace of
future technological progress." 381
G. Administrative Dispute Resolution Proceeding
Mark Lemley and Anthony Reese suggested that it may be possible
to design a "quick, cheap dispute resolution system that enables copy-
right owners to get some limited relief against abusers of p2p systems
and to deter others from such abuse." 382 The incentive for rights holders
to opt into this administrative procedure and give up the right to sue file-
sharers in court would be reduced enforcement costs. 383 Consumers
would benefit from limiting the procedure to "clear cases" of high-
volume uploaders and from a robust set of affirmative defenses for "ar-
guable fair uses" such as making out-of-print works available to the pub-
lic or space-shifting lawfully acquired files from CDs to other media. 384
This proposal was largely inspired by the success of the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP"). 385 Introduced in
378. See Loren, supra note 11, at 678.
379. S. REP. No. 104-128, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 360.
380. See Loren, supra note 11, at 678.
381. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 366, at viii.
382. Lemley & Reese, supra note 74, at 1351-52.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999), available at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
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October 1999, the UDRP set forth the terms and conditions for resolving
disputes over the registration and use of domain names. Under the
UDRP, all registrants must agree to participate in a mandatory adminis-
trative proceeding if a third party complains to a dispute resolution ser-
vice provider. To prevail, the party bringing the case must prove that the
registrant's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trade-
mark or service mark in which the complainant has rights, that the person
who registered the domain name has no rights to or legitimate interest in
the domain name, and that registrant is using the domain name in bad
faith.
Although there is general agreement that the UDRP has been cost-
effective in resolving thousands of cases filed since the policy entered
into force in December 1999, the policy has been heavily criticized for
its procedural weaknesses. 386 Among the criticisms are the selection and
composition of the dispute resolution panel, the failure to provide ade-
quate time for a domain name registrant to reply to a complaint, the fail-
ure to ensure that the registrant has received actual notice of the com-
plaint, and the registrant's limited access to courts for review when the
dispute resolution panel decides against a party. To respond to these
criticisms, the Lemley and Reese proposal includes such features as the
selection of judges in a "fair and balanced ® way," an administrative ap-
peal process, and sanctions on frivolous or bad-faith claims made by
copyright holders. 387
Despite these adjustments, the dispute resolution proceeding may
raise more concerns and challenges than the UDRP. While a UDRP pro-
ceeding may result in the transfer of ownership of the domain name to
the prevailing trademark holder, it does not assign damages or take prop-
erty from the losing domain name registrant. The new proceeding may,
however, result in "an award of money damages or... [the removal of]
infringing material or the infringer.., from the network. '388 The denial
of computer access to "repeat infringers," as proposed, will raise serious
issues concerning human rights and the digital divide, even though such
386. For criticisms of the UDRP, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy "--Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 605 (2002); Mi-
chael Geist, Fair.Com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the
ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903 (2002). See also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141 (2001); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn
in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17
(2000); MILTON MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ICANN's UNIFORM DISPUTE
RESOLUTION POLICY (2003), available at http://www.acm.org/usacm/IG/roughjustice.pdf (last
visited Mar. 23, 2005).
387. Lemley & Reese, supra note 74, at 1412.
388. Id.
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a denial would also serve as a strong deterrent to potential high-volume
uploaders, as Professors Lemley and Reese anticipated.
Moreover, the public may still consider the new proceeding unfair.
Today, the public considers the RIAA's litigation unfair, largely because
the industry's lawsuits target only a small group of file-swappers even
though a large number of people are swapping files. Although Lemley
and Reese proposed limiting the proceeding to egregious offenders who
uploaded more than fifty songs during a thirty-day period,389 the system
would overload if a large number of people continue to trade more than
fifty songs a month. Trading as few as two songs a day to many different
friends is fairly commonplace today, especially among teenagers and col-
lege students. In addition, those who just meet the administrative thresh-
old of uploading fifty songs will face $12,500 in liability, while most of
the RIAA's current lawsuits have been settled for only a few thousand
dollars.
Nevertheless, Lemley and Reese believe the proposed system would
be fairer to the alleged infringers if they were given enough notice and
would be more beneficial to the copyright holders. As they explained:
Such a system would permit low-cost enforcement of copyright law
against direct infringers, reducing the need for content owners to sue
facilitators. Relative to levies, a dispute resolution system would
trade off some increase in cost for precision, targeting only those
making illegal uses rather than all users of computers or p2p net-
works. It would be more fair than selective criminal or civil prosecu-
tion, because the burden of paying the penalty for infringement
would fall more evenly on each wrongdoer, rather than imposing
stark punishment on a few in order to serve society's interest in deter-
ring the rest. 390
H. Alternative Compensation
Some commentators have called for the abolition of copyright,
which they consider obsolete and irrelevant in the digital world. In a
widely circulated article in Wired,391 John Perry Barlow likened the ex-
isting intellectual property model to an old freighter ill fitted to carry the
"vaporous cargo" of digital content. 392 The old ship, he wrote, cannot
389. Id. at 1413.
390. Id. at 1352.
391. Barlow, supra note 11, at 84.
392. Id.; cf Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv, 281 (1970) (discussing how
[Vol. 76
P2P AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COPYING
"be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized expressions any
more than real estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of
broadcasting spectrum." 393 As others have noted, online distribution has
allowed artists to distribute music directly to consumers without any in-
termediary. Once digital content becomes unbundled, these commenta-
tors argue, artists may be better off in a copyright-less world, as the cur-
rent system tends to reward popular works beyond their market value. 394
The manufacturing, marketing, and distribution costs are very high under
the old brick-and-mortar business model, and the vast majority of artists
do not receive any royalties from the sale of their music. 395
Three alternative models have received substantial interest: patron-
age, ancillary service, and home production. Long before the copyright
model was adopted, wealthy patrons from the monarchy, the nobility,
and the church funded the creation of musical and cultural works.396 Pa-
the economics of publishing may render copyright protection of published works unneces-
sary); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCS. 42 (1966) (expressing skepticism about the economic ra-
tionale of copyright).
393. Barlow, supra note 11, at 84; see also Ku, supra note 11, at 294 (contending that "the
economics of digital technology renders copyright both unnecessary and inefficient").
394. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 886.
395. As Professor Ku explained:
Unbundling the incentives for the creation and dissemination of music exposes the
myth that copyright plays much of a role in encouraging the creation of music. The
relative importance of copyright to creators and distributors is most evident when
one considers the fact that even with copyright protection, the vast majority of mu-
sical artists do not earn any income in the form of royalties from the sale of music.
In fact, not only do musicians rarely earn royalties from the sale of CDs, they are of-
ten in debt to the recording industry for the costs of manufacturing, marketing, and
distributing their music. Recording companies typically charge the artist for all the
costs of production, marketing, promotion, and other expenses, including break-
age-a holdover from when albums were made from vinyl. Even in today's digital
world, in which the cost of digital distribution is nonexistent, some record labels
have demanded that artists surrender even larger portions of their royalties for the
cost of encoding the song to digital format, encryption, and digital delivery. As one
report indicates, an artist must typically sell a million copies of a CD before she re-
ceives any royalties because record companies deduct the costs of production, mar-
keting, promotion, and other expenses from the musician's royalties. Meanwhile,
the same million copies will have earned the record company approximately $11
million in gross revenue and $4 million net. The income to most artists from per-
formance and mechanical fights for songwriting and composing from the sale of
music are similarly insignificant.
Ku, supra note 11, at 306-07.
396. See generally F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE ECONOMICS
OF MUSIC COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES (2004) (examin-
ing the political, intellectual, and economic roots of the shift of music composers from the pa-
tronage system to a freelance market). See also Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Any-
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tronage could take the form of directly commissioning musical composi-
tions or indirectly subsidizing composers by employing them as, say,
church organists or court music directors. 397 Although the eighteenth
century was a period of transition away from the patronage model, with
composers sometimes moonlighting as freelance artists,398 "[i]t is rea-
sonably well accepted that at the outset of the eighteenth century, most
musicians creative enough to be composers were employed either by the
nobility or by the church. '399 When they needed support to compose
new works, they usually turned to patrons. In the case of Bach, "his
compositions for and direction of the Collegium remained secondary to
his salaried church and school duties." 400
While the aristocratic patronage model no longer exists-at least
not in the United States-we can still set up a reward system to provide
authors with needed incentives. Indeed, many commentators have pro-
posed the reinstitution of such a system. 401 A modem patronage model,
however, has many drawbacks. Such a system would tend to reward the
creation of works preferred by the social elites rather than the public.40 2
way? How We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
1405 (2004), for a history of legal protection of musical works.
397. See SCHERER, supra note 396, at 54-56 (discussing the support for composers in the
noble courts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). Johann Sebastian Bach, for ex-
ample, spent his entire adult life as an employee--"first as organist at churches in Arnstadt and
Miihlhausen, then as organist and director of court music for the Duke of Weimar and prince
of K6then, and finally as cantor and director of music for the Thomasschule (School of St.
Thomas) and four affiliated Leipzig churches." Id. at 3.
398. Handel and Mozart are among those composers who tried "to take advantage of the
increased demand for public entertainment among the middle classes and break away into a
freelance existence." Michael Hurd, Patronage, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC, 936
(Alison Latham ed., 2d ed. 2002).
399. SCHERER, supra note 396, at 1.
400. Id. at 3.
401. See Eckersley, supra note 11 (proposing a reward system based on virtual markets).
But see Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 80-83 (criticizing the creation of
government rewards). Most of the existing discussions of the reward system in legal literature
focus on patents. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When
Is It the Best Incentive System?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 2 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds, 2002); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115
(2003); Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights in Informa-
tion: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and
the Alternative of a Government-run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 301 (1998); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should
Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997); Mi-
chael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944); Steven Shavell & Tanguy
van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
402. As Marci Hamilton noted:
If the class of creators were winnowed down to the rich and the government-
sponsored, and the free market were thus to be replaced by a patronage system, the
ability of art to speak to the American people would dwindle precipitously. Artistic
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If government funding is involved, such a system may also run into sig-
nificant opposition from politicians, who are rarely excited about raising
taxes. Given the many more pressing concerns of public policy, such as
funding Social Security and national security, it is unlikely that the pub-
lic would support an adequate allocation of government tax revenues for
creative activities.40 3 An efficient compromise may be for the govern-
ment to allocate resources only to those activities that the market is
unlikely to reward or to use those resources to facilitate broader public
access to information technology. 404
Moreover, government funding of the arts may have the perverse ef-
fect of stifling freedom of expression-as we have learned from past ex-
perience. In 1999, when the Brooklyn Museum prepared to open an art
exhibition featuring a depiction of the Virgin Mary shellacked in ele-
phant dung, New York mayor Rudy Giuliani threatened to pull the mu-
seum's city funding.40 5 A year earlier, the Supreme Court upheld a stat-
ute requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to consider "general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public" before awarding grants for artistic projects.406 As Neil
Netanel noted, in our democratic society where free speech and free
press are paramount values, "there remain substantial benefits to funding
the creation and dissemination of many expressive works, and to funding
them from sources other than state subsidy, corporate munificence, and
party patronage." 40 7
works would cater to elites; classical music might survive, but rock and country
would encounter grave difficulties.
Marci Hamilton, Why Suing College Students for Illegal Music Downloading Is the Right
Thing to Do, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY (Aug. 5, 2003), at http://writ.news.
fmdlaw.com/hamilton/20030805.html.
403. See FISHER, supra note 11, at 216-17 (2004) (conceding that his proposal "would
likely be unpopular"); Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 81. But see Eck-
ersley, supra note 11, at 109 (suggesting that "various interest groups will end up agreeing on
a decent compromise").
404. See Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 82.
405. David Barstow, Giuliani Ordered to Restore Funds for Art Museum, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1999, at Al; Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, Museum Says Giuliani Knew of Show
in July and Was Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at B1.
406. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998); see also Sympo-
sium, Art, Distribution & the State: Perspectives on the National Endowment for the Arts, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 705 (1999). See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49
VAND. L. REv. 73 (1996) (arguing that representative democracy demands means of challeng-
ing government and that art performs this function in a singular way).
407. Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 76; see also Neil Weinstock
Netanel, The Commercial Mass Media's Continuing Fourth Estate Role, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 317 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002).
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The second alternative is ancillary service. To supplant copyright
royalties, artists can look to revenues from live concert performances,
commercials, and movies. As the industry veteran Esther Dyson insight-
fully observed in Wired:
Chief among the new rules is that "content is free." While not all
content will be free, the new economic dynamic will operate as if it
were. In the world of the Net, content (including software) will serve
as advertising for services such as support, aggregation, filtering, as-
sembly and integration of content modules, or training of customers
in their use. Intellectual property that can be copied easily likely will
be copied. It will be copied so easily and efficiently that much of it
will be distributed free in order to attract attention or create desire for
follow-up services that can be charged for.40 8
This is the model used by the band The Grateful Dead, who gave
away their music by letting audiences tape their concert performances. 409
Likewise, artists in countries that have limited copyright protection have
been supporting themselves by earning additional income through other
professional ventures, such as movies, commercials, and endorsements.
If musicians are half as entrepreneurial as the film director George Lu-
cas, they may also earn secondary rights through merchandising or ex-
ploitation of their likenesses and onstage personas. 410 Indeed, as recent
408. Dyson, supra note 11, at 136; see also id. (noting that "[tihe creator who writes off
the costs of developing content immediately-as if it were valueless-is always going to win
over the creator who can't figure out how to cover those costs").
409. As The Grateful Dead's former lyricist John Perry Barlow wrote:
[Tihere is no question that the band I write [songs] for, the Grateful Dead, has in-
creased its popularity enormously by giving them away. We have been letting peo-
ple tape our concerts since the early seventies, but instead of reducing the demand
for our product, we are now the largest concert draw in America, a fact that is at
least in part attributable to the popularity generated by those tapes.
True, I don't get any royalties on the millions of copies of my songs which have
been extracted from concerts, but I see no reason to complain. The fact is, no one
but the Grateful Dead can perform a Grateful Dead song, so if you want the experi-
ence and not its thin projection, you have to buy a ticket from us. In other words,
our intellectual property protection derives from our being the only real-time source
of it.
Barlow, supra note 11, at 84.
410. See Ku, supra note 11, at 309-10 (citing George Lucas to illustrate how "secondary
markets can be more lucrative [for the artist] than the right to reproduce and distribute con-
tent"); see also Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human
Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 355, 356-57 (1998) (describing merchandising
as "a multi-billion dollar business"). As Raymond Ku pointed out:
The vast majority of artists do not earn their income from the sale and distribution
of music. Rather, they earn their income from the fame and publicity that go with
the distribution of music. Ticket sales, T-shirt sales, and commercial endorsements
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examples demonstrated, "file trading can spur demand for live public
performances, broadcasts, webcasts, merchandising," 411 commercial li-
censes and other musical products, including CDs and DVDs. 412
Unfortunately, the ancillary service model favors those artists and
musicians who can sell performances and products. Good-looking artists
with limited musical talent may prosper at the expense of highly talented
musicians with mediocre looks. In this era of blockbuster shows, the pop
music audience may prefer perfection and entertainment to authentic-
ity.413  The ancillary service model may therefore overreward lip-
synched performances, pre-recorded sound, and high-tech tricks that cor-
rect artists' vocal errors.
The third alternative model is home production. Digital technology
and the Internet have enabled every artist and musician to become a
composer, sound engineer, producer, publisher, and distributor (or even
critic). They have also greatly improved the quality of the copyrighted
work. By means of computer game engines, for example, users can now
make their own feature machinima movies without having to buy costly
equipment, rent spectacular locations, or hire glamorous actors.4 14 They
are all a function of an artist's popularity. By facilitating the distribution of music,
[P2P networks] and the Internet in general can be useful tools for increasing an art-
ist's ability to earn revenue as a result of fame. This is especially beneficial to new
or non-mainstream artists who are otherwise unable to capture the public's attention
through more traditional media.
Ku, supra note 11, at 311.
411. Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 49.
412. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 79; cf OBERHOLZER & STRUMPF, supra
note 15 (showing that file sharing has only had a limited effect on record sales).
413. When interviewed about Beyonc's partial lip-synched performance in the 2003
MTV Video Music Awards, in which she began her performance by descending head first
from the ceiling, an audience member responded, "Tell me, who can sing hanging on a harness
upside-down?... I'd rather her not ruin my favorite song and just put on a good show." Chris
Nelson, Lip-Synching Gets Real, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, § 2, at 1. Interestingly, lip-
synching began as a result of union regulations. As historian Marc Weingarten explained:
No one could quite figure out what sort of royalties singers deserved for a live TV
performance, so in the early days they just faked it. Later, the practice continued
out of sheer expediency. On "American Bandstand" and most variety shows of the
1960's, vocals and instrumentals were all faked; Keith Moon, the drummer for the
Who, famously registered his contempt for the custom by flubbing his part on the
Smothers Brothers' show.
Id. (quoting MARC WEINGARTEN, STATION To STATION: THE SECRET HISTORY OF ROCK 'N'
ROLL ON TELEVISION (2000)).
414. See Matthew Mirapaul, Computer Games as the Tools for Digital Filmmakers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2002, at E2. As The New York Times described:
A digital Walt Disney who wants to make a machinima film will start with a
game engine, the software that generates the virtual 3-D environment in which a
game like Quake II is played. This is not unusual because some game developers
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can also determine how they want to distribute the movies and whether
to release them for free or under a creative commons license.
However, home production has serious limitations. While it may
not be necessary to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to produce a
good song or movie, homemade music and movies would not satisfy
even the existing public demand. Moreover, a multimillion-dollar
blockbuster does not necessarily lack artistic value; The Lord of the
Rings, for example, not only enjoyed box office success but also gar-
nered international critical acclaim. 415
Although alternative models provide novel ways to address the un-
authorized copying problem, commentators and copyright holders remain
skeptical of these untested models and wary of overturning the existing
copyright system with which our culture is closely intertwined. Until we
have a better model to protect copyrights, the prevailing wisdom is to
maintain the status quo. When Congress undertook a critical examina-
tion of the patent system, one of its experts, Fritz Machlup, famously re-
marked:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences to rec-
ommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.416
What Professor Machlup observed about the patent system seems to
hold true for copyrights in the digital context: If we did not extend copy-
right protection to digital works, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of
have made parts of their software publicly accessible, allowing players to modify a
game. For instance, one might put a terrorist's head on an opponent's body.
But machinima directors go a step further, discarding the game's out-of-the-box
elements in favor of their own characters, scenery, story line and dialogue. What
remains is the game's underlying animation technology, which is really a stage on
which an alien Amberson or a cartoon cat person could cavort. More than one per-
son can use the same virtual space simultaneously, each one guiding his character
through a scene while speaking its lines. A designated cinematographer chooses
camera angles, adjusts the lighting and records the action.
Id.
415. Sharon Waxman, "Lord of the Rings" Dominates the Oscars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2004, at El (reporting that the Lord of the Rings "has taken in a billion dollars at the box of-
fice" while taking the Oscars for best picture, best director, film editing, art direction, visual
effects, makeup, sound mixing, costume design, best adapted screenplay, best original score,
and best original song).
416. FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No. 15 OF
THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY 80 (1958).
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our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend in-
stituting one. But since we have already extended such protection, it
would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to rec-
ommend abolishing it.
I. The Argument for a Range of Solutions
Each of the models discussed above has its benefits and limitations,
and each of them targets only part of the unauthorized copying problem.
The best system for policymakers to adopt may therefore involve a com-
bination of these proposals. For example, some European countries
combine the compulsory licensing model with the alternative compensa-
tion model by setting aside a certain percentage of the levy funds for
specified social and cultural purposes and for the nurturing of new au-
thors.4 17 Jessica Litman has combined three of the models in her pro-
posal for "a music space that resembles the current digital information
space in the ubiquity of music it contains and the ease with which music
may be shared, and that we should devise a combination of blanket fees
or levies designed to compensate the creators of the music we ex-
change." 4 18 As she explained:
In order to achieve the breadth and diversity of music (and the com-
munity of consumers who enjoy it) that has evolved in the Internet in-
formation space, we will need to rely on consumer-to-consumer dis-
semination as well as licensed downloads or streams. If we as
consumers want to pay for the music we exchange, we need some
form of blanket fee or levy to enable us to do so. Because some crea-
tors and copyright owners find the idea of consumer-to-consumer
dissemination unacceptable, I suggest that we devise a way to allow
them to withhold their music from the system. To discourage them
from electing that option, I believe we should optimize the legal in-
frastructure for sharing. I've drawn the details of that infrastructure
with an eye toward recapturing some of the lost advantages of notice
and indivisibility.4 19
While Professor Litman's proposal encourages copyright holders to
participate in the system, it also allows them to choose what content to
put in. In particular, the proposal includes an opt-out mechanism that al-
lows copyright holders to utilize digital rights management to "exclude
their works from the network and enable consumers to quickly and
417. SeeLunney, supranote 11, at915.
418. Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 11, at 40.
419. Id. at40-41.
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painlessly ascertain that those works may not lawfully be shared."420
Because the Copyright Act grants copyright holders the right to withhold
their works from distribution in a manner they find inefficient, inexpedi-
ent, and unacceptable, it is important that any solution policymakers se-
lect, be it Litman's proposal or some other system, allow record compa-
nies to determine whether they want to participate or withhold their
music from the system.42 1
There is no panacea for the unauthorized copying problem. To re-
duce the economic threat posed by P2P technologies, all stakeholders in
the copyright system-industry, consumers, and policymakers-must
understand the different models and think hard about how best to apply
them in light of their needs, goals, and interests. They must also take
into account the decentralized nature of P2P networks, the evolving
technology, and the ever-changing market structure and conditions. In-
stead of offering one solution, policymakers should consider a range of
solutions. As David Post put it passionately, "The invisible hand may
have many deficiencies, but the one thing that it does best.., is to place
before members of the public a diverse set of offerings in response to the
diverse needs and preferences of that public." 422
A comprehensive solution to the unauthorized copying problem will
include a set of solutions with a variety of characteristics. First, it will
consist of a mix of measures to solve both short- and long-term prob-
lems. Some of the above proposals are well suited to address immediate
concerns but are unlikely to change social norms in the digital copyright
world. Nevertheless, these proposals are worthwhile because they will
pave the way for measures that require more time, effort, and resources
to take effect, such as public education and market development.
Second, as many of the proposals are interim fixes that are likely to
become obsolete as technology evolves, the industry must be prepared to
migrate from one regime to another, or even to adjust to living with
many different regimes at the same time. As Lawrence Lessig cautioned
in his book Free Culture:
Policy makers should not make policy on the basis of technology in
transition. They should make policy on the basis of where the tech-
nology is going. The question should not be, how should the law
regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what law will
420. Id. at 45.
421. See id. (noting the importance that the system "adopt[s] a legal architecture that en-
courages but does not compel copyright owners to make their works available for widespread
sharing over digital networks").
422. David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1439, 1454 (2000) [hereinafter Post, What Larry Doesn't Get].
[Vol. 76
P2P AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COPYING
we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly be-
coming? That network is one in which every machine with electric-
ity is essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are--except
maybe the desert or the Rockies-you can instantaneously be con-
nected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best
cell-phone service, where with the flip of a device, you are con-
nected.
... The "problem" with file sharing-to the extent there is a
real problem-is one that will increasingly disappear as it becomes
easier to connect to the Internet. It thus is an extraordinary mistake
for policynakers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a
technology that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be
how to regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing. (The Net will
evolve that problem away.) The question instead should be how to
assure that artists get paid, during this transition between twentieth-
century models for doing business and twenty-first-century technolo-
gies. 42 3
As technologies advance, the threat to copyright holders from P2P
technology is likely to diminish. Mobile-to-mobile ("M2M") technolo-
gies requiring only cellular telephones are already in place that will make
file sharing more widely available to consumers, especially in less devel-
oped countries, where the cost of fixed-line telephone service is prohibi-
tive. Moreover, technologies that allow individuals to transfer copy-
righted works from one entertainment system to another are on the
horizon. If policymakers focus on today's technologies, they will always
be behind and can only play catch-up-a game which they cannot win,
given the sluggish pace of the legislative process.
423. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 297-99 (2004); see also Gervais, supra note 300
(noting the need to find "solutions appropriate for all those involved in the creation, produc-
tion, dissemination and use of copyrighted material" if P2P is here to stay). In an earlier arti-
cle written in the early days of the Internet, Professor Lessig made a similar point, which Jus-
tice Souter found helpful in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 777 (1996) (Souter J., concurring) (quoting Lawrence Lessig, The Path of
Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1754 (1995)). As Professor Lessig wrote:
[Ihf we had to decide today, say, just what the First Amendment should mean in cy-
berspace, my sense is that we would get it fundamentally wrong .... A prudent
Court would let these issues evolve, long into this revolution, until the nature of the
beast became a bit more deftned. If there is sanction to intervene, then it is simply
to assure that the revolution continue, not to assure that every step conforms with
the First Amendment as now understood.
Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, supra, at 1745, 1754.
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The European Union has already learned this lesson of flexibility.
Its Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society takes into ac-
count the interim nature of legislative solutions and the possibility of
multiple solutions. Article 5.2(b) specifies that the calculation of the
amount of fair compensation must take into account both "the application
[and] non-application of technological measures."424 As Bernt Hugen-
holtz and his colleagues explained, "This provision suggests a gradual
phasing-out of levies on digital media or equipment, as digital rights
management systems enable content owners to control private copying,
and set conditions of private use, at their discretion." 425
Third, in crafting the solution, the industry must take into account
the Internet's structural resistance to control and its immutable character-
istics as a network. The architecture of the Internet can constrain illegal
activities, but it can also make otherwise legal activities difficult, costly,
or even impossible to conduct. For example, a proposal that imposes
bandwidth levies based on usage volume will not necessarily reduce the
cross-subsidization problem associated with collective licenses. 426 In-
stead, it may create distortionary effects that favor the consumption of
low-bandwidth media, such as text files, over high-bandwidth media,
such as music or movie files.427 Such a proposal would also force those
who share homemade movies with their friends to subsidize-at times
heavily-those downloading copyrighted songs and videos.
Policymakers should also consider the changing social norms in the
digital copyright world and create solutions that meet the changing needs
of consumers to conduct activities in cyberspace that they used to con-
duct only in real space. Napster succeeded because it supplied a market
solution to an emerging demand. As one may recall, Shawn Fanning was
inspired to create Napster by his college roommate's frustration in
searching for MP3s on the Web.428 Napster responded to the market in-
stead of chasing it.
424. EC Information Society Directive, supra note 278, art. 5.2(b).
425. HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 278, at ii.
426. See discussion supra Part III.A for a discussion of the cross-subsidization problem.
427. See Eckersley, supra note 11, at 107.
428. As one commentator explained:
People wanted something like Napster-so Fanning did his best to come up with the
goods. It is a rare example of supply matching demand in technology, which is why
Napster simply cannot be ignored. Usually supply comes first and then its creators
wonder why the general public isn't smart enough to understand its potential. Sup-
pliers often whine that the public doesn't understand their product or service and
"needs educating" but at the end of the day the public will buy only those things that
improve the quality of their lives, or save them time or money.
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Moreover, flexible solutions may allow entrepreneurs to develop
products and services that directly and efficiently capture the value of
content uses which, under present copyright law, consumers pay for only
indirectly and inefficiently. In economic terms, such changes may help
to overcome the problem of "indirect appropriability," which Stan Lie-
bowitz nicely illustrated by the example of CD pricing in the days when
car stereos played only cassette tapes:
Assume that each and every purchaser of a compact disc makes a
single audio-cassette copy to play in their automobile ... [and] that
this copying, although illegal, is unstoppable ..... Since each origi-
nal CD will have a copy made from it, and since it is reasonable to in-
fer that the consumers of originals place some value on the ability to
make a copy, each consumer's willingness to pay for the original CD
is higher than it would otherwise be. The copyright owner can cap-
ture some of this additional value by charging a higher price for the
CD.429
There is ample evidence that if such a product or service is well de-
signed to satisfy a growing demand, consumers are willing to pay a pre-
mium for it. Shortly before the dot-com crash, a few visionary (and,
ironically, now defimnct) companies offered exciting new services that
were well tailored to emerging consumer needs. For example, mu-
sicmaker.com created custom-made CDs for users by letting them select
tracks from different artists.430 Hithive.com allowed customers to invite
up to twenty-five friends to listen to selected recordings for a limited
time while preventing users from distributing copies. 431 And Mojo Na-
tion required users to contribute resources to the community to earn
Mojo, the currency used in file-sharing transactions. 432 By doing so, the
service induced accountability and responsibility while ridding the net-
work of freeloaders.
Today, the recording industry is trying very hard to reinvent itself.
Consumers of music and videos now have many more choices than they
did even a few years ago. Where once they had to purchase a complete
platter of songs pre-selected by the record company, consumers can now
order their music A la carte. 433 Eventually, however, they will demand
TREVOR MERRIDEN, IRRESISTIBLE FORCES: THE BUSINESS LEGACY OF NAPSTER & THE
GROWTH OF THE UNDERGROUND INTERNET 170 (2001).
429. LIEBOWITZ, supra note 237, at 151 (footnote omitted).
430. See MERRIDEN, supra note 428, at 114.
431. See id.
432. See id. at 138-39 (describing Mojo Nation).
433. As Hillary Rosen, former chairman of the RIAA, noted:
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"all you can eat" 434 or even welcome a potluck. Although the recording
industry has shifted from the album model to the singles model, it has yet
to fully embrace the licensing model by putting together reasonably
priced, tailor-made subscription packages that meet the needs of its cus-
tomers. Until the industry satisfies consumer needs, illegal online file
trading-whether through existing P2P networks or the underground
Darknet-is likely to continue.
IV. RETHINKING THE UNAUTHORIZED COPYING PROBLEM
The emergence of the Internet and new communications technolo-
gies spurred commentators to devise frameworks to regulate cyberspace
and manage the expansion of intellectual property rights in the digital
environment. For example, David Johnson and David Post articulated
the necessity to allow Internet users to create new laws and institutions
best suited to the users' needs and customs.435 Lawrence Lessig empha-
sized the regulatory power of code and explained how the Internet's ar-
chitecture can affect the enjoyment of our constitutional freedoms and
fundamental rights in cyberspace. 436 James Boyle alerted us to the in-
creasing privatization of the public domain, which he called the "second
enclosure movement," and underscored the need for a new politics of in-
tellectual property.437
Very few commentators, however, have come up with new ideas
about how to reconceptualize the unauthorized copying problem. This
Part presents three thought experiments that compare the ongoing P2P
file-sharing wars to (1) a battle for self-preservation between humans and
machines, (2) an imaginary World War III, and (3) the conquest of Gen-
eration Y. These experiments seek to remind readers that law can supply
I used to say that the record business was like a soft-drink company that sold its
products in nothing but 64-ounce bottles, because our product was principally the
full-length album. Well, thanks to electronic distribution through multiple types of
networks with varied business models, we now have the equivalent of cans and six-
packs and fountain drinks. Consumers can buy digital music A la carte or sign up
for subscription services offering unlimited downloads, and they can take their tunes
with them wherever they go.
Hillary Rosen, Why the Industry Loves Tech, BUSINESS 2.0, May 2003, quoted in COMM. FOR
ECON. DEV., supra note 236, at 70.
434. Shirky, supra note 319, at 33 (discussing the all-you-can-eat model).
435. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cy-
berspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
436. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinaf-
ter LESSIG, CODE].
437. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?,
47 DuKE L.J. 87 (1997); see also Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 9, at 33.
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only a partial solution to the unauthorized copying problem. Thus, poli-
cymakers also need to focus attention on market forces, technological ar-
chitectures, and social norms if they are to create an effective solution.
As Professor Lessig observed, each of these four factors constrains hu-
man action, and the interplay of these factors governs human behavior in
cyberspace: "Norms constrain through the stigma that a community im-
poses; markets constrain through the price that they exact; architectures
constrain through the physical burdens they impose; and law constrains
through the punishment it threatens." 438
In the P2P context, each of these constraints exerts its influence, and
each of them plays an important role (see fig. 1). None of them alone de-
termines human behavior, however. Sometimes the law is more impor-
tant, while at other times the technological architecture takes control.
Thus, it is vital that policymakers and commentators take a holistic view
of the P2P file-sharing controversy and consider all four constraints to-
gether to develop solutions that go to the heart of the unauthorized copy-
ing problem.
Law
Market 0, Human Behavior 4 _o Architecture
I
Norm
Fig. 1 Constraints on Behavior in Cyberspace
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A. The Battle Between Humans and Machines
The P2P file-sharing wars resemble a battle for self-preservation be-
tween humans and machines. Computers, digital technology, and file-
sharing networks are disrupting the existing distribution model, threaten-
ing to permanently eliminate hundreds of thousands of jobs.439 Through
the Internet and P2P technologies, music can now be distributed directly
from artists to consumers. Intermediaries are no longer needed, and fac-
tories, warehouses, delivery trucks, and record stores have become
largely redundant. 440
This dismal picture does not, however, reflect the entire landscape.
True, humans are losing jobs to machines, but the digital revolution has
created many new jobs for people. This is what Joseph Schumpeter de-
scribed as "creative destruction,' '44 1 a revolutionary process through
which the old economic structure is demolished at the same time as the
foundations of a new structure are being built. As Professor Schumpeter
declared in his seminal work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy:
Capitalism ... is by nature a form or method of economic change and
not only never is but never can be stationary. And this evolutionary
character of the capitalist process is not merely due to the fact that
economic life goes on in a social and natural environment which
changes and by its change alters the data of economic action; this fact
is important and these changes (wars, revolutions and so on) often
condition industrial change, but they are not its prime movers. Nor is
this evolutionary character due to a quasi-automatic increase in popu-
lation and capital or to the vagaries of monetary systems, of which
exactly the same thing holds true. The fundamental impulse that sets
and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new con-
439. See Simon Beavis, Record Firms Threaten Big Employers with Action to Combat Pi-
racy, INDEP. (London), Jan. 21, 2003, at 19 (reporting that the head of the International Fed-
eration of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) had indicated that music piracy had threatened
600,000 jobs in the European music industry).
440. It is no surprise that Tower Records filed for bankruptcy in February 2004. See Janny
Scott, Big Music Retailer Is Seeking Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, at C1
(reporting Tower Records' filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection).
441. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81 (Harper
Collins 1975). As Professor Ku explained:
[Creative destruction] "strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of ex-
isting firms but at their foundations and their lives." In this process of creative de-
struction, digital technology and the Internet strike at the foundation of copyright
and the industries built upon copyright by eliminating the need for firms to distrib-
ute copyrighted works and for exclusive property rights to support creation.
Ku, supra note 11, at 269 (quoting SCHUMPETER, supra, at 84).
[Vol. 76
P2P AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COPYING
sumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the
new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist
enterprise creates.
44 2
A recent historical example of creative destruction at work in the
entertainment industry concerns the videotape recorder. Testifying be-
fore a House subcommittee in 1982, Jack Valenti, then-president of the
Motion Picture Association of America, predicted that videocassettes
would spell the death of the movie industry. The videotape recorder, he
declared, "is to the American film producer and the American public as
the Boston Strangler is to the woman alone." 443 Valenti's widely cited
prediction was famously incorrect. Videocassettes not only did not
strangle the motion picture industry, but they transformed it by bringing
new revenues and business opportunities.444 Peer-to-peer networks may
do likewise. Instead of strangling the entertainment industry and threat-
ening the creation of copyrighted works, these networks may open new
markets, create new niches and products, and attract new audiences. 44
5
442. SCHUMPETER, supra note 441, at 82-83.
443. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (testi-
mony of Jack Valenti, President of the MPAA).
444. Copyright holders are always paranoid about the threat of new technologies:
In 17th century England, the emergence of lending libraries was seen as the death
knell of book stores; in the 20th century, photocopying was seen as the end of the
publishing business, and videotape the end of the movie business .... Yet in each
case, the new development produced a new market far larger than the impact it had
on the existing market. Lending libraries gave inexpensive access to books that
were too expensive to purchase, thereby helping to make literacy widespread and
vastly increasing the sale of books. Similarly, the ability to photocopy makes the
printed material in a library more valuable to consumers, while videotapes have sig-
nificantly increased viewing of movies. But the original market in each case was
also transformed, in some cases bringing a new cast of players and a new power
structure.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 78-79.
445. As the recent National Research Council study explained:
Some suggest that the ability to download music will increase sales by providing
easy purchase and delivery 24 hours a day, opening up new marketing opportunities
and new niches. For example, the low overhead of electronic distribution may al-
low artists themselves to distribute free promotional recordings of individual live
performances, while record companies continue to focus on more polished works
for mass release. Digital information may also help create a new form of product,
as consumers' music collections become enormously more personalizable (e.g., the
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Every time a new technology emerges, it is inevitable that some
jobs will be lost. In the past few decades, hundreds of thousands of jobs
disappeared in such old-fashioned industries as automobiles, coal, and
rubber, and steel. The steel industry, for example, has faced serious
competition from manufacturers in Europe, Asia, and South America. 446
Cost-saving technology and the acquisition of new blast furnaces have
also reduced the demand for steelworkers. With less than an eighth of
the original workforce, steel manufacturers can now produce almost as
much steel as they did thirty years ago. 447 As a result, many of them
have restructured their companies with massive layoffs, tearing apart
families and communities and forcing workers to relocate to other job
markets or acquire skills in a different trade.
Indeed, history has revealed the need to change business models.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average-
"the great financial symbol of U.S. business and manufacturing" 448-
included Amalgamated Copper, American Sugar, Tennessee Coal &
Iron, U.S. Rubber, and U.S. Steel.449 Today, the index features such
high-tech companies as 3M, Boeing, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, and
Microsoft.450
Transition is never easy and always painful. Nevertheless, no mat-
ter how painful it is, there is no legal entitlement to an old business
model or obsolete jobs. As the science fiction writer Robert Heinlein
reminded us in his first short story Life-Line:
There has grown up in the minds of certain groups in this country the
notion that because a man or a corporation has made a profit out of
446. See generally PHILIPPE LEGRAIN, OPEN WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT
GLOBALIZATION 26-31 (2004) (describing the woes of the United States steel industry). In
March 2002, the Bush Administration imposed tariffs of up to thirty percent on steel imported
from Europe, Asia, and South America to provide short-term relief to struggling American
steel makers. David E. Sanger, Bush Puts Tariffs of as Much as 30% on Steel Imports, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at Al. A year later, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel declared that the
tariffs violated the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. United States-Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products-Final Reports of the Panel, WTO Docs.
WT/DS248/R, WT/DS249/R, WT/DS251/R, WT/DS252/R, WT/DS253/R, WT/DS254/R,
WT/DS258/R, WTiDS259/R (July 11, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/VT/DS/248R-00.doc (last visited Mar. 13, 2005). The Bush administration
finally removed the tariffs in December 2003. Richard W. Stevenson & Elizabeth Becker, Af-
ter 21 Months, Bush Lifts Tariff on Steel Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at Al.
447. See LEGRAIN, supra note 446, at 29.
448. Bob Greene, A Mouse Replaces Men of Steel, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1991, at IC; see
also J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Propertj--America's Overlooked Export, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 809, 809-10 (1995) (discussing Greene's observation).
449. Dow Jones Industrial Average History 3, at http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/
downloads/DJIAHistComp.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
450. Id. at 14.
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the public for a number of years, the government and the courts are
charged with the duty of guaranteeing such profit in the future, even
in the face of changing circumstances and contrary public interest.
This strange doctrine is not supported by statute nor common law.
Neither individuals nor corporations have any right to come into
court and ask that the clock of history be stopped, or turned back, for
their private benefit. 45 1
Today, P2P file-sharing technologies have facilitated a new distri-
bution model. It is time that the entertainment industry recognize this
change and take advantage of its potential. As Professor Schumpeter
noted in his observation of the creative destruction process: "Every piece
of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the back-
ground of process and within the situation created by it. ''452 The key to
success is not how a firm, or in this case an industry, protects its existing
business model, but how it adapts that model to new conditions and
technological environments.
When the old Napster first gained popularity several years ago, the
entertainment industry could have adapted to the online distribution
model. The industry missed its initial opportunities, but it is not too late
to change. Intermediaries are not entirely redundant in the digital
world.453 Due to scarcity of time454 and the capital-intensive nature of
many of these services, intermediaries-especially trusted ones-have a
renewed significance in the information age. For example, many users
will not have time to slog through a morass of undifferentiated poetic
451. Robert A. Heinlein, Life-Line (1939), quoted in Alderman, supra note 81, at 131.
452. SCHUMPETER, supra note 441, at 83-84.
453. As Daniel Gervais put it: "Information no longer wants to be free; it wants to be
found. In this scenario, there is a great role for intermediaries, but not for property." Gervais,
supra note 300, at 56.
454. As Jack Balkin explained:
All communications media produce too much information. So in that sense, all me-
dia have a problem of scarcity. But the scarcity is not a scarcity of bandwidth. It is
a scarcity of audience. There is only so much time for individuals to assimilate in-
formation. And not only is there too much information, some of it is positively un-
desirable. As a result, all media give rise to filtering by their audience, or, more im-
portantly, by people to whom the audience delegates the task of filtering.
J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45
DUKE L.J. 1131, 1148 (1996); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, at 214 (stating that "time
will be the scarcest resource in the digital future"); Dyson, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that
"[iun the end, the only unfungible, unreplicable value in the new economy will be people's
presence, time, and attention"); Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Informa-
tion-Rich World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41
(Martin Greenberger ed., 1971) (stating that "a wealth of information creates a poverty of at-
tention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of informa-
tion sources that might consume it").
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musings, home movies, and garage band recordings. They will need in-
termediaries, such as entertainment companies, to screen works for them.
Moreover, P2P networks do not affect every sector of the entertainment
industry, and specialty music stores will remain successful despite ram-
pant file sharing.
B. Imaginary World War III
The second thought experiment involves an imaginary nuclear at-
tack on decentralized U.S. military bases during the Cold War. Although
commentators have tied the development of the Internet, in particular its
funding, to the need for maintaining communications between strategic
military and political sites in the event of a nuclear war, many commen-
tators have explained why the nuclear threat had nothing to do with the
origin of the network.455 Regardless of its origin, the Internet has a
unique architecture: it is "rudderless, decentralized, and transna-
455. As the authoritative A Brief History of the Internet recounted:
The first recorded description of the social interactions that could be enabled
through networking was a series of memos written by J.C.R. Licklider of MIT in
August 1962 discussing his "Galactic Network" concept. He envisioned a globally
interconnected set of computers through which everyone could quickly access data
and programs from any site. In spirit, the concept was very much like the Internet
of today. Licklider was the first head of the computer research program at DARPA
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], starting in October 1962. While at
DARPA he convinced his successors at DARPA, Ivan Sutherland, Bob Taylor, and
MIT researcher Lawrence G. Roberts, of the importance of this networking concept.
In late 1966 Roberts went to DARPA to develop the computer network concept
and quickly put together his plan for the "ARPANET," publishing it in 1967. At the
conference where he presented the paper, there was also a paper on a packet net-
work concept from the UK by Donald Davies and Roger Scantlebury of NPL [Na-
tional Physical Laboratory]. Scantlebury told Roberts about the NPL work as well
as that of Paul Baran and others at RAND. The RAND group had written a paper
on packet switching networks for secure voice in the military in 1964. It happened
that the work at MIT (1961-1967), at RAND (1962-1965), and at NPL (1964-
1967) had all proceeded in parallel without any of the researchers knowing about
the other work.
Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/
brief.shtml (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). For an interesting discussion of the origins of the
Internet, see generally TiM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND
ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (1999); Katie HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996);
JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: FROM RADIO DAYS TO INTERNET
YEARS IN A LIFETIME (2000); Leiner et al., supra.
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tional,"456 and its packet-switching feature has made government regula-
tion difficult.457
If the entertainment industry is to succeed, it must develop a new
war strategy that takes into account the network's decentralized nature
and other unique features. So far, the industry has explored the use of
computer software to launch viral attacks on P2P networks. In July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the Peer to Peer Piracy
Prevention Act, which, if enacted, would have allowed movie and record
companies to hack into personal computers and P2P networks when they
suspected that infringing materials were being circulated.458 The next
year, at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,459 Senator Orrin Hatch
was reported to have made the shocking remark that "he favor[ed] devel-
oping new technology to remotely destroy the computers of people who
illegally download music from the Internet. ''46° While it is too early to
456. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 448 (2000) (review-
ing LESSIG, CODE, supra note 436; ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW
THE INTERNET IS PUTrING PEOPLE IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW
(1999)).
457. As Michael Froomkin explained:
Three technologies underlie the Internet's resistance to control. First, the Internet is
a packet switching network, which makes it difficult for anyone, even a government,
to block or monitor information flows originating from large numbers of users.
Second, users have access to powerful military-grade cryptography that can, if used
properly, make messages unreadable to anyone but the intended recipient. Third,
and resulting from the first two, users of the Internet have access to powerful ano-
nymizing tools. Together, these three technologies mean that anonymous commu-
nication is within reach of anyone with access to a personal computer and a link to
the Internet unless a government practices very strict access control, devotes vast re-
sources to monitoring, or can persuade its population (whether by liability rules or
criminal law) to avoid using these tools.
A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129,
129-30 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson ed., 1997) (footnote omitted).
458. Peer to Peer Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002); see also Rep.
Howard L. Berman, The Truth About the Peer to Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Why Copyright
Owner Self-Help Must Be Part of the P2P Piracy Solution, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL
COMMENTARY (Oct. 1, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
20021001_berman.htnl (explaining the need for the legislation); Julie Hilden, Going After
Individuals for Copyright Violations: The New Bill That Would Grant Copyright Owners a
"License to Hack" Peer-to-Peer Networks, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY (Aug.
20, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20020820.html (criticizing the legislation).
459. The Dark Side of a Bright Idea: Could Personal and National Security Risks Com-
promise the Potential of P2P File-Sharing Networks?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003). The hearing, which was held on June 17, 2003, focused on the
risks posed by P2P networks to personal privacy and national security.
460. Ted Bridis, Senator Favors Really Punishing Music Thieves, CHI. TRIB., June 18,
2003, at 2C (reporting about Senator Hatch's remark). According to this newspaper report,
Senator Hatch reasoned that damaging someone's computer "may be the only way you can
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evaluate these abandoned strategies, commentators and civil liberties
groups have already expressed concerns about their intrusion on privacy
and constitutional rights.461
Such strategies may backfire on the entertainment industry, as most
consumers of entertainment products are also creators and copyright
holders. It is hard to imagine that entertainment companies would be
very welcoming if their competitors and customers snooped on their
networks looking for infringing materials. It is also unlikely that Con-
gress would be able to enact a statute that protects major entertainment
companies while discriminating against individual copyright holders and
small media entrepreneurs.
Commentators are fond of quoting Stewart Brand's hacker motto
"Information wants to be free," but they often ignore the very next line
from his book The Media Lab, "Information also wants to be expen-
sive." 462 As Brand explains:
Information wants to be free because it has become so cheap to dis-
tribute, copy, and recombine-too cheap to meter. It wants to be ex-
pensive because it can be immeasurably valuable to the recipient.
That tension will not go away. It leads to endless wrenching debate
about price, copyright, "intellectual property," and the moral right-
ness of casual distribution, because each round of new devices makes
the tension worse, not better.463
Recently, the entertainment industry has turned to spoofing to fight
the unauthorized copying problem.464 By uploading decoy files onto the
networks, the industry hopes to undermine the spirit of cooperation
among users and create "a norm of free-riding" 465 that prompts users to
blame each other for spoofed files and wasted downloading time.466 The
teach somebody about copyrights." Id.; see also Dwight Silverman, Senator's "Extreme"
Cure for Piracy Is Unconstitutional, HOUS. CHRON., June 21, 2003, Business Sec., at 1. The
senator's prepared statement for the hearing is available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-
statement.cfm?id=623&witid=51 (last visited March 3, 2005).
461. See Sonia K. Katyal, A War on CD Piracy, a War on Our Rights, L.A. TIMES, June
27, 2003, at B17.
462. STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987),
quoted in Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright's Windmill,
34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 38 (2002).
463. Id.
464. See discussion supra Part III.D.
465. Strahilovitz, supra note 12, at 509.
466. See id. at 509-10. As Strahilevitz explained, P2P technologies are "charismatic
codes" that have made the file-sharing community appear to individual users to be "far more
cooperative than it really is." Id. at 508-09. "The architecture of the networks is such that
although many users on the networks do not share, the networks create an appearance that
sharing is the norm." Id. at 551.
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industry hopes that the spoofed files will induce file-sharers to stop co-
operating and instead undertake noncooperative behavior that makes P2P
networks undesirable. 467
In addition, the industry has explored ways to contain the network
and halt the interchange of copyrighted contents by erecting fences,
roadblocks, and speed bumps. No matter how much information wants
to be free, it "does not flow in a vacuum, but in political space that is al-
ready occupied. ' 468 Legal regimes, norms, and rules therefore can de-
tennine what sorts of communities will thrive in cyberspace, how infor-
mation will spread from one individual to another, and who can
participate in the New Economy.
Code is law.4 69 It defines the contours of the space in which indi-
viduals act and sets the conditions for human behavior. By regulating
467. See id. at 591. As Professor Strahilevitz explained:
Given the open-source nature of the Gnutella applications for file-swapping, the re-
cord labels are free to create "patches" (or updates) to existing versions of Gnutella.
The recording industry might find it worthwhile to develop and distribute software
patches that expose users to the many free-riders on Gnutella and magnify the ac-
tions of those free-riders. For example, the program might prominently identify
free-riders and those sharing very few files in response to search queries. Alterna-
tively, the patch might prominently gather and display real time updates concerning
the number of free-riders on the network and the median number of files being
shared. Similarly, the record labels or their allies might release a Kazaa patch that
either magnifies the extent of the free-riding on Kazaa, defaults users into free-
riding, or, as the Kazaa Lite application has already done, allows free-riders to
download files more efficiently than most file-sharers. In order to convince file-
swappers to download these patches, the creators of these patches would need to
create desirable improvemehts that enhance the experience of using these applica-
tions, and bundle these improvements with the un-charismatic code elements. If
such patches were widely disseminated, the recording industry might effectively
combat the distortion created by charismatic code. By providing file-swappers with
a more realistic assessment of their peers or strengthening the appeal of free-riding,
the recording industry might well prompt file-swappers to imitate the free-riding
behavior that is still somewhat common on these networks.
Id. at 592.
468. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 217 (3d ed.
2001).
469. See generally LESSIG, CODE, supra note 436; Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 679 (2003). For articles advocating the self-governance of cyberspace, see, for exam-
ple, Johnson & Post, supra note 435; David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Es-
say on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L., at http://www.wm.edu/
law/publications/jol/articles/post.shtml; I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cy-
berspace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994); Henry H. Peritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-
Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
413 (1997); Edward J. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: Understanding the Internet Community, 1
FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 7, 1996), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4/
valauskas/index.html. But see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
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codes, governments therefore can regulate human behavior.470 Never-
theless, some codes, like open source codes, are less regulable, 471 and
thieves, pirates, and Robin Hoods thrive underground. Some govern-
ments may choose to sacrifice regulability for markets and growing eco-
nomic prosperity, 472 while others may decide to forgo protection from
some circumvention by picking the easy route of regulating network end
points, rather than network architecture. 473
1199 (1998) (disputing the need to distinguish between cyberspace and real-space transactions
and advocating the need to ground cyberspace transactions in real-space laws).
470. As Professor Lessig explained in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace:
The software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is constitute a set of con-
straints on how you can behave. The substance of these constraints may vary, but
they are experienced as conditions on your access to cyberspace. In some places
(online services such as AOL, for instance) you must enter a password before you
gain access; in other places you can enter whether identified or not. In some places
the transactions you engage in produce traces that link the transactions (the "mouse
droppings") back to you; in other places this link is achieved only if you want it to
be. In some places you can choose to speak a language that only the recipient can
hear (through encryption); in other places encryption is not an option. The code or
software or architecture or protocols set these features; they are features selected by
code writers; they constrain some behavior by making other behavior possible, or
impossible. The code embeds certain values or makes certain values impossible. In
this sense, it too is regulation, just as the architectures of real-space codes are regu-
lations.
LESSIG, CODE, supra note 436, at 89.
471. See id. at 107 (noting that open source code is less regulable than closed source code).
472. In response to Professor Lessig's call for government intervention to preserve indi-
vidual liberty and other foundational values in cyberspace, Professor Post argued that funda-
mental values in cyberspace can best be protected by the market. As he explained:
Fundamental values are indeed at stake in the construction of cyberspace, but those
values can best be protected by allowing the widest possible scope for uncoordi-
nated and uncoerced individual choice among different values and among different
embodiments of those values. We don't need "a plan" but a multitude of plans from
among which individuals can choose, and "the market," and not action by the global
collective, is most likely to bring that plenitude to us.
... [I]f there are many different architectures, then there is choice about
whether to obey these controls. If there are multiple architectures from which to
choose, it is no longer correct to say that "nothing requires" booksellers to provide
users the ability to browse for free; the market for bookstores, the existence of com-
peting bookstores, and consumers' desire to browse do so. It is hardly nothing;
these are the very same things that "require[]" the real-space booksellers that Lessig
mentions to allow you to browse for free. And if there are diverse architectures of
privacy, of identity, and of content protection laid before the public, why is it so ob-
vious that we will end up choosing the one(s) that deny us those things that Lessig
(and I) think are so important?
Post, What Larry Doesn't Get, supra note 422, at 1440, 1453-54.
473. See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323,348 (2003).
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Since the emergence of the Internet, the Chinese government has
tried hard to impose its information control policy on cyberspace. 474 Un-
fortunately, that policy was originally designed for traditional mass me-
dia and may be obsolete in the digital world. Thus, although Chinese au-
thorities have repeatedly cracked down on cybercafes, handed out heavy
jail sentences to online dissidents, implemented new restrictive laws and
regulations, and censored political and nationalistic Web sites, access to
Internet content remains relatively unrestricted in the country to all but
jailed dissidents.475
Indeed, the Chinese authorities' heavy-handed tactics have back-
fired by heightening the cautiousness and sophistication of Chinese neti-
zens. Antimonitoring technologies have proliferated, and Chinese users
increasingly rely on proxy servers, offshore and mirror Web sites, and
encrypted P2P systems to evade government detection, monitoring, and
control. If the Chinese government is struggling to regulate the online
behavior of its citizens, it is unlikely that the entertainment industry
alone will achieve any better success.
Commentators may disagree whether the Cold War had anything to
do with the origin of the Internet. It is not too far-fetched, however, to
suggest that had a nuclear attack been launched, the Internet's decentral-
ized architecture would have enabled the network to survive. If the en-
tertainment industry is to wage war on P2P file sharing, it must devise a
strategy that enables large-scale simultaneous attacks on multiple targets.
Because of the Internet's decentralized architecture, anything less would
simply be ineffective.
474. For a discussion of efforts by Chinese authorities to regulate the Internet, see gener-
ally Nina Hachigian, China's Cyber-Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 118; Jack
Linchuan Qiu, Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate Between the Cyberspaces, 4
INT'L J. CoMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (winter 1999/2000), at http://www.ijclp.org/4_2000/pdf/
ijclp..webdoc l_4_2000.pdf; Jiang-yu Wang, The Internet and E-Commerce in China: Regu-
lations, Judicial Views, and Government Policies, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Jan. 2001, at
12; Peter K. Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment in the Chinese Internet Industry,
GIGALAW.COM (Mar. 2001), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-03.html (dis-
cussing the regulation of the Internet industry in China; SHANTHi KALATHIL & TAYLOR C.
BOAS, THE INTERNET AND STATE CONTROL IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: CHINA, CUBA,
AND THE COUNTERREVOLUTION (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace Info. Revolution and
World Pol. Project, Working Paper No. 21 2001), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/
21 KalathilBoas.pdf.
475. See Leonard R. Sussman, The Internet in Flux, in FREEDOM HOUSE, How FREE?:
THE WEB & THE PRESS: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF PRESS FREEDOM 4 (2001), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs200l/pfs2001 .pdf.
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C. The Conquest of Generation Y
The final thought experiment concerns Generation Y, a group of
teenagers who neither understand copyright law nor see the benefits of
complying with it. As I discussed elsewhere, there is a widening divide
between copyright holders, who are eager to protect their interests, and
the users of copyrighted works, who do not understand their stakes in the
copyright system.476 As a result, copyright piracy is rampant, and illegal
file sharing has become the norm.
Children and teenagers cannot be expected to understand the eco-
nomic plight of artists and songwriters. Before the advent of the Internet,
their indifference did not matter to the recording industry, because their
only connection to music products was retail purchases and consumption.
Today, however, this attitude has become a problem for copyright hold-
ers, as the Internet has given kids ample opportunity to make high-
quality reproductions of music, thus allowing them to acquire and dis-
tribute music free of charge. As they grow older and start working full-
time, their perspective on copyright may change. They may come to
empathize with artists and songwriters as they experience the pain of not
getting paid for a hard day's work. As the rapper Eminem said candidly
in his usual provocative style:
Whoever put my s-t on the Internet, I want to meet that motherf-
ker and beat the s-t out of him, because I picture this scrawny little
d[-]khead going 'I got Eminem's new CD! I got Eminem's new
CD! I'm going to put it on the Internet.' I think that anybody who
tries to make excuses for that s-t is a f-king bitch. I'm sorry;
when I worked 9 to 5, I expected to get a f-king paycheck every
week. It's the same with music; if I'm putting my f-king heart and
all my time into music, I expect to get rewarded for that. I work
hard.., and anybody can just throw a computer up and download my
s-t for free.... If you can afford a computer, you can afford to pay
$16 for my CD.477
Eminem seems not to have realized how the market actually
works-kids may pay for CDs, but parents pay for the computer, which
the kids use for free. Nonetheless, his comparison of recording efforts to
working a nine-to-five job is something file-sharers can relate to when
they grow up. In fact, file-sharers may see piracy differently after they
see their musician friends struggle to stay out of the poorhouse because
they are not receiving royalties or because they fail to earn recording
476. See generally Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 6.
477. ALDERMAN, supra note 81, at 114 (quoting Eminem as printed in Wall of Sound).
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contracts as a result of rampant online file trading. Young aspiring mu-
sicians who themselves share files over the Internet may even learn their
lessons from first-hand experience.
The industry can approach this lost generation of music users in two
ways. First, it can disregard them and move on to Generation Z. To-
day's schoolchildren and college teenagers are unlikely to learn appro-
priate online conduct from their parents and teachers, who did not grow
up in a digital environment-except for a small group of scientists, tech-
nophiles, and early computer enthusiasts. Indeed, many of these adults
have limited computer literacy and use the Internet primarily for e-mail
and online shopping. Even if they made a successful transition to the
digital age, the nuances of the application of copyright law to online con-
tent are foreign to them. They are therefore ill equipped to teach children
which Internet activities are legal and which ones are not, let alone to
serve as role models.
Jessica Litman vividly illustrated this problem by describing an in-
cident in her son's third-grade class.478 The teacher asked the class to
conduct online research on the alpine tundra. At the end of the period,
she rewarded the students by giving each of them a CD containing the
class's favorite songs, all downloaded from the Internet. Obviously, the
teacher did not understand the difference between using online materials
and reproducing copies of music. The teacher's action was troubling
from the standpoint of copyright education: teachers are major role mod-
els for students, and actions such as this third-grade teacher's are likely
to have more of an impact on the children than the many formal copy-
right pledges that school officials require students (and sometimes their
parents) to sign.
Young file-sharers can also substantially affect each other's behav-
ior through peer pressure and what social psychologists call pluralistic
ignorance.479 As Robert MacCoun explained, in ambiguous social situa-
tions,
478. Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 11, at 23-25. But see Laura M. Holson,
Studios Moving to Block Piracy of Films Online, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at Al (discuss-
ing the role-playing activity "Starving Artist," in which "groups of students are encouraged to
come up with an idea for a musical act, write lyrics and design a CD cover only to be told by a
volunteer teacher their work can be downloaded free").
479. David Luban described in general how pluralistic ignorance affects human behavior:
Evidently, we respond to situations by checking to see how other people respond,
and their response in large measure determines how we perceive the situation and
therefore how we ourselves will respond. And of course the phenomenon is recip-
rocal: as we watch the other, the other watches us. We reinforce each other, in
wrong beliefs as well as accurate ones (a phenomenon psychologists call pluralistic
ignorance). The shaping and reciprocal reinforcement of perception by seeing how
others perceive the same thing constitutes the basic phenomenon of socially influ-
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we look to other people to help us define what's appropriate in a
given situation. And we often infer from the fact that no one else is
acting alarmed that there's nothing alarming going on... [as in the
1970s] when marijuana use became so prevalent that people acted as
though it had been defacto legalized.4 80
Although students from Generation Y may privately believe it is
wrong to trade copyrighted songs or movies on the Internet, they may
pretend to support file swapping in public out of fear that they will be
stigmatized for acting or speaking contrary to the norm they perceive
their community to endorse. Such a pretense is dangerous, as it may lead
young people to conform their private preferences to the misperceived
public norm.
In light of these factors, it may be wise for the entertainment indus-
try to recognize that it is time to give up on Generation Y and stop wast-
ing its resources on changing that generation's online copying behavior.
No doubt, it is painful for the industry to skip a generation of potential
customers. However, it is more painful to see its profits falling every
year without any practical strategy in sight to stem the downslide. Wide-
spread prosecution of individual file-sharers who downloaded copy-
righted materials in their private homes for noncommercial use has only
succeeded in alienating consumers and is unlikely to win legislative sup-
port for the industry. 481 As the RIAA's recent lawsuits have shown, un-
der the existing regime, "courts would need to punish the few infringers
chosen for prosecution to an extent radically disproportionate to the
wrong they committed. At some point.., the level of punishment re-
quired to deter private copying generally will simply become unjust. ' 482
enced cognition, or, for short, social cognition. Pedestrians stepping around the
body of a homeless man collapsed in the street may simply be taking their cues from
each other; the evidence suggests that they would stop to help if they were alone.
Our moral compass may point true north when we are by ourselves, but place us
next to a few dozen other compasses pointing East, and our needle will fall into
alignment with theirs-and, in doing so, influence the needles of others' compasses.
David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 284 (2003); see also
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 356-58
(2000) (discussing pluralistic ignorance and the "Emperor's New Clothes" phenomenon).
480. MERRIDEN, supra note 428, at 25 (quoting Professor Robert MacCoun).
481. See Harmon, Verizon Challenges Music Industry's Subpoenas, supra note 67 (report-
ing that Senator Coleman had scheduled a congressional hearing to address "privacy issues as
well as the broader effect of technology on copyright enforcement"); see also Robert E. Litan,
Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1070 (2001) (noting that "it is
highly doubtful that Americans would tolerate for very long, if at all, the police raiding homes
and arresting teenagers for copying music or movies"); Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 545 (not-
ing that "it is widely believed that the public could not stomach widespread prosecutions of
individual computer users who had illicitly downloaded copyrighted content").
482. Lunney, supra note 11, at 851-52.
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Moreover, as access to the Internet continues to expand to the rest
of the world, Generation Y in the United States may come to make up for
only a tiny portion of the entire file-sharing population.483 Forecasts in-
dicate that Americans-all generations combined-will comprise only a
quarter of the world's Internet population by 2005, down from thirty-six
percent in 2001,484 and that Chinese will overtake English as the most
widely used language on the Internet by 2007.485 Given the fact that the
future P2P file-sharing wars are likely to be transnational, Generation Y
in the United States will have only a small impact on their outcome.
A more effective solution would be to educate Generation Y (and
perhaps their parents as well) and transform them into copyright-abiding
netizens. As they understand copyright better, they are likely to serve as
role models for the next generation, who in turn will internalize those
values and live by them as adults. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted,
"Education is not the teaching of the three R's. Education is the teaching
of the overall citizenship, to learn to live together with fellow citizens,
and above all to learn to obey the law."486 Through education, children
in Generation Z should become better citizens in the digital copyright
world.
Today, the public still has many misconceptions about copyright
law. Consider the treatment of copyrighted music, for example. Some
Internet users believe they can download and listen to a copyrighted song
without violating its copyright if they sample it and keep it for less than
twenty-four hours.487 Some maintain that it is legal to post copyrighted
songs for downloading on a foreign Web site because U.S. copyright
laws do not extend to countries abroad.488 Some assume that all the
songs posted on the Internet and P2P networks are in the public domain
and thus free for others to download or copy.489 Some believe that art-
ists and copyright holders do not receive any royalties when radio plays
483. Thanks to my colleague, Adam Candeub, for pointing this out.
484. Michael Pastore, Global Internet Population Moves Away from US, CYBERATLAS, at
http://cyberatlas.intemet.com/big-picture/geographics/article/0,,5911_558061,00.html (Jan.
11, 2001), cited in Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the
Formation of Legal Norms, 35 Loy. U. CIl. L.J. 155, 165 (2003).
485. Frances Williams, Chinese to Become Most-Used Language on Web, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2001 at 12. The Author is, however, skeptical of this forecast because of the ever-
widening digital divide in China and the many problems the country has encountered in the
wake of its accession to the WTO. For a discussion of these problems, see sources collected
supra note 192.
486. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 436, at 92-93 n.32 (quoting Thurgood Marshall's oral ar-
gument in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958)).
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their music. 490 Some claim that they attain a measure of protection by
ripping, mixing, and burning songs and posting them online.491 Most in-
teresting of all, there is a prevailing attitude that it is alright, or even le-
gitimate, to trade copyrighted music because the recording industry has
been making bad music for years to rip customers off.4 92
In recent years, the entertainment industry has become increasingly
active in educating the consuming public. For example, the recording
and motion picture industries have set up several Web sites to stem the
illegal distribution of copyrighted music and movies.493 "Entertainment
groups have sent thousands of letters to colleges and corporations, alert-
ing them to infringements," while celebrity musicians, like Dixie Chicks
and Missy Elliott, have appeared on MTV and BET to relay artists' con-
cems.494 During the 2004 Annual GRAMMY Awards Ceremony, the
Recording Academy even unveiled a major public education campaign,
490. See MERRIDEN, supra note 428, at 71 (quoting an interviewee as saying that
"[n]obody claims to lose money when their [sic] music is played on the radio").
491. From time to time, one would read on Internet Web sites about requests that users not
copy photos the site owner scanned or songs the owner ripped.
492. As one interviewee maintained: "The record companies have been ripping customers
off with huge profits for years, is it no wonder people resort to using Napster. The record
companies are worried as they won't be able [sic] finance their extortionate lifestyles."
MERRIDEN, supra note 428, at 63. Jazz artist Herbie Hancock, however, contended that Nap-
ster was not the answer to the industry's bad deal with artists and consumers:
So far, [Napster]'s even worse than the labels. On the way to making millions for
its owners and investors, Napster has yet to give anything to artists other than the
chance to spread their music, for free, and whether they like it or not. Its supporters
hide behind claims that labels misuse artists and consumers, as if that entitled them
to take everything they want absolutely free. Excuse me, but just because record ex-
ecutives give artists a bad deal doesn't mean that everyone else can then go and do
worse.
Herbie Hancock, Preface to ALDERMAN, supra note 81, at xviii.
493. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 308 n.3.
494. Entertainment Industry Widens War, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2003, at 9D. As Neil
Netanel recounted:
Copyright industries have also threatened to hold employers liable for employees'
P2P file swapping in the workplace. The Motion Picture Association of America,
Recording Industry Association of America, National Music Publishers' Associa-
tion and Songwriters Guild have sent a letter to 1,000 large corporations expressing
alarm that "piracy of music, movies, and other creative works is taking place at a
surprisingly large number of companies." The letter then states that such use of a
company's digital network subjects the company to "significant legal liability under
the Federal copyright law" and ominously warns that the entertainment industries
plan to "aggressively enforce [their] rights in cases of copyright infringement." The
copyright industry missive follows a similar letter sent to more than 2,300 university
presidents demanding that they prevent students' P2P file swapping.
Netanel, Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 11, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
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including a new Web site, whatsthedownload.com, 495 print and radio
public service announcements, grassroots initiatives, and retail activi-
ties.496
In addition, the recording industry and universities have been ac-
tively encouraging students to switch to legal and legitimate music sub-
scription services. A case in point is the recent arrangements that major
colleges and universities made with music downloading services, like
MusicNet, Napster, and Rhapsody, to provide students with unlimited
access to licensed music streams.497 By doing so, the industry hopes that
students will develop habits that they will continue to follow after they
graduate. As Napster's former president Michael Bebel proclaimed,
"'This deal encourages a new generation to try a legitimate service, enjoy
and adopt it, and later when they have more time and money, continue
it.' 498
Despite the industry's active involvement, its educational campaign
has been ineffective. A respect for copyright "is not an inherent or natu-
ral part of the cultural infrastructure"; it can only be developed through a
slow learning process. 499 To be effective, an educational program must
495. The Web site is available at http://www.whatsthedownload.com. As the Press Re-
lease described:
WhatsTheDownload.com fills the crucial need for consumer information about the
impact of illegal downloading. The site provides an overview of the issues, quotes
from music-makers and artists offering personal perspectives on file-swapping, a
message board where consumers can connect with one another and discuss
downloading, a news and information section, and an opt-in eNewsletter called
"The Download" that keeps consumers up-to-date on various file-swapping news.
Additionally, the site includes in-depth information about copyright laws and a
comprehensive listing of legitimate online music retailers.
Press Release, Recording Academy®, "What's the Downloadsm " Consumer Education Cam-
paign Addressing the Value of Paying for Music Unveiled at 46th Annual Grammy® Awards
(Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://www.whatsthedownload.com/word-docs/
WhatsTheDownloadLaunchPress_Release.doc.
496. See id.
497. See Borland, College P2P Use on the Decline?, supra note 239 (citing a report of the
Joint Committee of the Higher Education and Entertainment Communities that more than
twenty colleges and universities have "signed up for deeply discounted access to music ser-
vices" such as MusicNet, Napster, and RealNetworks' Rhapsody); Graham, Students Score
Music Perks, supra note 239 (reporting about arrangements universities and colleges made
with the record industry for their students).
498. Borland, Napster to Give Students Music, supra note 92 (quoting Michael Bebel,
former president of Napster).
499. See Bartow, supra note 310, at 23; see also Sheldon W. Halpem, Copyright Law in
the Digital Age: Malum in se and Malum Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 11
(2000) (suggesting that copyright law might not have a normative role). As Professor Halpern
elaborated:
Individual determinations of moral and ethical conduct require a moral and ethical
context. The problem for intellectual property law in general, and the law of copy-
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emphasize the core goals of copyright law, the difficult balance between
control and dissemination, and the need for copyrighted materials to be-
come a part of our shared intellectual heritage. 500 The program must
also include both the exclusive rights of copyright holders and the limits
on those rights, such as the idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use privi-
lege, the first sale doctrine, and other statutory exemptions. By being
clear, balanced, and comprehensive, the program will convey to the pub-
lic a message that copyright law is fair and equitable. Through the crea-
tion of social and peer pressure, the message will also dissuade consum-
ers from engaging in unauthorized file trading.501
In the next few years, public education efforts will continue to face
many serious challenges. First, copyright law is complex; it involves a
delicate balance between exclusive control and public access to informa-
tion. An oversimplified educational message "will obscure the genuine
and legitimate debate about how far copyright law extends." 50 2 David
Lange asserted that it is "fundamentally wrong to insist that children in-
ternalize the proprietary and moral values of the copyright system. ' 50 3
The converse is also true. It would be unsatisfactory to focus solely on
the public domain and our shared cultural heritage. Congress, courts,
and commentators have spent a great deal of time and resources in the
past two centuries trying to balance the interests of authors, copyright
holders, and the consuming public. It is unlikely that schools and teach-
ers will do a better and more efficient job in striking this balance.
right in particular, is the lack of such an underlying clear context. The nature of
American copyright law makes it difficult, if not impossible to find or to construct
an unambiguous moral compass.
Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 569, 572 (2001).
500. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 216.
501. See id. at 305.
502. Id. at 309.
503. David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Win-
ter/Spring 2003, at 463, 471. As Professor Lange explained:
It is wrong to challenge school children with responsibility for copyright.
Wrong for copyright to intrude into private lives. Wrong to measure creativity by
the standards of copyright. Wrong to lay impediments (moral, intellectual, legal)
before exercises of the imagination, whether great or small. Wrong, in short, to rob
us of this vital aspect of our citizenship: the right to think as we please and to speak
as we think.
We must learn to reimagine the public domain. We must learn to ask questions
from within the province of that new status, a status like citizenship, measured by
creativity and the imagination, and invoked by an exercise of either.
Id. at 482-83.
[Vol. 76
P2P AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COPYING
Second, the law on the books is very different from the one that is
actually carried out.504 Like speeding and jaywalking laws, most people
treat copyright law as if it did not exist. That does not mean, however,
that drivers pay no attention to their speed or that pedestrians crossing a
street pay no attention to traffic. The fact that people do not obey exist-
ing law does not mean that they will obey no law whatsoever. Often,
they refuse to obey because they find the law silly or expect a more sen-
sible one.505 In those scenarios, they are likely to substitute the law on
the books with a different norm or misperceive that the norm reflects the
law. As Professor Strahilevitz noted in the file-sharing context:
Although the file-swapping networks encourage unlawful copyright
infringement, the networks by no means cede the moral high ground.
In the parlance of the file-swapping networks, those who infringe
copyrights employ the language of reciprocity. "Freeloaders" are not
those who download copyrighted content without paying for it, but
those who download content without uploading content to other us-
ers.
506
Finally, it may be irresponsible and inexpedient for policymakers to
divert public funds for copyright education in times of budget cuts and
economic stagnation. Even worse, some might consider such efforts in-
appropriate subsidies to the entertainment industry. For example, stu-
dents and critics have voiced their disappointment over the Penn State-
Napster deal for misusing educational fees to subsidize entertainment-
or, worse, "to prop up flagging record company revenue. '50 7
CONCLUSION
Today, P2P networks pose a serious challenge to the entertainment
industry, and copyright battles have become increasingly difficult to
504. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 305; see also Roscoe Pound, Law in Books
and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
505. See Shirky, supra note 319, at 34 (noting that "the civil disobedience against the 55
MPH speed limit did not mean that drivers were committed to having no speed limit whatso-
ever; they simply wanted a higher one").
506. Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 556.
507. Borland, Napster to Give Students Music, supra note 92. As one student noted:
The money I pay could go to much better things such as rebuilding the network or
better lab equipment.... Almost every single student I have talked to is outraged
that their money is going to a program that they don't even want ... (and that) their
money is being sent to the music industry without their consent.
John Borland, Penn State Students Blast Napster Deal, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 6, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5103918.html.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
fight. To remedy the situation, commentators have proposed many dif-
ferent solutions, ranging from abolishing the copyright system to impos-
ing private levies on P2P goods and services. Each of these proposals
has its benefits and limitations, and each of them deals with only part of
the unauthorized copying problem.
The law cannot provide a complete solution. Market forces, techno-
logical architectures, and social norms also play very important roles in
crafting a comprehensive solution to the unauthorized copying problem.
Regardless of which set of proposals-from those discussed in this Arti-
cle or from others yet to be imagined-policymakers ultimately adopt,
this solution must meet the needs of consumers while taking into account
the Internet's structural resistance to control, its immutable characteris-
tics as a network, and the changing social norms in the digital copyright
world.
Reducing copyright piracy is not easy, and the debate on private
copying is likely to continue, expand, and escalate. It is time to start
from first principles and rethink some of the fundamental questions about
our copyright system: Will the current system make sense when consum-
ers can store their entire music collections, or even DVD collections, in
small, cheap, portable playback devices? Should Congress shorten the
duration of the copyright term and switch to a format- or medium-based
system in light of the increasingly short shelf-life of hardware and copy-
righted products? Do entertainment companies have the needed rights to
experiment with or switch to new business models? Should society re-
think the industry structure and transform the role of intermediaries in
light of our ability to distribute copyrighted works online? These ques-
tions have no easy answers, and the debate can only become more in-
triguing.
The P2P file-sharing controversy has existed for years. If one has to
find, in retrospect, a single word to account for it, that word is likely to
be nostalgia. 50 8 The hacker community and cyber libertarians long for
508. Jane Ginsburg used a different word-"greed." Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright
Got a Bad Name for Itself 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 61 (2002). As she explained:
I have a theory about how copyright got a bad name for itself, and I can summarize
it in one word: Greed.
Corporate greed and consumer greed. Copyright owners, generally perceived to
be large, impersonal and unlovable corporations (the human creators and interpret-
ers-authors and performers-albeit often initial copyright owners, tend to vanish
from polemical view), have eyed enhanced prospects for global earnings in an in-
creasingly international copyright market. Accordingly, they have urged and ob-
tained ever more protective legislation, that extends the term of copyright and inter-
feres with the development and dissemination of consumer-friendly copying
technologies.
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the good old days when information was free, the network was open, and
the online marketplace was not commercialized. Similarly, the recording
industry wants to return to those good old days when it was worth more
than $14 billion, growing at an annual rate of more than six percent.
Those days are gone, however. They belonged to the past century,
the past millennium. Turning back the clock is impossible. Even if it
were possible, it might not be a good idea. Instead of looking back, both
sides should start planning for the future, keeping in mind the needs and
interests of authors and artists. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation put
it succinctly in its recent white paper:
The current battles surrounding peer-to-peer file sharing are a losing
proposition for everyone. The record labels continue to face lacklus-
ter sales, while the tens of millions of American file sharers-
American music fans-are made to feel like criminals. Every day the
collateral damage mounts-privacy at risk, innovation stymied, eco-
nomic growth suppressed, and a few unlucky individuals singled out
for legal action by the recording industry. And the litigation cam-
paign against music fans has not put a penny into the pockets of art-
ists. 509
It is time for both sides to work together to develop a constructive,
forward-looking solution. It is also time to rethink the P2P file-sharing
controversy and the future of private copying. Music is part of our cul-
ture and heritage, and it would be sorely missed if it were extinguished.
Greed, of course, runs both ways. Consumers, for their part, have exhibited an
increasing rapacity in acquiring and "sharing" unauthorized copies of music, and
more recently, motion pictures. Copyright owners' attempts to tame technology
notwithstanding, such developments as compression formats, high speed lines, and
peer to peer networks, particularly popular on college campuses, recast Annie Oak-
ley's anthem from "Anything you can do, I can do better," to "Anything you can
steal, I can steal more of." At least some of the general public senses as illegitimate
any law, or more particularly, any enforcement that gets in the way of what people
can do with their own equipment in their own homes (or dorm rooms). Worse, they
would decry this enforcement as a threat to the Constitutional goal of promotion of
the Progress of Science, and thus a threat to the public interest.
Id. at 61-62 (footnote omitted).
509. EFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 1.
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